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Abstract 
Citizen participation has become a focus as a means for increasing democratic legitimacy across a 
range of policy contexts, including marine governance. At national and sub-national scales, civil and 
‘stakeholder’ participation in marine governance has become increasingly common. Benefits from 
participatory processes promised in the literature include the reduction of conflict between sectors, 
industries and/or communities (including the so-called ‘social licence to operate’); social learning and 
community adaptation to changing marine ecosystems, conditions and new marine industries; 
increased social acceptance of decisions about shared use of marine ecosystems; and increased 
democratic legitimacy for decision-makers. In practice, however, empirical research in marine 
governance is pointing to the failure of participatory processes to achieve these aims, resulting in a 
continuation of contested outcomes and citizen disillusionment. Further, there are limited approaches 
to theorisation of participation in marine governance, constraining the ability of practitioners and 
researchers to explain or address these failures. 
In this thesis, I examined participatory norms and practices in marine governance to consider 
institutional limits that contribute to the problem of participatory governance failure, and to extend the 
theoretical underpinnings of marine governance research and practice. My research was designed as 
a mixed-method constructivist examination: an approach that is appropriate to address the complexity 
of discourses, norms and material practices. To shed new light on how we think about participation in 
marine governance, I adapted Hannah Fenichel Pitkin’s seminal theory of democratic participation 
and representation. Pitkin established that ‘participation’ and ‘representation’ are intrinsically linked by 
three essential conditions: authorisation, dissent and exit, and accountability. Using this core element 
of Pitkin’s theory as a ‘lens of participation–representation’, I conducted a detailed analysis of how 
participatory principles and practices are constituted in marine governance, identifying the norms and 
implied political theory underpinning contemporary marine governance discourse. I found that marine 
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governance research and practice is strongly influenced by norms from participatory democracy 
theory – what I refer to as the social-ecological systems (SES) paradigm. I argue that the ecosystem 
framing of the SES paradigm pushes participatory democracy theory into new conceptualisations of 
the polity – as defined by the ecosystem rather than the nation-state – and recasts political processes 
as social interrelations built on social capital. I also found that this reframing of political structures is 
largely unarticulated and incomplete, and as a result creates limitations in the institutional and 
material practices of marine governance. To test this conceptual framing, I turned to empirical 
practices to see if and how the precepts of the SES participation norm and the lens of participation–
representation manifest in practice. Through two case studies I found that participatory initiatives 
lacked democratic legitimacy in the terms established by the conceptual frame (the lens) and that the 
SES discourse, norms and practices were prevalent and implicated in the institutional and legitimacy 
limitations. 
The conceptual frame I developed in this research proved to be relevant and useful for analysing the 
limitations of the two case studies I examined. The quantitative basis of my analysis of marine 
governance discourse means that these case study findings are likely to be relevant to other 
instances of participatory marine governance. On this basis, I suggest the conceptual lens is sound 
and makes a useful contribution to the work of articulating the theoretical underpinnings of the SES 
paradigm. Finally, I suggest this work supports the development of a richer understanding of 
democratic institutional legitimacy and reflective practice in marine governance as we move through 
significant social, political and ecosystem changes. 
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Preface 
This research has been a personal, professional and academic challenge. My commitment to 
democratic principles and processes as the basis of human dignity has grown from lived experience 
as well as a philosophical commitment. My Australian ancestry comprises English free settlers who 
were among the forefront of colonial dispossession of the Wurundjeri people from their Country, 
known today as the city of Melbourne, Victoria, Australia. More immediately, I grew up in a 
professional, well-educated middle-class family that fell into poverty and I started my career in human 
rights activism and addressing homelessness and disadvantage. From these beginnings I learnt first-
hand about the essential role of participation, and social and political agency in every person’s identity 
and human dignity.  
Professionally, my career took an unexpected turn into marine governance based on my community 
development and community engagement experience. I was fortunate to have worked with 
Tasmanian aquaculture industry leaders at a time when they were building a progressive approach to 
industry operations and industry governance. Notwithstanding this, intense public backlash and 
pockets of fierce community resistance to the rapid expansion of the salmon industry and grave 
concerns about negative ecosystem impacts remained. At this time, Tasmanian communities had also 
been racked by public fights over the forestry industry and public outrage and disillusionment with 
both our government and industry governance. Despite an audacious participatory ‘peace deal’, 
forestry represented the failure of democratic governance in the eyes of many at the time. In this 
context, I came across the ‘democratic deficit’: the lack of legitimacy in governance process, and 
community concerns about the excluding effects of participatory processes. This period led me 
directly to this research project and the research concerns. It was time for me to stop and think 
through this problem of seeming participation failure. 
  
 
  16 
  
  
  
  
   
In taking a critical perspective on participation and the social-ecological systems approach, I have at 
times lost hope in the reliability or meaning of democratic participation. One of the gifts this research 
has brought me, and which I would like to offer my readers, is a renewed sense of optimism for 
participatory principles, processes and practices as we confront the challenges of adapting to 
emerging climate conditions. If democracy remains our shared ideal, then ensuring coherence and 
alignment between our intentions and social-ecological institutional governance structures will always 
matter. My research has made this endeavour for me, and I hope for readers and my colleagues, a 
little more manageable, little more imaginable and a little more hopeful.   
  
 
  17 
  
  
  
  
   
Chapter 1. Introduction - 
The problem of participation in marine governance 
Efforts to confront the implications of a rapidly changing environment are challenging and are 
changing the shape of democratic governance. In this context, the development of this thesis has 
been concerned with two large-scale and interconnecting narratives: the spread of integrated, 
ecosystem-based governance for multiple-use marine ecosystems; and changing forms of democratic 
governance, defined as dispersed decision-making processes that draw on a range of actors 
(Sorenson and Torfing 2005a, 2005b, 2018). 
A key point at which these narratives connect concerns citizen participation. Participation is a defining 
feature of a democracy, and the way in which participation is achieved is a core function of 
democratic structures, processes and practices. The way in which participation is achieved in the 
governance of shared marine resources has become a largely settled expectation and practice in 
democratic marine nations such as Australia and Canada. This reflects United Nations directives and 
agreements, science and research and contemporary governance practice (e.g. Jentoft et al 2007; 
Pomeroy and Douvere 2008; UN Environment 2019). 
The emergence of participatory approaches to policy governance resonates strongly with discourses 
of ‘direct democracy’ that link citizen participation in decision making and governance with increased 
political agency and democratic legitimacy (e.g. Dryzek 2006; Pateman 1970). Despite intentions for 
increased democratic legitimacy, the empirical research indicates that citizen participation in marine 
governance is more complex than anticipated and is not delivering the expected benefits (e.g. De 
Santo 2016; Flannery et al 2018; Pieraccini 2015; Santos et al 2018; Treffney and Beilin 2011). This 
is what I call the contemporary problem of participation – that despite more direct citizen participation 
in governance processes, we also see less trust and more disillusionment with democratic 
governance. 
  
 
  18 
  
  
  
  
   
Direct or participatory democracy theory and the ways in which democratic legitimacy can be 
achieved and demonstrated through institutional forms of direct democracy have been subject to 
critique in political theory (e.g. Alonso et al 2011; Bohman 1998; Saward 2010). From within social 
and ethnographic research, Cooke and Kothari (2001) and Li (2007) have done influential work 
critiquing participation practices, the role of agents of power and expertise such as the ‘state’ or 
‘science’ and the potential to undermine rather than support the influence of communities and civil 
society on decision-making. These rich and critical research traditions however, have focused 
primarily on the ‘development’ context and draw minimally on the literature critiquing participatory 
democracy in developed nations.  In marine governance research and practice, the ‘participatory turn’ 
not been fully subject to the critiques of direct democracy by political theorists (Puente-Rodriguez 
2014; De Santo 2016).  A notable exception is Griffin’s (2013) analysis of the European Common 
Fisheries Policy which identified the exclusionary effects of participation practices deployed in 
fisheries reform. In this thesis, I have brought a critique of the assumptions and practices of direct 
democratic theory to bear on the aspirations and practices of participation in marine governance. I 
have done this to enable us to think differently about participation from the way it is currently thought 
about in marine governance, and to generate fresh insights that can strengthen participatory 
institutions and practices. 
Governing coastal and marine social-ecological systems is becoming more complex and increasingly 
significant for human wellbeing. I use the term ‘marine social-ecological systems to signify interlinked 
human and bio-physical systems sensu Berkes et al 2008, and I use the term ‘marine ecosystem’ to 
refer to an ecological subset of marine systems that encompasses the interactions and influencing 
loops among marine plants, animals, the benthos and water column. The United Nations estimates 
that three billion people globally depend on marine ecosystems (UN 2019). In 2015, United Nations 
members elevated the need to balance marine conservation and human uses to one of the United 
Nations Sustainable Development Goals (Goal 14 Life Below Water), pointing to the global 
significance of marine governance (UN 2019). Human uses of marine ecosystems span food 
production, coastal land-based industry and increasing urbanisation, recreation, tourism, waste 
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disposal and marine pollution, extractive marine industries and energy generation (Halpern et al 
2008). Marine ecosystems are also facing increasing future pressures from a number of sources: the 
impacts of climate change on ecosystem resilience driving conservation imperatives (Doney et al 
2012; Hoegh-Guldberg and Bruno 2010); the impacts of population increases on food security and 
marine pollution driving human adaptation imperatives (Barboza et al 2018; Pauly et al 2005; Rice et 
al 2011); and economic drives to develop the ‘blue economy’ driving access rights and multiple-use 
governance imperatives (Pauli 2010; Golden et al 2017; Patil et al 2016). Marine ecosystems are 
complex social and ecological systems and marked by multiple and sometimes seemingly conflicting 
uses (Berkes et al. 2008; Perry et al 2010; Walker et al 2002; UN 2019). Generating legitimate 
effective and democratic governance institutions and practices that can address this complexity is 
increasingly essential to human wellbeing. 
The institutions of mature or consolidated democracies, i.e. the nation-state, are failing to keep up 
with the complexity of social, political, economic and environmental changes underway (Alonso et al 
2011; Runciman 2018; Urbinati 2015). The failures of the nation-state are giving rise to increasingly 
intense demands for citizen participation that cannot be met through existing governance institutions 
(Urbinati 2015; Urbinati and Warren 2008; Wessels 2011). The failures are evidenced as low levels of 
citizen trust and citizen disillusionment in existing nation-state institutions and processes that are 
undermining the legitimacy of democratic nations (Urbinti 2015; Edelman 2018). These failures also 
reflect practical and material tensions for nation-states that have resulted from the emergence of the 
‘network society’ (Castells 2011; Hajer and Wagenaar 2003). Castells (2011) used the term ‘network 
society’ to describe social and cultural changes associated with the spread of information and 
communication technologies and social, cultural and economic globalisation (Castells 2011). 
Subsequently, Hajer and Wagenaar (2003) identified five sociological characteristics of the network 
society that have significance for democratic governance: 
• new ‘spaces’ of politics, i.e. new processes and actors other than those of the classical 
modernist state institutions; 
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• widespread experience of ‘radical uncertainty’, i.e. increased awareness of complex problems 
and issues with no readily identifiable solutions, and awareness of the high likelihood of 
unintended consequences resulting from dispersed action; 
• the rising importance of difference – groups, values, languages and meanings – and the 
impact of difference on the ways of conducting politics (see new ‘spaces’ above); 
• the growing need to negotiate trust and create identity outside the institutions and 
assumptions of the classical modernist state; and, 
• increasing awareness of conditions of interdependence and the sense of imperative to 
develop common paths of problem resolution. 
In this context, governance becomes a dispersed activity across a diverse set of actors, and 
government by the nation-state ceases to be the central agency but rather becomes one of several 
essential actors (Ansell 2000; Rhodes 1996; Rhodes 2007). Citizen participation is central to this 
contemporary network context (Ansell 2000; Griffin 2013). The normative drive to increased citizen 
participation is changing how democratic legitimacy is perceived by citizens and achieved through 
institutional design (Larsson 2019). This contemporary network context is relevant for how the marine 
environment is governed currently and into the future because the marine environment is subject to 
multiple and sometimes conflicting uses, and this challenge of plurality and diversity is set to increase 
into the future (Berkes et al 2008; Perry et al 2010; Walker et al 2002). As such, in this thesis I have 
focused on how the democratic legitimacy of network governance institutions can be examined and 
strengthened in the face of increasing citizen distrust. 
Network governance is conceptualised against the backdrop of the established hierarchical 
institutions of the nation-state (Ansell 2000; Hajer and Wagenaar 2003; Pierre and Peters 2006; 
Rhodes 1996, 2007). Forms of network governance are also characterised by a powerful drive 
towards direct citizen participation in policy processes, and proponents place a high value on the 
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engagement of a diversity of civil society actors as the means to greater democratic legitimacy and 
better policy outcomes (e.g. Fung 2006; Hoppe 2011; Sorensen and Torfing 2005a). The legitimacy of 
network governance in turn is tightly coupled to institutions that facilitate a direct mediation among 
such a diversity of actors (e.g. Ansell and Gash 2008; Sorensen and Torfing 2005a; Fung 2006; Fung 
and Wright 2003). However, efforts to establish direct participatory governance in practice have 
struggled to explain how to ensure the participation of citizens in large diverse societies (Cabannes 
and Lipietz 2018; Howard 2018; Larsson 2019; Weber 2018). Further, recent analysis is pointing to 
exclusionary effects of network governance that are yet to be fully addressed in the normative theory 
or governance practice (Griffin 2013; Larsson 2019; Patterson et al 2017). Such critiques make clear 
that contemporary challenges to the institutions and practices of the nation-state, such as climate 
change and citizen disillusionment, cannot be met by a return to previous forms of representative 
government. Legitimate participatory forms of governance, however, are still in development (e.g. 
Mattila 2018; Radil and Anderson 2018; Larsson 2019; Pittman and Armitage 2019). 
Nation-states and their subsidiary jurisdictions (i.e. commonwealth, state and local government) 
continue to be primary, though constrained, active institutions in the governance of marine 
ecosystems (Cicin-Sain et al 2015; Campbell et al 2016; Stephenson et al 2019). The participation of 
stakeholders, citizens and communities in marine governance has been established in the marine 
literature as essential for negotiating the multiple uses of and diversity of values with respect to the 
marine environment (e.g. Ban et al 2017; Charles 2012; McKinley and Fletcher 2012; Reed 2008; 
Stephenson et al 2019). Promised benefits of participation in marine governance include conflict 
reduction or management; human behaviour change, and adaptation to new marine resources limits, 
access arrangements and new ecosystem conditions; increased compliance with new management 
arrangements; and increased legitimacy of marine governance decision making (e.g. Ban et al 2017; 
Charles 2012; Reed 2008; Soma and Vatn 2014; Young et al 2012). More recent empirical literature 
continues to point to the gap between the practices of participatory marine governance and the 
achievement of desired benefits and continues to indicate that participatory approaches to 
governance are leading to disillusionment in populous mature democracies (e.g. Flannery et al 2019; 
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Karlsson 2019; Santos et al 2018). These problems of disillusionment and lowering levels of trust in 
democratic processes experienced in the marine governance context reflect similar trends more 
broadly across mature democracies (Edelman 2018). 
Calls for greater attention to critical analysis that can progress the governance of social-ecological 
systems are not new (e.g. Boda 2015; Bodin et al 2016; Epstein et al 2015; Leenhardt et al 2015; 
Patterson et al 2017). Within marine governance, however, the work of theorising participation is 
limited (e.g. Boda 2015; De Santo 2016; Orach and Schluter 2016; Puente-Rodriguez 2014), and the 
work of critically analysing the participatory assumptions and practices in marine governance 
continues (e.g. Boda 2015; De Santo 2016; Griffin 2013; Flannery et al 2018; Flannery et al 2019). It 
is in this gap that I have positioned my research as a critical analysis of conceptualisations and 
practices of participatory marine governance. To build on existing work and to extend the theoretical 
underpinnings of marine governance, I have set out to problematise the normative drivers of 
participatory practices and generate fresh insights into the limits of participatory governance and open 
new pathways for improving participatory practices. 
Research questions 
As a research strategy, to ‘problematise’ is to unsettle accepted ‘truths’ associated with a complex 
problem, to examine the political implications, and to think in new ways about the problem (Bacchi 
2012). In my case, the settled, largely accepted ‘truth’ I aimed to problematised is that citizen 
participation in governance will result in greater democratic legitimacy of the process and the 
governance outcomes. To problematise ‘participation’, I set two overarching research questions and 
sub-questions to guide my research: 
(1) What is the dominant conceptualisation of participation (the norm) within the marine 
governance theory and practice? 
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a. How does the dominant conceptualisation of participation (the norm) influence the 
structure and activities of participatory initiatives in the applied context (if at all)? 
(2) What can political theory help explain about the limits of participatory approaches to marine 
governance? 
a. What conceptual lens from political theory can assist in the problematisation of 
‘participation’ in marine governance? 
b. What does application of the conceptual lens explain, if anything, about the dominant 
conceptualisation of participation in the marine governance literature? 
c. What does application of the conceptual lens explain, if anything, about the dominant 
conceptualisation of participation in the applied context? 
I have set out the research design in detail progressively through the thesis: Chapter 2 provides the 
overarching design, methodology and methods, and finer details of specific methods and theoretical 
material are provided in Chapters 4 and 5. 
Research scope and limitations 
The study of democratic states, processes and institutions is a well-established and complex body of 
research with a vast empirical and normative literature. Notwithstanding the vast literature in 
democracy studies, no single agreed definition of ‘democracy’, typologies of democracies or 
democratic processes exists. To deal with this complexity, I focused on mature, populous democratic 
marine nations in this research for two reasons. Firstly, because the normative drive of the research 
concerns is the improvement of democratic process and institutions as a priori a public good and so 
focusing the scope of the research to democratic nations stands to reason. Secondly, large mature 
populous nations with established mature nation-state institutions face specific challenges with 
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participation and disillusionment that differ from those in developing democracies (e.g. Runicman 
2018; Saward 2010; Urbinati 2015; Wessels 2011). 
Understanding the limits and distortions within current practices of participatory marine governance is 
particularly important for democratic marine nations such as Canada and Australia that have also 
made strong commitments to advancing the United Nations commitments to participation and to the 
emerging research and practices of governance (Cicin-Sain et al 2015; Haward and Vince 2008). For 
this reason, I have focused my empirical case studies in these two large, mature democratic marine 
nations. Testing my conceptual research material in comparable nations enabled me to examine the 
normative value of the research outputs without having to account for differing stages of development 
of existing democratic institutions. In focusing on mature populous democratic nations, I did not 
specifically or closely analyse the conceptualisations of participation as they pertain to emerging 
democracies, so-called developing nations with resource-dependent populations, failed states, partly 
democratic contexts or non-democratic contexts. 
From within the vast and longstanding traditions of democratic theory, I have selected Hannah 
Fenichel Pitkin’s 1967 seminal theory of representation as the basis of my problematisation of 
participation. I made this choice for two reasons. Firstly, at its core, Pitkin’s theory is concerned with 
establishing normative criteria for democratic legitimacy and the facilitation of participation in a 
democratic context. This is directly aligned with my research purpose. Secondly, and related, Pitkin’s 
theory preceded the powerful drivers for increased participation and the contemporary work in 
participatory governance. This means that her work in 1967 was not influenced by the contemporary 
thinking and practices of participatory governance. For this reason, I decided that Pitkin’s work was 
well suited to my purpose for problematising ‘participation’; that is, thinking differently about 
participation, but using an established and well-critiqued approach to democratic legitimacy. I discuss 
this further in Chapter 3 (see page 51). 
The empirical focus of my research is institutional design and practice rather than the analysis of 
legislative instruments for marine governance or the regulatory or legislative framing of participation in 
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marine governance. The study of institutions is well established in both political studies (e.g. Lowndes 
et al 2017; Pitkin 1967, Saward 2010) and resource governance (e.g. Ostrom 2011; Poteete et al 
2010). Following Crawford and Ostrom (1995), I defined institutions in this research as ‘enduring 
regularities of human action in situations structured by rules, norms and shared strategies’ (Crawford 
and Ostrom 1995, pg. 582). Institutions defined in this way are the material practices that connect 
people’s aspirations and assumptions with actions through rules and norms. As such, I decided that 
institutional analysis was an appropriate basis for the ‘problematisation’ of the largely settled notion 
and practices of participation in marine governance (Glynos et al 2009). 
Within institutional design, I have specifically focused democratic legitimacy as it is constituted 
through rules, norms and strategies rather than via a power analysis. Following Scharpf (1999, pg. 7), 
and Schmidt (2013) I make the distinction between input legitimacy, throughput legitimacy and output 
legitimacy. Input legitimacy is concerned with the processes and quality of the decision-making 
process and is associated with rules, laws and practices (Scharpf 1999; Schmidt 2013). Output 
legitimacy refers to the perceived efficiency of the result of the applications of these rules and laws 
(Lindgren and Persson 2010; Scharpf 1999; Schmidt 2013). Output legitimacy is an ‘end justifies the 
means’ argument that focuses on the performance of the system or the extent to which the outputs of 
the system are accepted as legitimate within the polity. Scharpf (1999) contrasted output legitimacy 
against input-oriented legitimacy, which takes citizen participation in the process as the measure of 
legitimacy. Common designs include attempts to develop institutional alignment between legislation 
through the representative body (such as a parliament or congress) with an aggregation of citizen 
preferences. More recently, Schmidt (2013) argued that governance processes also play a role in 
democratic legitimacy, creating what she termed ‘throughput’ legitimacy. Throughput legitimacy refers 
to the perceptions of the legitimacy associated with procedural fairness. In particular, Schmidt (2013) 
was concerned with the extent to which the design of institutional processes are held to support and 
facilitate political agency, and to which the conduct of processes reflects people’s expectations for 
and perceptions of democratic fairness. Given my focus on institutional analysis, throughput 
legitimacy is the most relevant aspect for my research concerns and the scope of my analysis. I 
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recognise this limitation in the research as power relations are an important dimension of policy, 
decision-making and governance. In future studies an analysis of how power is created, distributed 
and exercised would be useful for further problematising participation. To ensure my research was 
tightly focused, however, I have maintained a focus on throughput legitimacy and institutional 
analysis. 
Finally, in this research I have concentrated on multiple-use marine governance rather than 
governance of a specific resource such as fisheries, seabed mining or marine energy. Fisheries 
governance has an established body of empirical research but, notwithstanding the introduction of 
ecosystem-based and integrated approaches to fisheries research, it remains primarily single-sector 
focused and concentrates on the participation of resource users. The choice of multiple-use marine 
governance, on the other hand, reflects my assessment of the challenges ahead for the marine 
environment as set out earlier. 
Overview of the thesis 
I have structured this thesis so that it moves from a conceptual analysis of participation as a norm to 
an empirical focus through practical instances of participatory marine governance using two case 
studies and finishing with a synthesis of the conceptual and case study findings. I open the thesis in 
Chapter 2 by describing the design of the research as multiple-methods qualitative research. In 
Chapter 3, I start the process of problematising participation by reviewing how citizen participation is 
conceptualised in democratic theory and establish a conceptual lens from my re-reading of Pitkin’s 
normative criteria for democratic legitimacy and participation. Chapter 4 provides a qualitative content 
analysis of ‘participation’ across a large sample of marine governance empirical literature. In that 
chapter, I identify the components of the norm of participation, which is later used to analyse the two 
case studies. Chapter 5 marks the shift from conceptual to material practices of participatory 
governance in the applied context. In Chapter 5, I have set out the detail of the case study methods 
and materials for my analysis of the applied context. In Chapter 6, I have set out the first of the case 
  
 
  27 
  
  
  
  
   
studies, an examination of the Southwest Bay of Fundy Marine Advisory Committee (MAC), an almost 
decade-long experiment in established participatory integrated governance of a shared and highly 
productive waterway in eastern Canada. In Chapter 7, I present my second case study, the West 
Coast Community-Aquaculture Forum, a five-year participatory community–industry initiative that 
focused on governing the social benefits and shared use of a unique waterway, Macquarie Harbour in 
Australia’s island state, Tasmania. In Chapter 8, the findings from both the content analysis and case 
studies are brought together and synthesised through the conceptual lens generated in Chapter 3. In 
Chapter 9 I close the thesis with a set of conclusions and proposed applications of my findings for 
future research but also for extending participatory practice in marine governance. 
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Chapter 2. Research methodology and design  
Marine governance, institutional design and democratic legitimacy are weighty and complex social 
phenomena, as are the links among them. Qualitative social research is an overarching methodology 
that is effective and appropriate for examination, exploration and interpretation of such complex social 
processes and practices (Bryman 2012; Denzin and Lincoln 2018). It is particularly useful for 
providing explanation and draws on the particularity of social experiences to shed light on complex 
social phenomena (Denzin and Lincoln 2018; Mason 2002; Silverman 2016). The overarching 
purpose of my research was to investigate the limits of participatory marine governance in the 
democratic context by considering institutional design and democratic legitimacy. The research 
methods most appropriate to my research concerns, then, was qualitative social research. 
 In qualitative social research the evaluation of the research reliability and validity relies on a clearly 
explained research design that comprises methodology and methods (Aguinaldo 2004; Golafshani 
2003; Tracy 2010; Yardley 2000). Further, following Denzin and Lincoln (2018) I take a qualitative 
research methodology to also include a description of the researcher’s values and philosophical 
orientation within which the researcher designs the research purpose, objectives, questions and 
methods (see also Creswell, 2007; Vasilachis 2009). In this chapter I lay out my research design 
comprising a positionality statement and empirical methods to assist in the evaluation of the reliability 
and validity of my research. Using a combination of Golafshani (2003), Tracy (2010) and Yardley 
(2000), I have applied the following criteria to address the reliability and validity of my research: 
• Impact and significance: that the research has value for the people involved and the relevant 
academic field; 
• Coherence and rigour: that the research design is coherent, the methods are appropriate to 
the research questions, the conduct of the data collection and analysis methods have been 
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appropriate and met ethical standards, and that the findings flow logically from the data 
collection and analysis; and, 
• Transparency: that the research structure and practice are described clearly enough that 
readers can take into account and assess the decisions and practices that have influenced 
the production of the knowledge through the research. 
Methodology 
In qualitative social research, the researcher is often the research tool (Xu and Storr 2012; Golafshani 
2003). This means that understanding the values and orientation of the researcher and how these 
inform the research design is important for evaluating potential researcher bias and so also evaluating 
the reliability of the research (Bourke 2014; Palaganas et al 2017; Sultana 2007; Tracy 2010). To 
support evaluation of the research, the generation of a positionality statement has become 
established as a critically reflexive practice in qualitative social research (Palaganas et al 2017). A 
positionality statement provides an account of the researcher’s way of seeing the world and links the 
ways of seeing the world to the research design and methods (Aguinaldo 2004; Mason 2004; 
Palaganas et al 2017). This is a slightly different epistemological take on researcher bias from other 
research traditions and is a strength of the interpretative methodology provided the researcher has 
made their position and methods sufficiently transparent (Tracy 2010; Yilmaz 2013). In this section I 
provide a researcher positionality statement comprising my ontology, epistemology and axiology, link 
these together into an epistemological framework for the research and then set out how these inform 
my research methods and the structure of the thesis. 
For the qualitative researcher, there are a number of core epistemological questions that are 
important to identify and explain in order for the quality of the research process and the reliability of 
the findings to be assessed: How can reality be known? What is the relationship between the knower 
and what is known? What assumptions guide the process of knowing and generating findings? Can 
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the process of knowing be replicated by another? (Vasilachis 2009). These epistemological questions 
go to the issues of research coherence and reliability, and so are matters of research design. In this 
section I respond to these questions so that readers can assess the quality, coherence and reliability 
of my research study (Mays and Pope 2000; Tracy 2010). The following statements explain my 
position on the nature of reality, my ontological position, that is the foundation for addressing the 
epistemological questions and articulating my axiological positions (Law 2004; Mason 2002): 
• We, i.e. people, actively make sense of the world within the context of and through our 
relationships, with others and with ideas. 
• We, i.e. people, construct and create meaning, culture, emotion, practices and institutions in 
and through social relationships and these social relationships have material consequences. 
• We, i.e. people, simultaneously influence/create and are influenced by/created through 
the many communicative and material actions that constitute culture, institutions, discourses 
and action. 
• Cultural, political, economic and emotional ‘facts’, realities, truths and objects are 
articulations/instantiations of the meaning given by interacting people through communicative 
and material actions. 
• The meaning given is also shaped by the communicative and material actions and events 
that have gone before/happened in the past and out of interpretation of those past 
meanings. 
• Power is the capacity to influence communicative and material activities and is also 
constituted through the mass of interactions and relationships. This capacity, power, is 
marked significantly by, though not necessarily solely determined by, material effects, e.g. 
physical force or having more money. 
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In sociological terms, I see human experience and reality as a dynamic, co-constructing and mutually 
influencing interaction between structure and agency. These statements reflect what others have 
labelled a subjectivist and constructivist ontological paradigm (Bryman 2012; Denzin and Lincoln 
2018; Silverman 2016; Vasilachis 2009). In summary, I regard ‘reality’ (or how we live and experience 
the world) as co-created and continually created through relationships and associated material 
activities. The implication of this position for the research process is that I regard instances of shared 
meaning-making as it is encapsulated in written records and verbally articulated accounts of thoughts, 
intentions and actions and material activities and practices, as the nature of the social ‘reality’ that I 
wish to investigate – in other words, what people say and what people do. 
What can be known? 
Extending from this ontological position, I suggest that what can be known is my interpretation of what 
people tell each other and themselves. To me, shared meaning-making can be found in written 
records and objects (including minutes, policy documents, media communications), in articulated 
descriptions and accounts of events, and in interpretations of past events. This then is the nature of 
the social ‘reality’ that I wish to investigate. Within much qualitative research, this is generally referred 
to as an ‘interpretivist approach’, which refers to the understanding that meaning is made through 
interpretation (Creswell 2007; Flick 2009). 
What is the relationship between the knower and what is known? 
As an everyday person who is also a researcher, I both contribute to and am influenced by the many 
communicative and material actions that constitute culture, institutions, discourses and action. This 
has consequences for my research practice and how I approach the research process and 
participants. The most significant is that I as researcher cannot be separate from the constitution of 
the topic, nor the generation of the data (Law 2004). Maree as the researcher is actively involved in 
the creation of the topic and the data. This means that I cannot seek to solve the ‘problem’ of 
participation/representation through this research, nor produce objective truth about a situation or the 
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experiences of those involved in the research situation. Rather, my job as researcher becomes one of 
explaining and creating an explanation (Creswell 2007). 
Can the process of knowing be replicated by another? 
I have explained that I regard the process of knowing as being necessarily generated by a person 
informed by their own experiences, values and perspectives. I would also argue that with sufficient 
transparency and description, the process of knowing can be followed, understood and replicated by 
another. The other may not come to the same conclusions but they can replicate and assess the 
soundness of the process of knowing. In research terms, this means that thorough description of the 
methods, the analysis, the decisions on interpreting the materials is essential for the possibility of 
replication by another. This position is also consistent with, and informed by, the interpretivist 
approach (Creswell 2007). 
Table 1 on the following page summarises how these positions link together as an epistemological 
framework for my research and draws the links to my research questions and methods. In the 
following final section of this chapter, I explain how I designed the research based on the links in this 
table, ensuring the research process is coherent with my research paradigm. 
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Table 1: Summary of the flow from my positionality through to the methods for this research project 
Research questions Ontology Epistemology Axiology Research concerns What I take to be data Method 
What are the limits 
to the theory and 
practice of 
participation in 
marine governance? 
 
Subjectivist Interpretivist 
The researcher cannot 
be separated from the 
research process. 
In examining 
instances/events of attempts 
at participatory marine 
governance, new ways of 
understanding an 
established approach might 
be generated. 
Utterances by others, 
either in person or in 
written form 
interpreted by the 
research  
Case study 
involving 
interpretation of 
utterances in 
documents and 
interviews 
What can political 
theory help explain 
about why 
participatory 
initiatives fail? 
Constructivist Constructivist 
The researcher can 
seek to understand, 
and become an actor 
in construction, but 
cannot produce 
objective truth. 
Political theory represents a 
knowledge produced by 
many thinkers and actors 
concerned with how life can 
be constructed and 
understood. 
Applying established 
political theory or 
frameworks may assist in 
interpreting the experiences 
of people involved in 
attempts at participatory 
governance of marine 
social-ecological systems. 
 
Explanations of actions 
and decisions by actors 
as represented in their 
own words, reported 
by people also 
involved, or through 
written documentation 
of actions, rationale 
and decisions 
 
Qualitative content 
analysis and 
inductive 
interpretation of 
written material 
  
 
  34 
  
  
  
  
   
Design of the empirical studies and methods 
To address the research questions (see pg. 22) in alignment with my epistemological position, I set an 
overarching objective for the research to problematise notions and practices of participation to enable 
me to think about a largely settled concept, participation, in new ways. Following Bacchi (2012), to 
problematise participation I brought together an analysis of ways of thinking about participation – the 
conceptual – with material practices in the applied context – what people do in participatory marine 
governance. I did this by conducting three sequential and layered studies as shown in Figure 1 below. 
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Figure 1: Layered design of the research 
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The first problematisation step was to examine democratic theory. The research question for this first 
step was: (2a) What conceptual lens from political theory can assist in the problematisation of 
‘participation’ in marine governance? In this study, set out in Chapter 3, I reviewed the two major 
traditions of democratic theory with a specific focus on how citizen participation is addressed and 
understood. I then generated a conceptual frame from a normative theory. 
For the second step, I moved to an empirically based conceptual level. The first research question I 
set for this second study was (1) What is the dominant conceptualisation of participation in the marine 
governance theory and practice? This study involved parsing and analysing the components of the 
participation norm in marine governance by qualitative content analysis of the academic literature. 
Qualitative content analysis is a structured, replicable method of interpreting textual data using a 
systematic process of coding and is appropriate for examining complex social phenomena (Fereday 
and Muir-Cochrane 2006; Neuendorf 2016; Stemler 2001) and is therefore appropriate for this study. I 
then posed a second research question: (2b) What does application of the conceptual lens explain, if 
anything, about the dominant conceptualisation of participation in the marine governance literature? 
To address this question, I applied the conceptual frame from the first study to conduct a deductive 
analysis of the material generated through the first part of this study. The detailed methods and 
materials for this study are set out in Chapter 4, and specific details are also set out in Appendices 1, 
2, 3 and 4. 
The third step in problematising participation was designed to explore the relevance of the findings 
from both the first and second studies in the applied context; that is, real situations in which people 
have conducted participatory marine governance. I set two research questions for this third step: 
(1a) How does the dominant conceptualisation of participation (the norm) influence the 
structure and activities of participatory initiatives in the applied context (if at all)? 
(2c) What does application of the conceptual lens explain, if anything, about the dominant 
conceptualisation of participation in the applied context? 
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To address these questions, I selected two instances of efforts in participatory marine governance as 
explanatory case studies (Merriam 1998). The specific details of the case study design are set out in 
Chapter 5. The case study approach is a well-established qualitative research method for examining 
social phenomena from the applied context (Mills et al 2017; Yazan 2015, Yin 2017). Following 
Merriam (1998) and Stake (2013), I have used case study as an interpretive method for explaining 
each participatory governance instance with reference to the research concerns. To do this, I set the 
research questions as a theoretical and deductive framework (sensu Merriam 1998) derived from the 
first two research studies described above. To address the research questions, I combined inductive 
and deductive analyses of each initiative (Fereday and Muir-Cochrane 2006). Firstly, I generated the 
material through inductive analysis of the case study documentation and what people said to me 
through semi-structured in-person interviews. I used this material to generate a coherent and rich 
picture of how the initiative operated based on the documentation and people’s reported experiences 
of the initiative. I then deductively analysed the material by applying the conceptual frames 
represented in the research questions. 
In defining the unit of analysis, I focused on the institutional design of each participatory initiative 
(Merriam 1998). The study of institutional design and processes is a well-established empirical 
approach to examining shared political systems (Hall et al 1996; Lowndes et al 2018) and human–
nature interactions (Vogler 2003). The definition of ‘institution’ is the subject of much discussion and 
the term can reflect a range of theoretical perspectives (Peters 2012). Following Crawford and Ostrom 
(1995), for this research I defined ‘institution’ as ‘enduring regularities of human action in situations 
structured by rules, norms and shared strategies’ (Crawford and Ostrom 1995). Each case is set out 
in a separate chapter (Chapters 6 and 7) and the details of the methods and materials can be found in 
Chapter 5. 
The layered and mixed-method design of the research enabled me to combine the conceptual with 
the applied analysis, and pair an examination of the ‘particular’, through the case studies, with the 
‘general’ through the empirically based qualitative content analysis. In Table 2 I have set out how the 
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four characteristics of social research were integrated in my research design to strengthen the 
reliability and relevance of the research findings. 
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Table 2: Integrated research design to problematise ‘participation’ 
  Conceptual Applied 
General  Rethought concepts of political participation 
using political theory and produced a conceptual 
lens in Chapter 3 
 
Parsed the axioms of the participation norm from 
marine governance literature and produced an 
analytical frame for the norm in Chapter 4  
Conducted qualitative content analysis of 
participation norm from across a broad 
sample of marine governance literature in 
Chapter 4 
Particular Examined two case studies using the conceptual 
lens from Chapter 3 and the analytical frame 
from Chapter 4 
Each case study is an in-depth analysis of 
specific instances in different places.  
 
Limitations 
Sample size and generalisability 
The limited samples relevant for qualitative research can be a constraint to generalisability of the 
research findings (Tracy 2010). The extent to which this limitation influences the findings should be 
determined by research purpose; that is, is the purpose to solve a well-structured problem or is the 
research purpose to explain a complex situation (Golafshani 2003; Tracy 2010)? The limitation for 
generalisability has some relevance for my research project as participation in marine governance is a 
widespread practice and the challenges experienced in implementing participatory forms of marine 
governance are geographically widespread (as per my discussion in the Introduction above). My 
research purposes, however, were to identify and examine the elements of the participation norm as 
they operated within the cases, and then examine the theoretical elements which explain the 
influences of the norm. As such I did not seek to extrapolate grounded findings from the case studies 
to marine governance but rather understand the theoretical elements to which the cases speak. To do 
this I conducted three studies which explicitly presented the norm at work: an analysis of the literature 
through the most influencing texts; two case studies from the applied context. This research, then, 
was an exploration through empirical studies rather than a global characterisation of marine 
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governance. As such, this limitation, while important to consider when assessing the findings, does 
not limit the reliability or validity of the findings as explanation. In future studies of the participation 
norm, I suggest a greater sample of case studies would assist in extending the generalisability of the 
findings with respect to the limits created in institutional structures and practices by the influence of 
the participation norm. 
Self-report through semi-structured interviews 
Potential biases associated with self-report data such as I have collected through semi-structured 
interviews is well recognised and includes selective memory and exaggeration (Opdenakker 2006). 
The influence of this bias in my research is not significant because the purpose of my interviews was 
to generate material through which I could explore the presence or absence of the participation norm 
in people’s experiences. That is, my purpose was to understand perceptions and experiences of the 
norm as intention and practice rather than to seek an objective ‘truth’ of ‘what happened’ for which 
self-report bias would be a negative factor. In contrast, for this research people’s report of their 
experiences and memories through interview was useful for exploring how they made sense of their 
material practices and the assumptions they made in doing so. In other words, people’s reports were 
appropriate material for understanding how a norm is formed and influences material practices. This 
means that what in other paradigms might be biases in semi-structured interview were appropriate to 
the research purpose (Mabry 2008). 
Notwithstanding the appropriateness of semi-structured interview data for the research purpose, I 
triangulated the individual self-report data with analysis of the documentation of the case study 
initiative (Mabry 2008).  I did this by using the group-approved meeting minute, the documentation, to 
provide an alternative account of experiences and perceptions of the initiative to balance the semi-
structured interview material. This material represented at-the-time and group-agreed records of 
activities, intentions and decisions. Although the documentation was largely created by the same 
people as were interviewed, this material nevertheless provided perspectives on the initiative that 
differed from the interview material in two ways. Firstly, it was group-agreed rather than individual and 
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so reflected agreed interpretations of perspectives, intentions and concerns and why decisions were 
made, or actions were undertaken, as opposed to individual perspectives. Secondly, the material 
reflected interpretations and perspectives generated at the time of the initiative rather than a reflective 
memory or representation such as is produced through interview. This second source of data on the 
initiative expanded the material that represented each case study initiative and ensured my analysis 
did not solely rely on semi-structured interview data. 
Bias in the case study analysis due to the deductive design 
The layered deductive design set out above brings the findings from the first two studies to bear as 
deductive analysis frames for the case studies, enabling comparative and iterative analysis across the 
whole thesis (sensu constant-comparative approach e.g. Strauss and Corbin 1990). The strengths of 
this design were that firstly it enabled the problematisation of the core concept (participation) and 
secondly that it enabled me to systematically examine the case studies in comparable and replicable 
ways and to compare the data. A potential limitation of the layered design lay in also bringing a 
researcher perspective bias from the conceptual frames to the data (e.g. Hammersley and Gomm 
1997; Stahl 2003): that is, I went to identify a norm and so I found the norm because that is what I 
was looking for. Similarly, I wanted to understand the institutional links between participatory and 
representation and so I found links between the two. I have addressed this potential limitation in three 
ways through my research design. 
Firstly, the purpose of the research was to understand how the two phenomena (1. the link between 
participation and representation and 2. the norm) influenced the applied context. It was not to prove or 
disprove the phenomena through presence or absence, but to understand how (if at all) they 
influenced the case studies (e.g. Lin 1998). As such, rather than the potential for bias, the layered 
design formed the conceptual frame for the research and was described in detail for transparency 
(Tracy 2010) and that the method can be replicated by others for understanding how in other cases 
(e.g. Tracy 2010). 
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Secondly, I combined inductive analysis of the documentation and people’s experiences of the case 
study initiatives with a transparent deductive analysis of the material using the conceptual frames. 
The inductive analysis provided as close as possible presentation of the initiative through the lens of 
people’s own experiences without reference to my research concerns (participation and 
representation). I then transparently and overtly applied a deductive analysis to the material as set out 
in each chapter. I do not suggest that this removed the potential bias in me overtly bringing my 
research concerns to bear on the case study material, but it did ensure a high level of transparency 
and so enables the reader to assess the influence of my research concerns on the case study 
material (Tracy 2010). 
Thirdly, and closely related to the second strategy, I designed the semi-structured interviews to 
provide a wide scope for interviewees to talk with me about any aspect of their marine-related 
interests and concerns, and their experiences and perspectives of the case study initiative (Qu and 
Dumay 2011). The interview protocol is laid out and discussed in Chapter 5 (pg. 125). In short, the 
interview was designed to open with a general discussion about the person, their marine interests and 
concerns, and then broaden out to strengths, achievements, weaknesses and challenges of the 
initiative. People were aware of my broad interests in participation and representation from the 
information and consent material I provided them prior to interview (see Appendix 6). We did not 
discuss these interests directly in the interview unless interviewees themselves raised them and 
wanted to talk about them. This strategy struck a balance between openness about the research 
purpose and concerns and minimal interference on my part as the interviewer, and maximum 
participant control over what they wanted me to understand about their marine ecosystem and their 
experience of the initiative or anything else they felt was relevant for me to understand. 
Interpretivist analysis and replicability 
As established in the opening statement of this chapter, concerns about replicability are commonly 
associated with the interpretivist methodology I have used. I have also established that given the 
epistemological location for the research, as also discussed above, replicability is less the indicator of 
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research quality for qualitative research than transparency and the capacity for the reader to assess 
the influences and the process for the generation of the findings (Tracy 2010). In this chapter, and in 
the methods and materials of Chapter 4 and in Chapter 5, which present the details of the methods 
and materials for the case studies, I have aimed for as much transparency as possible to assist the 
evaluation of my research quality and coherence. 
At the same time, I have been motivated to introduce some degree of replicability of the deductive 
analysis for the research findings to be of practical use and application in other contexts. As such, the 
conceptual frames I have generated in Chapters 3 and 4 can be used to guide others in analysing 
governance practices. The frames function to bound the ‘process of knowing’ as the research 
process, but also provide a replicable hermeneutic device for governance studies. 
Summary: Research quality and reliability 
To conclude this chapter, in Table 3 below I have summarised how I have addressed the criteria set 
out in the opening statement for assessing my research quality and reliability throughout this thesis.  
 
 
 
 
Table 3: References for assessing research quality and reliability  
Criteria Evidence Reference 
Impact and significance 
The research has value both for the people 
involved and within a relevant academic 
field. 
Problem context Introduction pg. 17 
Research purpose Introduction pg. 17 
Research questions Introduction pg. 22 
Case study engagement Chapter 4 pg. 117 
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Interviewee recruitment Chapter 4 pg.122 
Concluding statements Conclusion pg. 174, 208, 241, 
 
Coherence and rigour 
The research design is coherent, the methods 
are appropriate to the research questions, the 
conduct of the data collection and analysis 
methods have been appropriate and met 
ethical standards, and the findings flow 
logically from the data collection and 
analysis. 
 
Research purpose Introduction pg. 17 
Research questions Introduction pg. 22 
Research design Chapter 2 
Methods and materials Chapter 4 pg.75 
Case study methods  Chapter 5 
Synthesis of findings Chapter 8 
 
Transparency 
The research structure and practice are 
described clearly enough that readers can 
take into account and assess the decisions 
and practices that have influenced the 
production of the knowledge through the 
research. 
Research design Chapter 2  
Methods and materials Chapter 4 and Appendices 1, 2, 3, 4 
Methods and materials Chapter 5  
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Chapter 3. 
Thinking about participation 
Citizen disillusionment with participatory approaches to marine governance is what I have described 
as a contemporary problem of political participation (see Introduction, pg. 17). Concern about the 
legitimacy or trustworthiness of participatory approaches is a puzzle, given that the promise of greater 
participation is that of increased political agency and influence on the policy issues at hand (e.g. Reed 
2008). In this thesis, my attention is on how people involved in participatory marine governance 
initiatives deal with the citizen participation as the means to political agency. The research questions 
used to guide this study were: (2) What can political theory help explain about the limits of 
participatory approaches to marine governance?  and (2a) What conceptual lens from political theory 
can assist in the problematisation of ‘participation’ in marine governance? To address these 
questions, I examine the main theories of democratic participation and generate a lens for examining 
the contemporary problem of political participation.  
I propose that political participation and political representation are inextricably linked as a relationship 
that defines political agency and which is conducted through institutional rules and practices. The 
major traditions of democratic theory that underpin governance theory and practice have treated 
representation and participation differently: placing different values on one or the other. In particular, 
and most relevant for this research, is that in participatory democracy theories direct participation is 
privileged, and the function of political representation is largely overlooked. Failure to fully 
acknowledge the function of representative mechanisms in participatory theory and practice 
undermines the capacity of participatory practices to deliver political agency for citizens and so leads 
to a lack of democratic legitimacy. I contend that understanding this disconnect will help identify, and 
perhaps even overcome, citizen disillusionment with participatory processes. Although there are many 
conceptual and practical implications of this assertion, I examine the implications for the design of 
participatory governance institutions. 
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To these ends, in this chapter I introduce three ‘conditions’ for analysing how the political agency of 
citizens is constituted through institutional processes: authorisation, dissent and exit, and 
accountability. I have revisited Hannah Fenichel Pitkin’s 1967 seminal political representation theory, 
The Concept of Representation, to examine these conditions and how they function to safeguard 
citizens’ participation in their polity1. I propose that the three conditions can serve the participatory 
turn in marine governance by introducing overt consideration of the connection between political 
participation and political representation. I propose that the three conditions work together as a 
conceptual lens that can be used to understand how the connection is constituted through institutional 
rules and practices. This understanding in turn provides useful insights into how the legitimacy of 
participatory processes is constructed through institutional rules and practices. Moreover, using the 
conditions together as a lens in this way will enable policy makers, industry actors and civil society 
actors to better assess of the limits participatory processes and introduce fruitful ways to think about 
institutional responses for extending participation in marine governance. 
Legitimacy is a complex topic with a long genealogy and is served by a broad literature. I do not 
presume to address this wide field, rather, as discussed in the Introduction (page 26), I am concerned 
here with Schmidt’s concept of throughput legitimacy that connects theory with practice via 
institutional design and people’s experiences of institutional processes and practices. Throughput 
legitimacy is directly relevant to my research concerns because my purpose in this thesis is to 
examine how participation is constituted through institutional norms and practices.  
Political agency is a central concept at the heart of democratisation studies and in particular 
democratic legitimacy (Warren 2017). Following Marchetti (2013), I define political agency in 
minimalist terms as the opportunity for and capability of each citizen to experience their political right 
as a power to participate in the decision-making of a polity. This definition allows analysis of 
                                                     
1 The term ‘polity’ is used to describe an organised community when considered as a political entity, regardless 
of the structure, values or orientation – Cambridge English Dictionary 
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institutional forms of contemporary networked contexts in which political agency takes effect. Political 
agency is participation in the polity and is the spread of power across the polity; that is, to each 
citizen. This means the ‘promise’ of participation to citizens is that of political agency and the 
experience of their power (e.g. Bishop and Davis 2002; Head 2007; Reed 2008). Participation in 
these terms is the defining principle of ‘democracy’ and is what distinguishes democracy from other 
political arrangements (Warren 2017). These are not only conceptual or theoretical concerns: at stake 
are the power to control resources and the legitimacy of decision-making. This means that a central 
design challenge in democracies and for political theorists is how to facilitate citizen participation (e.g. 
Rehfeld 2005). The questions of who, how and when citizens should and can be involved, however, 
are not only institutional or procedural questions of participation but are also questions of political 
representation (Bishop and Davis 2002; Schweber 2016). When thinking about the practice of 
participation in the democratic context, it is also necessary to think conceptually about participation, 
and that means drawing on political theory. Political representation theory is concerned with who, how 
and when citizens can and should participate. This means that it is likely to hold promise for 
explaining institutional factors impacting on the institutional legitimacy of efforts at facilitating 
participation marine governance. 
Citizen participation in the polity is facilitated through forms of political representation (Schweber 
2016). The processes of political representation are what links the articulation and creation of citizen 
perspectives, values and interests with the power to allocate resources (Pitkin 1967; Brito Vieira and 
Runciman 2013; Saward 2010). Political representation processes are also necessarily institutional 
processes, systemised relationships, rules and behaviours (Brito Vieira and Runciman 2013; Ostrom 
2009; Pitkin 1967; Rehfeld 2005). This is the principle of political structure and institutional design. A 
significant body of political representation theory has been developed from this principle to examine 
and explain how political representation facilitates political participation. Major theorists in democracy 
studies have all been concerned with political representation and citizen participation: Hobbes (e.g. 
Runicman 2009; Pitkin 1067) and Edmund Burke (e.g. Eulau et al 1959; Pitkin 1967) for example, and 
more recently Mansbridge (2003; 2011; 2018), Rehfeld (2017), Warren (2018), Urbinati (2017) and 
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Runciman (2007 see also Brito Vieira and Runciman 2013). The central challenge of political 
representation remains how to convert the plurality and diversity across large, populous polities into 
the practical exercise of power, while maintaining legitimate political participation of each citizen (Brito 
Vieira and Runciman 2013; Disch 2012; Pitkin 1967; Saward 2010; Schweber 2016). Political 
representation theory, then, is fundamental to analysing legitimacy as it is constituted through 
governance practices in complex societies. In this chapter I proceed as follows.  
Firstly, I examine Pitkin’s seminal 1967 theory of political representation (The Concept of 
Representation). Pitkin’s theory sets out the inextricable link between political representation and 
political participation, the connection that democracy theory and practice seeks to institutionalise in 
populous, plural societies2. Secondly, the two major traditions of political representation are 
examined: representative democracy, and its counter, participatory democracy. I acknowledge that 
recent political theorists (e.g. see Saward 2010; Brito Vieira 2017a) have sought to move beyond this 
dichotomy and offer the observation that this work remains primarily within in the participatory-
deliberative framework (Brito Vieira 2017a). For this thesis I have taken the strength of these 
traditions and the arguments between ‘representation’ and ‘participation’ to be salient for 
understanding norms in the applied context. I demonstrate that neither tradition adequately addresses 
the connection between participation and representation. I do not offer an exhaustive review of each 
theory, as this would not be directly relevant to the study purpose. Rather, I examine each through the 
lens of Pitkin’s connection between participation and representation. In both cases, I examine the 
conceptual and practical resolutions to facilitating participation in the polity. I establish that in neither 
case is the link between participation and representation adequately addressed; instead, either 
participation or representation is privileged. This means that neither tradition assists in addressing the 
                                                     
2 I do not address the vast and complex body of culture theory and philosophy dealing with representation, for 
example in the manner of Bruno Latour, in order to maintain a productive scope to this research. 
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contemporary challenge of political representation and participation in the network society, or, in turn, 
for social-ecological systems.  
Thirdly, I return to Pitkin and examine the core concepts she established for analysing participation 
and representation as core to understanding democratic legitimacy. I chose Piktin’s text as it remains 
central to developments within contemporary political representation theory (Brito Vieira 2017b). Key 
political representation theorists argue that remains relevant to contemporary theorisation and 
empirical studies as her account retains both analytic and critical resources for addressing 
contemporary problems of political representation (Brito Vieira 2017a; 2017b; Disch 2011).  More 
specifically for this study, Pitkin’s principles with respect to the relationship between participation and 
representation were established prior to the development of the ‘participatory turn’ of the 1970s and a 
second iteration of this, the ‘deliberative turn’ of the 1980s (see Dowding et al 2004). So, for example, 
Pitkin (1967) carefully analyses ‘representation’ and accepts that representation is not necessarily 
democratic and in doing so, I suggest her account sets up ways of thinking about how democratic 
legitimacy might be evaluated free from a normative drive to ‘prove’ deliberative or participatory 
modes or forms of political agency. Furthermore, the link Pitkin made with the function of institutions 
as integral to the representative process (e.g. see 1967, pp. 238-240) provided a stable foundation for 
my empirical scope on institutional forms of participation in governance processes.  
Subsequent to Pitkin approaches to theorising participation and representation remain normatively 
within the deliberative-participatory frame (Brito Vieira 2017a). In her system’s approach for example, 
Mansbridge (e.g. 2003; 2011) focuses on reconciling the theory of deliberative democracy, pluralism 
and political representation. Similarly, Dryzek’s (e.g. Dryzek and Niemeyer 2010) notion of discursive 
representation is largely normatively aligned with establishing the bona fide of his conceptualisation of 
deliberative democracy. This means that, unlike Pitkin’s account, these approaches did not provide 
adequate critical resources for problematising concepts related to participation and political agency as 
per the purpose of my study. The constructivist account of representation, such as that argued by 
Disch (e.g. 2011) and Saward (e.g. 2010; 2014), provides a possible alternative account of 
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representation for this study. As will be seen later in this chapter, I do draw on Saward’s account in 
partnership with Pitkin’s principles, to generate the conceptual lens at the core of this thesis.  
There are a number of possible limitations to using key principles from Pitkin as the basis for this 
research. Firstly, Pitkin has been criticised for failing to incorporate the constitutive or performative 
elements of representation into her account of specifically political representation (Brito Vieira 2017b). 
Later theorists such as Latour (e.g. 2005) and Baudrillard (2004) and Ankersmit (2002) drew on the 
cultural and aesthetic dimensions of representation to consider alternative ontologies of power and 
representation from Pitkin’s. Such theories drew out the political nature of cultural, aesthetic and 
performative representation which, I suggest, were not accessible to the historical moment in which 
Pitkin was writing.  Secondly, and closely related, Pitkin’s did not account for power in contemporary 
institutional (e.g. see Dowding 2006) post-Marxist (see Gill and Law 1989 or Haugaard 2006) post-
structuralist terms (e.g. see Lynch 2014). I acknowledge these as limitations to the approach I have 
taken. Notwithstanding these limitations, I suggest that returning to Pitkin in this way provided 
analytical resources to reconceptualise participation and representation that has relevance for the 
network context, that is, as a way of explicating and examining the conditions for democratic 
legitimacy across a range of governance forms but in a way that avoids the risk of normative bias 
from the alternative accounts identified above. In summary, I have used Pitkin’s principles as an 
empirical heuristic to ‘problematise’ participation.  
Finally, to close the chapter, I explain how the emerging constructivist approach to political 
representation extends how we think of political agency in the contemporary networked context, and 
outside the formal electoral institutional frame of existing theory and practice. 
Participation and representation: inextricably linked 
In her 1967 text The Concept of Representation Pitkin established that representation is a necessary 
and unavoidable set of social and institutional processes for facilitating political participation. This 
work has become a seminal theory of political representation for the contemporary era (Brito Vieira 
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and Runciman 2013; Brito Vieira 2017a). In this text, Pitkin grappled with the paradoxical 
characteristics of representation and systematically examined the elements of what representation 
‘is’, how it operates. She also theorised an intrinsic connection between political participation and 
political representation as the basis of democratic process (e.g. Pitkin 1967, pg. 9, 209) and the 
ubiquitous characteristic of representation as the basis of a polity (see also e.g. Saward 2010; 
Urbinati 2006; Urbinati and Warren 2008; Young 2004). The paradox of presence and absence is 
what explains the connection between participation and representation which she described as 
follows: (1967, pg. 153): 
Being represented means being made present in some sense, while not really being 
present literally or fully in fact. 
In examining this link Pitkin took a critical view of the established theories of political representation 
with respect to democratic legitimacy. While not addressing democratic legitimacy directly in 
contemporary terms, Pitkin focused on “true representation” and “proper relations” as defining 
legitimacy (e.g. 1967, pp. 8, 12,60, 112) and established that this is always at stake because of the 
exchange of rights at the heart of the intrinsic link between the two (e.g. 1967, pp. 2, 9-10, 139-142, 
209, 240). Furthermore, she established that political representation is not only a conceptual concern 
but also inescapably an institutional concern (e.g. Pitkin 1967, pg. 240 see also Saward 2010, 
pg.164). Contemporary theorists, including Pitkin herself, have maintained a dialogue with her 
seminal theory, in particular focusing in greater detail on explaining how specifically political 
representation works and what this means for institutional design and operations (Mansbridge 2011; 
Pitkin 2004; Rehfeld 2011; Schweber 2016; Saward 2010). Pitkin’s foundational thesis was first 
published in 1967 and prior to the ‘participatory turn’ of the 1970s (Saurugger 2010; Dowding et al 
2004). This means that Pitkin’s thesis was not influenced by contemporary assumptions and practices 
of participation in governance. For this reason, I decided to use Pitkin’s theory as a foundation for 
problematising and rethinking current conceptualisations of participation. 
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The tight paradoxical bond between participation and representation is axiomatic for thinking about 
the legitimacy of democratic institutions: representing is the process of making virtually present 
someone, or a group, who (that) is at the same time actually absent or non-existent until the moment 
of representation for the purpose of facilitating participation (Alonso et al 2011; Brito Vieira and 
Runciman 2013, Pitkin 1967; Saward 2010). In the act of representing, a representative 
simultaneously creates and ‘becomes’ the represented person or group – they are required to speak, 
think and act as; if they are in fact the represented person or group – while at the same time clearly 
not actually being the represented person or group. Paradoxically, the representative is engaged 
because they are not the represented person or group because they are required to draw on their 
own capabilities to extend the capability of the person or group being represented (e.g. Pitkin, pg. 
135-139; Brito Vieira and Runciman 2013, pg. 52). These capabilities vary and might include for 
example expertise, experience, judgement, communicative skills or simply available time. It is through 
the act of representing, providing the capability, that the participation of the represented person or 
group is enabled (Brito Vieira and Runciman 2013; Pitkin 1967; Saward 2013). The purpose of this 
provision of additional capability is to facilitate the participation of the ‘represented’ in a significant 
arena for which they are, presumably, otherwise unable to participate. The forms, structures and 
institutional arrangements that facilitate representation in the political arena must account for this 
complex link between representing and participating if they are to be regarded as legitimate (e.g. 
Pitkin 1967; Saward 2010; Brito Vieira and Runciman 2013). 
The paradox of representing and participating is also a relationship of power. Power is created, 
performed and transferred between the ‘represented’ and the ‘representative’ through the 
absence/presence paradox (Pitkin 1967; Baudrillard 2004; Saward 2010). Baudrillard, in Simulacra 
and Simulations (2004), argued that the paradox gives rise to a dangerous pretence – that the 
representative is somehow actually equivalent to the ‘represented’. He further argued that this fiction 
has the potential to also excuse a range of additional pretences and so negates any possibility of the 
‘reality’ or a truth of ‘represented’ (2004, pg. 387). In other words, inherent in the paradox is the risk 
that the person or group to be represented simply disappears once the representative commences 
  
 
  53 
  
  
  
  
   
representing (see also Saward, 2010, pg. 152). Baudrillard’s insight alerts us to this as a moral hazard 
inherent in the representative relationship. It is a moral hazard because without appropriate and 
agreed safeguards, there is little or no assurance that the representative will use the others’ power 
and agency in the others’ best interests rather than in the representative’s own interests (e.g. 
Gailmard 2014). In the specifically political sense, the power at stake is the individual’s political 
agency; that is, the democratic right (and responsibility) of each person to participate in the 
governance of the polity in which they live. Such power is inalienable and indeed partly constitutive of 
an individual’s status as a human, as expressed in the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights3. 
The represented takes a risk on the representative relationship and ‘lends’ or transfers an element of 
their inalienable right and power to the representative in order to participate in the agreed arena. In 
doing so, the represented becomes vulnerable to the representative exercising that power 
inappropriately, corruptly or coercively, e.g. in their own rather than the represented party’s interests. 
In seeking to address how power can be exercised responsibly, Pitkin conceptualised the 
representative relationship as either ‘delegate’ or ‘trustee’ (Alonso et al 2011; Brito Vieira and 
Runciman 2013, Pitkin 1967, Saward 2010). In the delegate form, the relationship is primarily 
transactional and the representative steps in directly for the person or group being represented. The 
terms and purpose are made clear and the relationship between the two is tightly controlled, often 
through a contract. The lawyer acting on the client’s instructions, for example, is acting in the delegate 
mode. In contrast, the ‘trustee’ representative is allocated a degree of independence from the initial 
instructions, preferences or interests of the person or group. The independence within the trustee 
mode also frees the representative from the direct and specific accountability for the initial terms of 
the relationship, in contrast to the delegate mode. Later scholars developed a typology of ‘modes’ 
available to the representative (see Brito Vieira and Runciman 2013; Saward 2013) but I suggest that 
                                                     
3 Preamble, opening statement and Article 21, http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/ 
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these are mostly nuances because they do not proffer distinctly different modes of power 
relationships but rather detail elements of these primary two functions (see Saward 2010, pg. 99). 
The primary difference between the trustee and delegate is the degree of independence from the 
initial instructions, wishes or interests of those to be represented. It works like this. Firstly, both those-
to-be-represented and the trustee accept the independence inherent in the paradox of the 
representative relationship. This acceptance then enables a transaction of power between those-to-
be-represented and the trustee-representative; the transaction then enables the political agency of 
those-to-be-represented by proxy through the trustee. Pitkin argued that the trustee-representative 
cannot always know how those-to-be-represented would have acted, and so the trustee must 
necessarily interpret on behalf of the represented (1967, pg.127-128). The trustee should, however, 
proceed with the intention of acting as if they were those-to-be-represented, and place their interests 
above over their own personal interests (e.g. Pitkin 1967, pg. 209). Pitkin argued that the reason that 
those-to-be-represented might choose to transfer their agency and power is to access some kind of 
capability they may not have but could be reasonably expected have (e.g. Pitkin 1967, pg.140; Brito 
Vieira and Runciman 2013, pg. 53). The trustee might, for instance, have access to information, 
expertise, resources or perspectives that will inform how they assess the best interests of the 
represented. This is not at all a simple relationship. It follows then, that in a democratic context, the 
agency of those-to-be-represented must be safeguarded because the trustee has the potential to 
misuse the other’s power or not act in the best interest of those-to-be-represented. 
Representing the best interests of groups is even more complex and yet is the core function of 
political representation in a large-scale populous state.  Political representation is a matter of the 
participation of groups in the policy and political processes of ‘who gets what, when, and how’ 
(Lasswell 1936). Groups are complex as they comprise continual and always uncertain processes of 
group formation of reformation of members and identities. Formalised groups, and at times non-
formalised groups, may articulate a group identity, group interest or preference, and even seek to act 
as a unified body on this basis (Brito Vieira and Runciman 2013; Pitkin 1967; Saward 2010). In a 
democratic context, however, it is not always the case that the group identity is an exact reflection of 
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the values, preferences and interests of each member (Young 2010; Disch 2012; Saward 2010). Brito 
Vieira and Runciman (2013) summarise the challenges groups present for political representation as 
follows:  
• how to aggregate a potentially endless multiplicity of perspectives, views, feelings, interests 
and concerns of a group but also of the individuals that comprise the group into a coherent 
‘program’; 
• understanding when and how such a program shifts and changes; and 
• managing the partial representation and risks of marginalisation that can and do result from 
slippage between the group and individual identities. 
How the political processes, forms and institutional arrangements are structured to deal with this 
complexity, i.e. the institutional design, is essential for ensuring democratic legitimacy. 
Representation, Saward (2010, pg. 152) argues, is not a tangible state or status of legitimacy won 
and subsequently maintained by a given representative and bestowed by a given, pre-existing 
political body – those-to-be-represented. Rather, political representation is a multi-directional process 
of noticing, articulating and testing concerns, developing a narrative of concerns into a policy position, 
and making claims and contesting others’ claims to represent those concerns or interests (Saward 
2010). Saward (2010, pg. 46) describes representation as enacted through dynamic relationships 
among three actors: the ‘represented’, the ‘representative’ and the ‘audience’. The representative is 
the actor (individual or group) seeking to exercise power on behalf of interest, value or preference. 
The represented is the actor (individual or group) identifying with an interest, value or preference 
articulated by the representative. The audience are those actors that witness a claim to representation 
and assess the plausibility, legitimacy and authenticity of the claim (e.g. Saward 2010, pg. 151. The 
audience is also a multi-faceted cohort for Saward because it includes a diversity of people potentially 
to be represented (e.g. 2010, pg.145). Understanding representation and participation as a co-
creative, relational process is useful for making sense of the ‘problems’ of groups (as discussed 
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above). It explains the dynamics of individuals deciding, prioritising and challenging group allegiances 
and political preferences. In drawing attention to the relationship dynamics of Saward’s performative 
approach to political representation has drawn greater attention to the dynamics of the relationship of 
representation and participation that help make sense of the problem of groups, legitimacy, political 
representation and participation (e.g. 2010, pg. 151-160). 
Understanding how throughput legitimacy can be structured and demonstrated becomes an 
institutional problem of organising this relational complexity and intrinsic link between participation 
and representation. With this in mind, in the following section I examine how the two major traditions 
of democracy theory have addressed throughput legitimacy and the participation–representation 
connection to consider the relevance for institutional legitimacy in the contemporary network context. 
Representative democracy theory: uneasy resolutions 
for participation 
Political representation theory has a long and close relationship with the development of the 
institutions, relationships and narratives of the representative democratic nation-state (Brito Vieira and 
Runciman 2013). Representative democracy theory and practice have remained the dominant 
approaches to delivering citizen participation via representation institutions and the trustee mode 
discussed above. So dominant in fact, that the very notion of democratic agency has become 
identified with the institutions of representative democratic nation-states, such as elections, 
parliaments or congress and the bureaucracy (Brito Vieira and Runciman 2013). Political 
representation through the institutions of the nation-state via versions of the trustee mode has 
become the primary means of addressing the problem of the participation of large numbers of people 
with a range of views, values and interests. It is also the primary means for claiming democratic 
legitimacy. Much of the scholarship has focused on the relationships between the citizen as a voter, 
the representatives and the institutional rules that govern the representative (e.g. Bohman 1998; 
Przeworski, Stokes and Manin 1999; Runciman 2007; Mansbridge 201). This deep-seated alignment 
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between the notion of political agency and the representative nation-state is important. This is 
because the still-powerful entrenched electoral forms of representation that characterise 
contemporary democracies are the backdrop against which participatory governance concepts and 
practices have developed (e.g. Ansell 2000; Bishop and Davis 2002; Dryzek 2006). 
In populous democratic societies, the citizen experiences political agency via the representative 
relationship with formally elected leaders (Brito Vieira and Runciman 2013; Pitkin 1967. The electoral 
process is not direct: it is mediated through political party processes and parliamentary processes. 
The task of the representative comprises a number of steps: to create and express the preferences 
and interests of citizens who vote for them; to synthesise the multiple and plural preferences and 
interests of the citizens that comprise the constituency that voted for them; to further aggregate these 
across constituencies through political party processes for form a policy platform; and then to govern 
over and above even the political platform through parliamentary processes in the service of the 
greater good or the ‘public interest’ (Alonso et al 2011; Brito Vieira and Runciman 2013; Hall et al 
2013; Urbinati 2006; Pitkin 1967). Nor is the process even this straightforward, as interpretations by 
bureaucrats, contributions by scientists, donations to political parties by specific interest groups, 
lobbying by representatives of organised interests and sometime adjudication through the courts all 
further mediate the initial relationship between citizen and representative (e.g. Bishop and Davis 
2002; Sabatier and Weible 2007; Weible 2006; Hoppe 2011). These are processes of negotiation and 
deal-making through which representatives convert the many preferences and interests, presented by 
many different representatives, into manageable and actionable platforms for protecting the political 
community and determining who gets what, when, how and why (Alonso et al 2011; Pitkin 1967). 
The representative system works through a long and complex chain of interpretations from citizen to 
representative. Citizen perceptions of performance, or output legitimacy, ride on the extent to which 
the allocation of resources state’s allocation of public resources reflects the overall majority of the 
diversity of aggregated preferences and symbolised by the seats in the parliament. A conflictual form 
of politics occurs at each link of this long chain of the representative-participant relationship. The 
contest of ideas through party policy platforms; the jostling of interests and rights; electoral 
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competition for seats; trades in influence: all are characteristic of the representative form of politics. 
The foundation of this chain, however, is the contract between the citizen and their representative for 
the representative to aggregate and exercise the power and right of the citizen to participate in the 
polity. It is the trustee mode of representation, discussed above, that justifies the long distance 
between the citizen and the representative as democratically legitimate. It is therefore also the trustee 
representative mechanism that makes it possible to convert individual and group political participation 
into political agency in a populous and diverse polity. The strength of the representative system, the 
long chain, is that for the citizen the checks and balances are clear: the ballot box and the ‘court of 
public opinion’ through which citizens provide guides for their representatives (Brito-Vieira and 
Runciman 2013). As I detail later in this chapter, the ballot box is a means of authorisation and 
accountability by which mandates to undertake implement platforms are held to be legitimated. 
Ultimately citizens are assured of the chance to express their judgement on the representative 
relationship through the ballot box. It is a process of authorisation and accountability that is 
understood, predictable and directly influences the contract with the trustee representative. 
The distance between the citizen and the trustee representative created by the long chain of 
representative political processes results in a legitimacy gap, similar to what is often termed the 
‘democratic deficit’4 (Vesnic-Alujevic and Nacarino 2012; Warren 2009). Debate continues about the 
degree of independence that is justifiably exercised by the representative through the long chain of 
representations and how to evaluate the gap between voter preferences and law-making (Mansbridge 
2011; Saward 2010; Warren 2009). This legitimacy gap calls into question the degree to which the 
trustee mode of representation can and does facilitate citizen participation. The legitimacy gap also 
points to the significance of throughput legitimacy: that is the role of fair and just process in facilitating 
citizen participation in the polity. While the trustee mode makes possible representative democracy, 
                                                     
4 The term ‘democratic deficit’ was coined in 1977 to refer to the widening gap between European citizens and 
the institutions of the European Union (Vesnic-Alujevic and Nacarino 2012) and has become a catch-cry for 
explaining citizen disaffection with the established forms of representation. 
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analysis of the legitimacy gap reveals three problems with the representative democratic form that 
point to a failure to deliver democratic participation through its representative mechanisms: 
authoritarian fiction, partial representation and exclusion and elitism. 
An authoritarian fiction lies at the heart of representative institutions that is taken to an extreme by the 
long chain of representation. Pitkin’s thinking suggested this fiction invalidates the claims of delivering 
political agency and participation through representative mechanisms without strong normative criteria 
for democratic institutions in place (e.g. 1967, pg. 219). In representative democracy, the state and 
the elected so-called representatives in principles can exert an absolute control of definition of the 
polity and of membership of the polity (e.g. Pitkin 1967, pp. 84 - 88). And that this is the case even if 
the citizens wish for different forms of participation or political structure. This is the potentially coercive 
or authoritarian fiction at the heart of the representative nation-state. Secondly, and implicit in the first, 
a fundamental conflict of interest exists in which representatives adjudicate on legitimacy of their 
positions through the instruments of the nation-state. The representatives use the instruments of the 
nation-state to construct the legitimacy of the nation-state and the representative relationship. The 
coercive fiction means that proponents of the representative nation-state struggle to sustain the claim 
of facilitating political participation of the citizenry, because the citizenry is not free to determine the 
terms of their own representation (e.g. Pitkin 1967, pp. 84 - 88). Hobbes’ solution to the fiction was 
the ‘social contract’ that underwrites the legitimacy of the nation-state (Hampton 1988). As indicated 
in my introduction, however, increasing disaffection with the functions of the representative nation-
state suggests that citizens are attempting to renegotiate the terms of such a social contract5 and that 
they are demanding alternative forms of input and throughput legitimacy (e.g. Wagenaar and Hajek 
2003; Urbinati 2017 and Warren 2018).  
                                                     
5 I suggest that analysis of discourses of ‘social licence’ across democracies may also provide insights into a 
possible ‘renegotiation’ of the social contract fiction of current democratic forms, that is also forcing change in the 
existing bureaucratic structure of the nation-state, and key components including the role of science in policy 
processes – a further research direction.  
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The fiction of representation is taken to its extreme within the long chain of representation and 
representative politics in an attempt to deal with the complexity of groups and political agency. 
Rehfeld (2011) drew attention to the problem of partial representation of groups in this context. 
Specifically, Rehfeld voiced concerns with the ways in which citizens and groups are forced to 
prioritise a particular value, interest or preference over others they may hold through the electoral act 
of casting a single vote (Rehfeld 2011). Similarly, Young drew attention to the processes of exclusion 
along this chain and the lack of accountability for why particular exclusions are made by 
representatives (Young 2000; 2004). Yet citizens hold a range of values and preferences, and even 
these may change as new information becomes available. Further, once the vote is cast – an act of 
both authorisation and accountability (Mansbridge 2011) – even this partial representation is distorted 
through the long chain. Under these circumstances, the agency of each citizen is significantly 
reduced, in some cases excluded, and then overtaken and subsumed by the agency of the 
representative and the representative institutional processes. The electoral process does not give the 
citizen opportunity to direct participation–representation agreement nor specify how far they are 
prepared for it to be stretched along the long representative chain and when the stretch becomes a 
‘murderous capacity’ (Baudrillard 2004). The growing disaffection with existing representative forms 
discussed in my introduction indicates that in the contemporary context political participation 
facilitated through these established representative forms and the trustee mode is no longer 
legitimate. 
The tension between participation and representation, compounded by long chain of representations 
leads to political elites at one end and citizens at the other. By necessity, in converting the agency of 
many citizens into manageable actionable structures and processes, power is pooled into the hands 
of the few trustee representatives that govern on behalf of the citizenry. This pooling of power creates 
political elites. The unifying imperatives of mediating bodies such as political parties, unions, and 
lobby and advocacy groups produces cohorts of representative elites along the chain from citizen to 
political decision-maker. This happens as a result of the active aggregation of interests, values and 
preferences by mediating bodies required to prosecute the representative politics between and at the 
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time of elections. The purpose of all this representative aggregating, simplifying and mediating is to 
convert a plurality into a governable unity. The argument that the elitism of a professional ‘political 
class’ is a practical function required for a populous nation-state sits, then, in tension with the 
fundamental democratic principle of political agency for each citizen. This is not a new argument: it 
can be seen, for example, in Dahl’s notion of polyarchy (1978). I contend, nevertheless, that the long 
chain of representation between the political elite and the citizen largely severs the citizen’s agency 
and once again calls into question the extent to which the representative mechanisms can facilitate 
democratically legitimate political participation in all contexts. 
In this section, I have examined the major tradition of democracy theory and practice and presented 
an argument that the representative mechanism developed to facilitate the citizen’s participation is 
marked by an inherent risk and legitimacy gap. The legitimacy gap of the representative nation-state 
form of democracy is both conceptual and empirical. The essential connection between participation 
and representation, as understood by Pitkin, has been overlooked in the efforts to address large-scale 
participation, and has resulted in anti-democratic structures and processes. Pitkin argued that these 
anti-democratic tensions – conceptual and empirical – mean that the nation-state’s representative 
institutions remain ‘sophisticated but uneasy institutional resolutions’ to the challenge of facilitating 
political participation through representative mechanisms (e.g. 1967, pg. 2019). Political participation 
is implicit and stretched thinly along the long chain of representation. 
Participatory democracy: technical solutions using 
representation 
Participatory democracy theory has developed in response to the legitimacy gap in representative 
democracy theory and practice but also faced conceptual and practical gaps with respect to 
legitimacy. Participatory democratic theories, including the predominant deliberative democracy 
approach (see Dowding et al 2004) privilege direct citizen participation in political and policy 
processes over participation via the long chain of representation (Bohman1998; Dryzek 2006; 
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Pateman 1970). Proponents of participatory democracy share the conceptual concerns discussed 
above but go further and argue that rather than an expression of democracy, representative forms 
undermine the essential tenets of participation and agency because of the coercive tendency within 
the representative relationship (e.g. Bohman 1998; Hendriks 2009; Hilmer 2010; Pateman 1970; Zittel 
2006). The participatory approach to political agency looks to forms of direct involvement to facilitate 
citizen participation as an alternative to representative forms. Commonly also, and inspired by 
Habermas’ theory of communicative rationality (e.g. see Bachtiger et al 2010), participatory theories 
argue for some form of deliberation among citizens as the central mechanism of participation (e.g. 
Dahlberg 2005; Innes and Booher 2016). This means direct citizen participation in policy debates and 
knowledge generation is an alternative to the long chains of representation that produce policy 
through representative government. These are network governance processes in which the citizen 
presents their own perspectives and preferences, negotiates and adapts in the context of other 
interests and values and new knowledge (Bishop and Davis 2002; Innes and Booher 2016). Direct 
participation and self-presentation, rather than mediated representation, are held to address the 
power imbalances inherent in the representative system and lead to rational and legitimate policy 
positions or decisions (e.g. Dryzek 2012; Dryzek et al 2019). Input and throughput legitimacy are 
created through direct engagement in collective reason and meaning-making (Dryzek 2012; Innes 
and Booher 2016; Pateman 1970). 
Participatory theories of democracy have underpinned the emergence of a range of participatory 
institutional forms and structured methods (e.g. Fischer 2003; Fishkin 1991, 2011, 2015). Fishkin and 
Mansbridge (2017) reiterated the argument that creating a tightly structured deliberative process for 
the citizen to be directly responsible for the generation of the policy directions reframes the very 
nature of polity, from representative to participatory. One of the more prominent forms is plebiscites, 
well established in some democracies, typically occasional and most often associated with policy 
areas of national significance (e.g. Hessami 2016). The plebiscite is closely coupled to the existing 
nation-state representative forms but adds a degree of direct and deliberative participation that is 
codified through constitutional arrangements. Other prominent methods are focused on policy areas 
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at the sub-national scale, particularly for planning phases (e.g. Bishop and Davis 2002; Innes and 
Booher 2010). These methods are typically local scale and often geographically defined. They also 
typically engage ‘everyday people’ in (Ansell and Gash 2008; Reed 2008; Innes and Booher 2016). 
These include methods such as participatory budgeting at municipal or city level (e.g. Cabannes and 
Lipietz 2018) urban planning (e.g. Innes and Booher 2010), and environmental resources planning 
(e.g. Weber 2018). The spread of network media technologies and of low-cost internet access have 
contributed to the explosion of forms, occurrence and substance of such efforts at direct participation 
at direct participation (e.g. Ess 2018; UrbinatI 2017). More recent literature has begun to examine the 
potential for deliberation through internet-based participation to balance the ‘populism’ risks of direct 
participation as mass consultation (e.g. Fishkin et al 2018). Against Arnstein’s (1969) well-established 
‘ladder of participation’, these participatory forms driven by participation democracy theory reflect the 
higher ‘rungs’ of partnership, delegated power and citizen control. 
Despite the drive to introduce more democratic legitimacy, these methods retain a close connection 
with the representative forms of government and policy (Bishop and Davis 2002). In explaining this 
proximity to the representative state, proponents have argued participatory approaches to policy and 
governance increase the throughput legitimacy through direct accountability and in this way reform 
the representative system (e.g. Curator et al 2017). Others (e.g. Dryzek 2002) have argued for the 
value of participatory methods within the representative system as important for building citizenry 
capabilities as the basis for a thriving democracy. For example, on the basis of their empirical 
research, Innes and Booher (2016) suggested that introducing significant participatory processes into 
state policy processes increases the adaptive capacity of the citizenry for addressing wicked policy 
problems. This position reflects the Habermassian model of direct deliberative democratic process, 
which rests on the quality of public discourse and the citizen’s access to good information and the 
opportunity to learn from other perspectives (e.g. Flyvberg 1998; Dryzek 2002). The connection 
between the methods and the state remains close, but the role of the politician and bureaucrat is 
recast from decision-maker distanced from the citizen via the chain of representation to steward and 
implementor – more ‘delegate’ than ‘trustee’ – and thereby increasing the input and throughput 
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legitimacy of the political process. The legitimacy gap of the existing representative mechanisms is 
addressed by facilitating participation through structured scientific principles rather than the more 
problematic relationship between representative and citizens. Proponents argue these forms of 
political participation are more legitimate and more truly democratic approaches to the exercise of 
power (Curator et al 2017; Mansbridge et al 2012) 
Although these forms offer the promise of political agency through direct and deliberative 
participation, they remain coupled with centralised formal controlling institutional structures of the 
representative state. Notwithstanding green shoots in the empirical research (e.g. Curato et al 2017; 
Fishkin 2018; Innes and Booher 2016), a number of problems persist that go to the fundamental link 
between participation and representation and reveal a legitimacy gap in the principles and practices of 
participatory democracy. I will address two here that are significant for thinking about throughput 
legitimacy and participation: the inevitable exclusion implicit in the concept and practices of 
participation; and distortions in the practice and principles because of the proximity to the 
representative state. 
The problem of managing the scale and complexity of populous plural polities is left largely 
unaddressed in participatory democracy theory and leads to exclusion of citizens. In a very practical 
way, the core principle of citizen self-presentation in deliberative processes is difficult to implement in 
polities with large numbers of people, and with widely diverse interests, values and preferences, 
simply because there are so many people – it is logistically extremely difficult. A more fundamental 
criticism is that the problem of exclusion is implicit and inescapable within participatory democracy 
theory (Young 2002). Young has argued that the principles of participatory democracy cannot hold, 
as, for some to participate, there must always be those who do not. She argued that minorities are 
always at risk of exclusion under a large-scale direct participatory state structure in which some 
version of majority rules must inevitably take hold despite consensus ideals (Young 2002). The 
foundations of a participatory system, then, must always be established on exclusion. This is not only 
a conceptual problem, it is also an institutional effect; that is, who participates, who is left out, and 
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who decides? Considered in this light, the question of who decides on the forms and processes of 
participation is a foundation stone for legitimacy democratic process. 
In practice, resolutions to the exclusion problem rest on representative mechanisms. I will explain this 
using two examples of prominent participatory practices: structured participatory methods, and 
stakeholder participation as proxy for citizen participation. Structured participatory methods such as 
discussed above rely on scientific techniques facilitated by professional elites to manage the problem 
of exclusion and large-scale participation. Fishkin (2011) for example, proposes population-level 
polling and probabilistic sampling as ways to replicate the plurality of a polity (see also Fishkin et al 
2018). Using these methods, elites such as social scientists and participatory professionals become 
responsible for the process that produces policy directions that are presented as most likely to reflect 
what all members of the polity would produce if they could all have a say directly in the policy process 
(Fishkin 2011). In the most well-funded examples with strong political support, the results are then 
subject to review and scrutiny of the broader population (Cabannes and Lipietz 2018) – a step that is, 
in effect, a representative claim (sensu Saward 2010). 
When viewed through the lens of the intrinsic link between participation and representation, it 
becomes possible to see that the scientific techniques are representative mechanisms for facilitating 
participation. They are used to define the terms of a representative relationship between all citizens 
and those who participate; they are used to define the idea of the citizen; and they are used to convert 
a representation of the possible plurality of citizens’ views and interests into policy and decision. 
These representative mechanisms, however, are de-politicised and, rather, are given over to scientific 
methods (e.g. probabilistic sampling). The democratic checks and balances for these representative 
forms are not clear and effectively shut out some citizens altogether. In doing so, these practices 
inadvertently sever citizens’ democratic responsibilities to control the terms of the representative 
relationship, a paradoxically non-democratic effect of these participatory methods. Proponents such 
as Fishkin stake a claim for increased throughput legitimacy through this ‘scientised’ representation of 
citizens (Fishkin 2011; Fishkin et al 2018). I suggest this ‘scientisation’ of representation hides the 
political nature of representative mechanism and so also hides the gap between the participatory 
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intention and inevitable and necessary representative mechanism in play. This is a different version of 
the representation chain, but with ‘scientific methods’ and the participatory professional determining 
who is in and who is out and converting the plurality into a policy program. Thus, even Fishkin’s 
sophisticated and carefully designed approaches that privilege participation have not managed to 
escape the need for representative mechanisms in populous plural societies. 
The stakeholder as proxy resolution to the problem of scale also systematically, if pragmatically, 
excludes people. A body of practice and empirical research has grown around stakeholder 
participation as a proxy for widespread citizen participation (Reed 2008). Notwithstanding the 
democratic ideal, Reed, for example, describes the pragmatic approach to the input legitimacy 
problem:  
for purposes of efficiency, conservationists focus on engaging those who hold a stake 
(whether directly or indirectly) in the scope of their initiative rather than attempting to 
meaningfully engage with the wider public. (Reed 2008, pg. 2418) 
In this resolution, the stakeholder is allocated legitimacy by reference to connection with sets of 
interests or groups with common values or interests and in this way becomes the proxy for the 
diversity of citizen interests and values (Reed 2008). In practice, the stakeholder proxy approach 
nearly always draws on formal representatives, backed by representative associations to substitute 
for citizen (Reed 2008). This means that the stakeholder proxy resolution relies on the long chain of 
representation to solve the problem of plurality and scale and to facilitate participation. A conceptual 
and practical paradox becomes immediately apparent: participatory methods solve the problem using 
the very representative mechanisms they critique. Explanations like Reed’s pragmatism act as a 
justification of what is nevertheless a fiction and sleight of hand for participatory approaches to argue 
for ‘community’ or civil participation while utilising the very representative mechanisms the approach 
purports to reform. Furthermore, in practical terms the stakeholder resolution means the benefits of 
the deliberative process can only be experienced by those few who are directly involved in the 
participatory-deliberative process. It is not at all clear how those benefits might then be distributed 
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across other citizens (Alonso et al 2011; Bohman 1998; Ganghof 2016; Przeworski, et al. 1999; 
Urbinati 2005). This means that participatory methods built on the stakeholder resolution merely form 
another link in the representative chain stretching from citizen to decision-maker rather than reforming 
the system or substantively facilitating citizen participation and political agency. 
The close coupling of participatory methods with existing state structures is a persistent challenge that 
in practice excludes people from participation. Recent empirical research raises doubts about the 
possibility of representative system reform via participatory methods and practices (e.g. Flannery et al 
2018; Weber 2018). From the citizen perspective, the normative democratic goal of participation 
predominates: the promise of direct participation as political agency as has been discussed 
throughout this section. On the other hand, an instrumental or ‘technocratic’ goal of increasing policy 
legitimacy and meeting codified or legislated expectations for citizen or stakeholder engagement 
becomes the driver for policy actors (Bishop and Davis 2002; Howard 2018; Weber 2018; Flannery et 
al 2018). The recent empirical research points to the way bureaucratic control of codified participatory 
approaches not only disenfranchises some citizens (Flannery et al 2018), it also controls the extent to 
which those who are involved do actually influence the policy process (Howard 2018). The efforts 
rarely in practice proceed beyond the lower rungs of Arnstein’s ‘ladder’ (Howard 2018). In terms of the 
Scharpf-Schmidt model of legitimacy, this is a throughput legitimacy problem: positive input legitimacy 
(the participatory method) is disconnected from the output (policy or decision) through an erosion of 
the throughput legitimacy, i.e. the institutional form of the participation. 
Participation, then, is valorised as an effort to address the imbalances of the still-dominant 
representative institutions of the nation-state. The close coupling between political representation and 
the representative nation-state, as discussed in the previous section, means that proponents of 
participatory democracy have sought to distance themselves from the dysfunctions of the 
representative state. In doing so, I contend, they have largely also turned their backs on the 
conceptual and practical potential of representation as a mechanism for facilitating participation. I 
argue this is important because it has meant the necessarily politicised character of representation 
has been largely overlooked within participatory theories and practices. Common to the critiques 
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examined here is the inadequacy of participatory theory and practice for dealing with the challenge of 
converting the diversity of interests, values and preferences into manageable and actionable 
agendas. In seeking to address the legitimacy gap in the long chain of representation, participatory 
theory places citizens deliberating together and creating their own unmediated political agency as the 
only legitimate exercise of their power. In practice, however, institutional efforts at facilitating either 
direct participatory or deliberative participation resort to technical solutions underpinned by 
representative mechanisms that are less clear or contestable than those they were to replace. In the 
process, a different legitimacy gap appears, buried in the practices of participatory methods and 
obscured by the claims to greater democratic legitimacy driven from participatory democracy theory. 
Taken together, my examination of the two major traditions of democratic theory suggest that the 
central problem of democracy studies – that of facilitating participation – is yet to be settled and 
remains problematic for network governance that relies on participatory principles and practices. My 
examination of representative democracy theory showed that the long chain of representation 
provides little safeguard for the citizen’s vulnerability in the representative relationship. Despite the 
clear accountability measures of the representative chain, the distance between citizen and decision-
maker has become too long and not sufficiently legitimate in the contemporary network society. My 
examination of participatory theory showed that, in practice, participatory methods rely on 
representative mechanisms as handmaid for the valorised principle of participation. Overlooking 
representative mechanisms – treating them instrumentally rather than as fundamentally political 
sensu Pitkin – leads to unexpected but no significant legitimacy gaps. In attempting to fulfil the 
promise of participation, participatory theory and representative democracy theory both fall 
substantively short. Given my central proposition that participation is always necessarily facilitated 
through some kind of representative relationship or mechanism, this oversight is likely to be 
contributing to citizen disillusionment with the promise of participation and forms of network 
governance. How then can this be addressed? In the next section, I return to Pitkin and revisit her 
principles of the representation–participation link to find a way forward. 
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Participation and representation (reprise): revisiting the 
central dynamic 
On the basis on my re-reading of Pitkin 1967, I propose that three normative conditions address the 
inherent and unstable power relations between participation and representation. The conditions are 
authorisation, dissent and exit, and accountability (see Pitkin 1967, pp. 113-115, 139, 145, 154, 231-
233; see also Brito Vieira and Runciman 2013, pg. 66, 67, 126; Saward 143-145;). The representative 
must be accountable and the represented must have a way of assessing the relationship, otherwise it 
is a controlling or authoritarian relationship, and not a democratic representation that facilitates 
political agency. In seeking to solve this problem of representative legitimacy, the ‘represented’ must, 
at all times, have the ability, capacity and opportunity to define the scope and terms of the 
representative relationship, described by Pitkin as the required presence of potential conflict (e.g. 
1967, pp. 209, 233). The three conditions (authorisation, dissent and exit, and accountability) must be 
present and recognisable for each actor for the relationship to be judged as legitimately facilitating 
democratic participation (e.g. see Saward’s logic of exit, 2010, pg.143). In this section, I argue that 
examining the presence or absence of these conditions, and how they are constituted, provides an 
approach for analysing the extent to which representative institutions and modes can be said to be 
facilitating the participation of the represented in political processes. Taken together, as shown in 
Figure 2, the three conditions comprise a lens for evaluating the legitimacy of a representative–
participative mechanism, process or institution. 
  
 
  70 
  
  
  
  
   
Figure 2: The lens of participation–representation for evaluating democratic legitimacy.  
Adapted from Brito Vieira and Runciman 2013, Pitkin 1967, Saward 2010. 
  
‘Authorisation’ is the ability of the group or individual to be represented by, appoint, acknowledge or in 
some way give permission to the representative Authorising a person or group to ensure one’s voice 
and interests are present in the political process is the foundation and initiating process of the 
representative relationship and the balance between participation and representation. Authorisation in 
an electoral process is clear – a majority of votes (however defined) for a clearly defined and 
articulated platform or set of actions and a clearly articulated process by which the interests will be 
progressed is said to confer authorisation, often called a mandate. The public process of articulating a 
platform, position or actions, and interpreting how the interest is experienced, and how it ‘should’ be 
addressed – or claim making – is a dynamic process of creating and expressing interests and 
identities that takes place between the would-be representative and the would-be represented. The 
vote, the opinion polls, social media trends, and organisational membership are common ways in the 
electoral system for testing the strength of a claim to representativeness (Saward 2010). Outside the 
electoral system, identifying the authorisation process is no less essential to the legitimacy of the 
representative’s mode of representation (process legitimacy) and no less essential to the judgement 
of the representative’s actions or decisions (output legitimacy). 
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The ‘dissent and exit’ condition refers to the capacity of the represented group or individual to dispute, 
object, change or withdraw from the representative relationship. The capacity to withdraw from the 
representative relationship indicates the freedom of the represented to exercise agency, and freedom 
from coercion (e.g. Brito Vieira and Runciman 2013, pg. 66; Pitkin 1967 pg. 154 – 155, 159; Saward 
pg. 143). 
‘Accountability’ is the ability of the represented to take responsibility or be held responsible for the 
actions of the representative. This condition extends the ‘accounting for’ definition that we more 
readily recognise as accountability in common usage. Accountability here is defined as the ability of 
the represented to take responsibility, or be held responsible, for the actions of the representative – 
i.e. to actually participate in the actions of the representative. For participation to have integrity within 
the representative relationship, the represented must be substantively invested in the actions and 
consequences, or the relationship is a simpler trustee ‘on your behalf’ representation (e.g. Pitkin 
1967, pg. 115). The two senses of accountability – the common usage and the experience of 
responsibility – must be taken together for a full experience of participation through the representative 
relationship. The ‘reporting back’ component of the common usage alone reduces the relationship to 
a passive one tilted in favour of the representative’s autonomy and increasing the potential for 
coercion. Extending the common usage, however, enables the represented party to experience 
participation through the absence/presence paradox. 
Once again, Pitkin set a foundation for evaluating the legitimacy of the representative relationship, 
namely the substantive and formalistic dimensions (e.g. Pitkin, pp. 59, 143). The substantive aspects 
of representation are what the representative does: the objects, impacts or artefacts of the acts of 
representation, for example a change to a fishing quota, recommendations of a senate investigation 
process, or a revised coastal development plan. This is equivalent to the output component of the 
Scharpf–Schmidt legitimacy model (as discussed earlier). The formalistic dimension of political 
representation refers to the rules, institutions and processes that contain and direct the representative 
relationship. This dimension is equivalent to the input and throughout components of Scharpf–
Schmidt legitimacy model. Pitkin (e.g. 1967, pp. 59, 143) argued that the substantive aspects of 
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representation are hierarchically secondary to the institutional dimensions. In other words, in the 
democratic context what a representative achieves matters only once the legitimacy of the 
representative relationship has been negotiated and established, and in so far as the formalistic 
dimensions – input and throughput aspects – support or dispute the legitimacy of the representative 
(e.g. Pitkin 1967, pg. 143). Furthermore, evaluating the legitimisation processes associated with 
representative institutions raises the questions of who’s interests are not included, and why this is the 
case, has become highly significant, as discussed earlier (e.g. see Young 2000; 2004). This means 
that how representative relationships are structured institutionally, formally or informally, and are 
experienced by the actors is essential to understanding democratic legitimacy. The actors – the 
represented, the representative and the audience – create, assess and test the balance between 
representation and agency within institutional processes. The tests of legitimacy lie in the processes 
of authorisation and accountability and exit and dissent. 
Conclusions 
Political participation and representation, then, are inextricably linked at the core of political 
institutions, processes and relationships. Political participation defines democracy; it defines political 
agency. Political representation is the principle, relationship and set of institutions that connect 
citizens directly to the allocation of resources, the continuation of the political community and the 
institutions of the polity. It facilitates their participation in the polity; it gives form to their political 
agency. I have shown that in the two major discourses of contemporary democracy, participation and 
representation are treated differently. In neither of these two major traditions is the dynamic of 
participation–representation accounted for in ways that make sense for the contemporary network 
context where participation in governance is increasingly expected and effective in dealing with 
complex policy problems. In representative democracy theory and practice, representative institutions 
to political agency are privileged, and the long chain of representation underpins the operations of the 
nation-state. The multiple and emerging sites of participation demanded by contemporary polities, 
however, are not adequately accounted for. In participatory democracy theory and practice, direct 
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participation as an ideal and aspiration is privileged as the solution to the problems of the long chain 
of representation. The representative side of the participation–representation dynamic, however, is 
downplayed and depoliticised. Practitioners and theorists treat representative mechanisms largely as 
pragmatic and technical resolutions to scale and exclusion. This means that the challenge of 
converting large-scale participation into ongoing political structures and processes is not adequately 
accounted for, leaving participatory practices vulnerable to the exclusion of citizens. 
I have established, however, that political representation is always present as an aspect of political 
participation and must be dealt with both conceptually and in practice. Revisiting Pitkin’s theory of 
political representation has enabled me to reintroduce the essential connection between political 
participation and political representation and to then re-examine the major traditions. In examining 
participatory theory and practices through this participation–representation lens, I have identified a 
bias towards direct participation as the ideal and aspiration for delivering political agency. This bias 
undermines the capacity of participatory practices to deliver political agency for citizens because it 
fails to recognise and overtly address the political dimensions of representative mechanisms. I 
contend that this inability to deal with the paradoxical connection between participation and 
representation also means that the bias is likely to be exacerbating the contemporary problem of 
participation, i.e. citizen disillusionment with the promise of agency inherent in the participatory ideal. 
I propose that Pitkin’s three conditions provide a guide for responding to the power relations implicit in 
the dynamic connection between participation and representation. The conditions are also a guide to 
analysing the democratic legitimacy of the forms and institutions of both political participation and 
political representation. Having re-examined Pitkin’s theory, I contend that the presence or absence of 
any or all of the three conditions provides a test for the legitimacy of participatory processes and 
approaches in the network society. Taken together, the three conditions form what I label the lens of 
participation–representation. In this chapter, then, I have set the theoretical foundations for the 
research in order to problematise the norms and practices of participation in marine governance. 
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Chapter 4. 
The norm of participation in marine governance 
The study presented in this chapter is the first step in problematising notions of participation in marine 
governance to generate fresh insights into the problem of participation, i.e. why is it that efforts at 
increased participation appear in many cases to result in disillusionment rather than increasing the 
experience of political agency for citizens? In this chapter, I apply the conceptual lens of participation–
representation generated in the previous chapter, to notions of participation in marine governance to 
test if it can shed new light on the problem of participatory failure. The lens comprises three 
‘conditions’ – authorisation, dissent and exit, and accountability – that taken together assist in 
assessing the power balance between the inextricably connected modes of political agency – 
participation and representation (see Figure 2, Chapter 3, pg. 70). Using the lens enables me to 
account for the intrinsic link between political participation and political representation in marine 
governance literature and address an analytical gap within the major traditions of democracy theory. 
Application of the lens in this chapter has enabled me to ‘put into question’ the assumptions of the 
dominant conceptualisation of participation in marine governance. Accordingly, the research 
questions for this study were: (1) What is the dominant conceptualisation of participation within the 
marine governance theory and practice? and, (2b) What does application of the participation–
representation lens explain, if anything, about the dominant conceptualisation of participation in the 
marine governance literature? 
This chapter opens with a description of the innovative methods used to establish the most influential 
marine governance papers. In the second section, I address research question 1 and analyse the 
dominant conceptualisation of participation in the marine governance literature.  I identify the major 
paradigm applied to marine governance which is source of an ontological conceptualisation of 
participation, and the theoretical basis of the paradigm. In the third section of the chapter, I address 
research question 2 and examine how the connection between participation and representation are 
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handled within the major paradigms. I finish the chapter with an assessment of the likely limits 
participatory practices influenced by the dominant paradigms will face in delivering democratic 
throughput legitimacy, based on the extent to which the precepts of the dominant paradigms are or 
are not able to account for the intrinsic link between participatory ideals and aspirations and the 
pragmatic representative mechanisms utilised to facilitate participation in marine governance. 
Methods and materials 
The purpose of this study was to examine the dominant conceptualisation of participation in marine 
governance. To do this, following Garcia-Lillo et al 2017, I identified highly influencing texts and 
associated clusters of intellectual sympathy across marine governance literature relevant to Australia 
and Canada. The methods I have used in this study introduce two innovations to qualitative 
interpretive research. Firstly, to identify a purposive sample from a large corpus of literature, I used 
emerging quantitatively based qualitative bibliometric methods using the Vosviewer software6 to 
analyse a large base corpus of material but also qualitatively determine intellectual influence. The 
steps I used are described below. Secondly, I introduced an artificial intelligence method to 
qualitatively analyse the material and triangulate the finer-grained interpretive qualitative analysis of 
the materials. Here I used automated conceptual analysis using the Leximancer software7 (Angus et 
                                                     
6 Vosviewer is a software tool for constructing and visualising bibliometric networks, https://www.vosviewer.com, 
accessed March 2018. Vosviewer was developed by researchers of the Leiden University's Centre for Science 
and Technology Studies (CWTS) as a tool for better understanding the scholarly impact of peer review articles. 
The software remains a product of the CWTS and the Centre provides support for researchers using the 
software. For this study I used Vosviewer version 1.5.5.  
7 Leximancer is an Australian-developed text analysis program. It is designed to inductively identify the concepts 
and themes across a set of texts, as well as the connections between concepts and themes. The materials are 
presented visually alongside the text sources (Leximancer User Guide Version 4.5, accessed April 12, 2018). 
Leximancer was developed by Dr Andrew Smith at the University of Queensland (Australia), and is now a 
commercial product available through the company Leximancer Pty Ltd. In this study I used Leximancer version 
4.5, licensed to the University of Tasmania.  
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al 2013; Sotiriadou et al 2014), the specific steps I used are described below. The value in these 
innovations was firstly in ensuring a quantitative basis for the analysis, and secondly in triangulating 
the analysis, and in so doing strengthening the replicability and reliability of the research. Meeting 
these criteria has largely restricted qualitative and interpretive research to smaller samples resulting in 
limited generalisability (Tracy 2010). 
Generating the sample for analysis 
This study was conducted as a qualitative content analysis of 14 influential marine governance papers 
which are discussed in detail below.  The material for this study comprised a purposive sample of 
highly influential marine governance journal articles. A purposive sample is one in which information-
rich cases are actively identified as the basis for the research (Etikan et al 2016; Teddlie and Yu 
2007). Determining a purposive sample of influential texts from the vast body of marine governance 
literature required two things: 1) a base corpus of marine governance literature, and 2) a reliable 
method for determining highly influential papers. 
(1) Base corpus 
The base corpus of papers was generated using established systematic literature search methods, 
and the details of the method can be found in Appendix 1. In summary, the steps involved a replicable 
systematic search of the academic literature using a combination of the following 5 search terms:  
i. ‘marine or coastal’ [and/or] ‘governance’;  
ii. ‘marine spatial planning’ [and/or] ‘governance’;  
iii. ‘marine protected areas’ [and/or] ‘governance’;  
iv. ‘marine renewable energy’ [and/or] ‘governance’; and, 
v. ‘aquaculture’ [and/or] ‘governance’.  
I used these terms to capture the breadth and diversity of forms of marine governance as well as the 
range of research methods addressing governance of marine ecosystems. The result of combining 
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the lists from both databases (and removing duplications) was a raw corpus comprising 2829 papers. 
I then added two additional search filters to the raw corpus to ensure the base corpus aligned with my 
research scope (see Introduction, pg. 23): ‘Australia’ and ‘Canada’ (see Appendix 1 for details), and 
with an assumption that key literature from within these countries would have greater salience for 
them than the general international literature. The result after ‘cleaning’ the combined database (see 
Appendix 1) was a base corpus of 724 journal articles.  
 
(2) Method for generating the purposive sample 
For the second requirement, ‘second generation’ bibliometric methods from information sciences were 
combined to generate the purposive sample from the base corpus. The detailed methods for 
generating the purposive sample can be seen at Appendix 1. Contemporary bibliometrics uses co-
citation statistics and network mapping of a body of literature to identify research influence and 
impact. The computer-assisted statistical methods produce substantive analyses of research fields, or 
‘research landscaping’ (Rowe 2014), that go beyond simple citation counts (Ellegaard and Wallin 
2015; Garcia-Lillo et al 2017; Naukkarinen and Bragge 2016; Wallin 2005; Van Eck et al 2014). Co-
citation refers to the citation of two (or more) papers together in a third citing paper (Small 1973). The 
higher the frequency of co-citation, the closer the intellectual links between all authors (Garcia-Lillo et 
al 2017). This approach addresses the problem of using just citation counts, i.e. quantity of citations, 
which can only indicate frequency of citations but does not explain the substantive use of the material 
cited; for example, as explanatory, supportive, critical or review (Garcia-Lillo et al 2017; Naukkarinen 
and Bragge 206; Wallin 2005; Van Eck and Waltman 2014). 
Bibliometric software Vosviewer has been designed specifically for such analyses (Van Eck and 
Waltman 2014) and was used in combination with literature indexing database citation data to 
generate the sample. Two indicators of influence were used: ‘descendant’ and ‘ancestor’ influence. 
Descendant analysis uses citation data to explain which papers are likely to have had substantial 
impact on other researchers based on how often they have been cited (Van Eck et al 2014). The 
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specific steps I used for descendant analysis are described in Appendix 1 (pp. 298-300). Ancestor 
analysis uses co-citation data and network mapping co-citation and keywords to identify papers that 
are most commonly referenced within a given corpus (Culnan 1986). The specific steps I used for the 
ancestor analysis are described in Appendix 1 (pp. 300 – 301). The two methods, citation 
‘descendant’ analysis and co-citation network ‘ancestor’ mapping bring together complementary 
indicators of both intellectual sympathy or connection between authors, and constellations of major 
theoretical concepts and/or methods to produce a picture of intellectual influence (Garcia-Lillo et al 
2017; Waltman et al 2010).  
A risk in using this approach lies in potentially creating an ‘echo-chamber’ effect through the co-
citations and clusters of intellectual sympathy’. For a systematic literature review, for example, this 
might constitute a limitation, particularly when zoning in to analyse the most highly influencing 
clusters. However, as noted above, the purpose of this study was to identify these clusters of 
intellectual sympathy to precisely examine the most highly influencing clusters. That means that for 
this study, the method was appropriate rather than a limitation. I recognise there are other, more 
qualitative, ways to establish intellectual sympathy and influence. However, the methods used here 
combined established protocols from both systematic literature review and second-generation 
bibliographic analysis for understanding research impact and influence, as discussed above. This 
means that although there are other approaches to establishing influence, the approach I have taken 
is nevertheless rigorous and replicable. On this basis, I assumed that I have been able to produce set 
of influential papers that are also a plausible proxy for the conceptualisations of participation across 
the base corpus. 
Coding and analysis 
Qualitative content analysis is a structured, replicable method of interpreting textual data using a 
systematic process of coding and is appropriate for examining complex social phenomena such as 
marine governance (Fereday and Muir-Cochrane 2006; Neuendorf 2017; Stemler 2011). It was 
therefore appropriate for this study. Qualitative content analysis is strongly associated with inductive 
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research, but it is also well suited to deductive or ‘directed’ analysis (Fereday and Muir-Cochrane 
2006; Neuendorf 2017), making the approach particularly relevant to my objective of examining how 
participation is conceptualised. The qualitative content analysis for this study was conducted through 
three steps: inductive analysis of each paper in the set; deductive coding across the data set; and 
automated (computer-assisted) inductive conceptual analysis. 
• Close reading of each paper in the set: Firstly, each text was analysed for: 1) the main 
general themes across the sample to understand the primary drivers of marine governance 
theory and practice, and 2) conceptualisations of participation to ensure any outlier or 
unexpected approaches to participation were captured alongside those from the previous 
deductive step. The codes used to organise this inductive step can be seen at Appendix 2, 
and the results of the analysis can be found at Appendix 3.  
• Deductive coding across the data set: Secondly, sentences and paragraphs from each 
paper were coded deductively using NVIVO 10 for Mac, with a specific focus on 
conceptualisations of participation (see Appendix 4 for the coding rules). The coded data 
were analysed for patterns and themes to enable comparison across the papers in the 
sample and identify dominant conceptualisations. 
• Automated inductive conceptual analysis: Thirdly, concepts and themes across the data 
set were analysed by computer-assisted automated conceptual analysis Leximancer software 
to generate a replicable, non-biased inductive and qualitative analysis of the material. 
To triangulate the data, I used the Leximancer software to identify the dominant themes and concepts 
and compare these to my own coding. Leximancer is an automated content analysis software that 
analyses the frequency of concepts. It does this by extracting collections of terms (or words) that 
comprise the concepts and then creates co-occurrence clusters of concepts (Leximancer User Guide 
2018). The co-occurrence clusters are then depicted as visual network ‘maps’. 
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The data, i.e. the text of the paper, were ‘cleaned’ for use in Leximancer by creating a Microsoft Word 
version of the body of the paper, removing headers and footers, the title and abstract, author details 
and section subheadings. The results of the computer-assisted analysis were compared with my 
inductive and deductive coding to validate my coding and ensure significant concepts were not 
overlooked. The results of each of these three steps were synthesised to address the research 
questions. In the following sections the three steps of analysis are presented. 
Findings and analysis 
The purposive sample of influencing texts 
The replicable steps I took to arrive at the sample of influencing papers are set out in detail in 
Appendix 1. In summary, the results from the descendant and ancestor analyses of the base corpus 
were combined and the top 15 were selected on the basis of the commonality between the highest 
counts in both analyses (descendant and ancestor). This means these 14 papers were highly 
influential across the base corpus marine governance literature. These are set out in Table 4 below. 
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Table 4: Data set of highly influencing journal articles in marine governance 
Reference  
Adger, W.N., Hughes, T.P., Folke, C., Carpenter, S.R. and Rockström, J., 2005. Social-ecological resilience 
to coastal disasters. Science, 309(5737), pp.1036-1039. 
Armitage, D.R., Plummer, R., Berkes, F., Arthur, R.I., Charles, A.T., Davidson-Hunt, I.J., Diduck, A.P., 
Doubleday, N.C., Johnson, D.S., Marschke, M. and McConney, P., 2009. Adaptive co‐management for 
social–ecological complexity. Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment, 7(2), pp.95-102. 
Berkes, F., 2009. Evolution of co-management: role of knowledge generation, bridging organizations and 
social learning. Journal of Environmental Management, 90(5), pp.1692-1702. 
Christie, P., 2004. Marine protected areas as biological successes and social failures in Southeast Asia. In 
American Fisheries Society Symposium (Vol. 42, No. 155-164). 
Defeo, O., McLachlan, A., Schoeman, D.S., Schlacher, T.A., Dugan, J., Jones, A., Lastra, M. and Scapini, 
F., 2009. Threats to sandy beach ecosystems: a review. Estuarine, Coastal and Shelf Science, 81(1), pp.1-
12. 
Dietz, T., Ostrom, E. and Stern, P.C., 2003. The struggle to govern the commons. Science, 302(5652), 
pp.1907-1912. 
Folke, C., Hahn, T., Olsson, P. and Norberg, J., 2005. Adaptive governance of social-ecological systems. 
Annual Review of Environmental Resources, 30, pp.441-473. 
Gelcich, S., Hughes, T.P., Olsson, P., Folke, C., Defeo, O., Fernández, M., Foale, S., Gunderson, L.H., 
Rodríguez-Sickert, C., Scheffer, M. and Steneck, R.S., 2010. Navigating transformations in governance of 
Chilean marine coastal resources. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 107(39), pp.16 794-
16 799. 
Gutiérrez, N.L., Hilborn, R. and Defeo, O., 2011. Leadership, social capital and incentives promote 
successful fisheries. Nature, 470(7334), p. 386. 
Hughes, T.P., Bellwood, D.R., Folke, C., Steneck, R.S. and Wilson, J., 2005. New paradigms for 
supporting the resilience of marine ecosystems. Trends in Ecology and Evolution, 20(7), pp. 380-386. 
Jentoft, S., 2007. Limits of governability: Institutional implications for fisheries and coastal governance. 
Marine Policy, 31(4), pp. 360-370. 
Jentoft, S., van Son, T.C. and Bjørkan, M., 2007. Marine protected areas: a governance system analysis. 
Human Ecology, 35(5), pp. 611-622. 
Ostrom, E., 2007. A diagnostic approach for going beyond panaceas. Proceedings of the National Academy 
of Sciences, 104(39), pp. 15 181-15 187. 
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Ostrom, E., 2009. A general framework for analyzing sustainability of social-ecological systems. Science, 
325(5939), pp. 419-422. 
 
An initial look across the titles shows that some of these papers deal specifically with fisheries or 
other resource problems (i.e. sandy beaches in the case of Defeo et al 2009) and a number do not 
deal with marine ecosystems directly at all. This is unsurprising because the purpose of the analyses 
was to understand intellectual influence over the marine governance corpus, and influence from 
outside marine governance discipline could be expected. 
The development of the social-ecological systems paradigm: 
inductive analysis of the most influencing texts 
In this section, the results of inductive analysis and theming of each paper is set out under a 
subheading that captures the core of each theme. The coding rules used for the two-step analysis are 
set out in Appendix 2 and Appendix 4. Reference to author and page numbers are provided 
throughout to link the reader to examples of text that were the basis for the interpretive analysis. An 
account of the inductive analysis of each paper can be found in Appendix 3. 
Resource failure and sustainable management – Dietz et al 2003 and Christie 
2004 
The driving imperative in the early two papers, Dietz et al (2003) and Christie (2004), is conserving 
fisheries stocks, or ecosystem services, from over-exploitation and potential collapse. To achieve 
these, the primary focus is on building compliance and resolving conflicts over resources. Social 
processes are identified as the lowest cost and also necessary approaches to doing so (e.g. ‘can 
spark learning and change’, Dietz et al 2003, pg.1909; Christie 2004, pg. 162). 
The social processes here are input to state-owned rules (for resource use and sanctions), in-person 
communication among the stakeholder group (‘well-structured dialogue’, Dietz et al 2003, pg. 1910) to 
build interpersonal relationships (‘dense social networks’, Dietz et al 2003, pg. 1908 and ‘social 
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capital’, Dietz et al 2003, pg. 1910; ‘the creation of dependent relationships’, Christie 2004, pg. 162) 
testing models and reviewing ecosystem science together (‘analytic deliberation’, Dietz et al 2003, pg. 
1910) and social monitoring (Christie 2004, pg. 162). 
The participants are resource users, decision-makers (Dietz et al 2003, pg. 1010), which means 
formally organised NGOs, and ‘community’ (Christie 2004, pg. 157, 160). The role of ‘science’ 
remains implicitly privileged for information provision to enable stakeholders to learn about ecosystem 
conditions and as a foundation for achieving compliance and generating alternative management 
options (Dietz et al 2003, pg.1909; Christie 2004, pg.162). To achieve the management imperative, 
the policy actors should extend a portion of power to resource users and stakeholders through 
structured dialogue processes, with the processes mediated by science actors. 
Participation, then, is assumed as necessary and the purpose is instrumental. That is, the purpose is 
clearly linked to achieving the outcomes specified by the legislative and formal resource management 
tools (Dietz et al 2003, pg.1908) by increasing compliance using social resources – such as trust, 
buy-in and interpersonal relationships – as strengthening factors and reducing other social resources, 
such as conflict or lack of personal commitment, as a prohibiting factors. 
This is the simplest formulation of the participation norm – it works to get the ecosystem or resource 
outcome. 
‘Apocalypse now’: Adaptation, change and uncertainty: the introduction of the 
social-ecological systems paradigm – Adger et al 2005; Folke et al 2005; 
Hughes et al 2005 
This subset of three papers is strongly influenced by Carl Folke from the Stockholm Resilience 
Centre, Stockholm University. Folke is a co-author on two papers and author of one. 
Together these papers introduced social-ecological systems theory (SES) and used it to explain how 
human societies might adapt to the impending, and likely catastrophic, changes in both ecosystems 
and the human societies dependent upon them. Hughes et al (2005), for example, explicitly positions 
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the SES approach to governance against the single-sector/species hierarchical government approach 
that the authors seek to leave behind as dysfunctional or at the very least as ineffective (pg. 380). 
There is a strong sense of urgency across these papers with terms like ‘disaster’ and ‘shocks’ (e.g. 
Adger et al 2005 title ‘Dealing with Disaster’), ‘unwanted regime shifts’ (Hughes et al 2005, pg. 380) 
and ‘abrupt, disorganizing and turbulent’ change (Folke et al 2005, pg. 442). An apocalyptic tone is 
discernible reflecting the growing concerns expressed in each paper regarding climate change and 
spikes in extreme climatic events globally in the preceding years (Adger et al 2005, pg.1036). 
In this subset, adaptive capacity and the social processes that underlie adaptive capacity are at the 
centre of attention. Ecosystem complexity, diversity and dynamics are held to also be true for social 
systems (Adger et al 2005, pg.1037) and for the connections of interdependency between social and 
ecological systems (Adger et al 2005, pg. 1036, 1037; Folke et al 2005, pg. 443; Hughes et al 2005, 
pg. 380). 
The dominant social processes discussed in this set are knowledge generation, social learning and 
social networks that not only characterise civil society (Adger et al 2005, pg. 1037, 1038; Folke et al 
2005, pg. 447, 448, 450) but are also required for the interactions between levels of governance 
(Adger et al 2005, pg. 1038, Folke et al 2005, pg. 445, 446, 449; Hughes et al 2005, pg. 384) or 
modes of governance: multiple-state scale, market and civil (Adger et al 2005, pg. 1039; Folke et al 
2005, pg. 448, 449). 
The forms of participation are social processes like collaborative problem solving, self-organising, 
trust building, dialogue and social memory (Folke et al 2005, pg. 453; Hughes et al 2005, pg. 383); 
Institutionally, the interest is in flexible, multi-scalar, network forms of interaction, such as bridging 
organisations, cross-jurisdictional projects, and polycentric and multi-level governance systems 
(Adger et al 2005, pg. 1039; Folke et al 2005, pg. 444, 461; Hughes et al 2005, pg. 83). Power or 
formal authority and participation cross institutional boundaries and are carried via social processes 
across networks (Adger et al 2005, pg. 1039; Folke et al 2005, pg. 449; Hughes et al 2005, pg. 384). 
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The social processes are extended across civil society through key group roles and functions, and the 
quality of leadership emerges as a prominent concern (Folke et al 2005, pg. 454). In this subset, self-
organisation, that is communities of interest organising their own systems of governance,  is 
presented as an important principle, and an authoritative responsible actor, such as the bureaucracy, 
is no longer necessarily the central responsible point (Adger et al 2005, pg. 1039; Hughes et al 2005, 
pg. 383). 
Self-organisation across civil society is promoted as an effective strategy for governments; the state is 
treated as one of a number of participating actors; and power is dispersed across civil society and 
through whatever institutional forms of governance are at play (Adger et al 2005, pg. 1039; Folke et al 
2005, pg. 449; Hughes et al 2005, pg. 384). The generative actor could be anyone; that is, not only 
governments or policy actors with a specific need but also ‘interested publics’, groups of resource 
users or self-organising coalitions of groups. 
The meaning of participation in this subset becomes ontological and epistemological – that is, it is an 
expression of how the world works, how knowledge is generated and how change is effected – and so 
also a normative prescriptive perspective on participation. 
‘Beware the panacea’: governance and policy under the social-ecological 
systems – Jentoft 2007; Jentoft et al 2007; Ostrom 2007 
This third subset of texts confirms the SES approach as a paradigm and moves to delving specifically 
into the mechanics and complexity of governance under this paradigm. At the heart of the SES 
paradigm in these texts is the complex adaptive ecological system with humans and participation at 
the centre. These texts are firmly within the paradigm and do not offer an alternative explanation for 
how marine resources could be understood (Jentoft 2007, pg. 362; Jentoft et al 2007, pg. 613; 
Ostrom 2007, pg. 15 181). Each examines the complexity, diversity and dynamics of the governance 
system and argues for balancing large- and local-scale dynamics – both social and ecological. In 
arguing that SES practice requires more complexity rather than simplicity, each text details a 
diagnostic approach and provides analytic devices for governance design and practice. 
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These three texts promote the features identified in the previous set: 
• social processes as fundamental to governance (Jentoft 2007, pg. 360, 362, 364, 366; 
Jentoft et al 2007, pg. 615, 617; Ostrom 2007, pg. 15 184–15 185); 
• social capital as an essential component or resource for the governance system (Jentoft 
2007, pg. 364, Jentoft et al 2007, pg. 615; Ostrom 2007, pg. 15 184); 
• self-organising, flexible, interconnected multi-scalar network institutions for governance 
(Jentoft 2007, pg. 364, 365, 367; Jentoft et al 2007, pg. 616, 618, 619; Ostrom 2007, 
pg. 15 181,15 182, 15 185); and 
• power sharing across the governance system (Jentoft 2007, pg. 365; Jentoft et al 2007, 
pg. 619). 
In adding guidance to what SES approach to governance entails, Jentoft’s (2007) paper introduces an 
analysis of power dynamics and political processes as a subset of SES social processes and provides 
a specific diagnostic for how the ‘stakeholders’ as the primary participants might be recognised and 
engaged. Ostrom (2007) contributes an analytic frame of influencing variables derived from empirical 
research. Jentoft et al. (2007) provide a working case study of a diagnostic approach in their analysis 
of a marine protected area as a governance system. 
In each of these papers, stakeholder, user-group or individual participation is assumed as a 
characteristic of the system (Jentoft 2007, pg. 362, 364; Jentoft et al 2007, pg. 615; 626, 619; Ostrom 
2007, pg. 15 181). The logic common to these texts is that working productively with social and 
political processes and ensuring people can develop and generate an equitable and just distribution of 
the costs and benefits of a governance regime will result in better ecological outcomes and, therefore 
also, lead to positive social and political outcomes) (Jentoft 2007, pg. 360, 367, 368; Jentoft et al 
2007, pg. 613, 615, 619; Ostrom 2007, pg. 15181, 15182, 15186) . 
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In this subset, as with the previous set, this instrumental logic to participation is based on the 
ontological assumption of complexity, diversity and dynamics, social processes and human agency as 
defining the SES way of understanding the world. Jentoft et al 2007’s conclusion in this respect is 
expressed succinctly as follows: 
Rather, the participation of user-groups and stakeholders is among those principles that, 
according to governance theory, should underpin marine and coastal governance as a 
value in itself. (pg. 619) 
Synthesising and operationalising SES governance – Armitage et al 2009; 
Berkes 2009; Ostrom 2009 
Each of these papers proposes an approach for addressing gaps in implementing or operationalising 
adaptive governance for the SES context. Each introduces more detail for thinking about governance 
under SES conditions that reinforces the necessity for collaboration, social learning and knowledge 
generation and integration among levels of responsibility or government as the basis for effective 
governance established in the previous sets (Armitage et al 2009, pg. 96; Berkes 2009, pg. 1692; 
Ostrom 2009, pg. 420, 421). 
In each of these papers, the problem to be solved is generating new forms of governance for sector-
based resources and human-use problems, e.g. fisheries, within the SES frame. Both Berkes (2009) 
and Armitage and his co-authors (2009) bring together existing resource management approaches 
with co-management and adaptive management approaches to establish a sense of evolution of 
governance towards adaptation through participatory and network governance forms. To facilitate the 
emergence of self-organising governance innovations, Ostrom (2009) offers a framework of system 
and subsystem variables to analyse the conditions of any resource commons context. 
With respect to social processes as the foundation, in each paper social processes are accepted as 
the starting point for governance and each adds detail to how social processes can best be facilitated: 
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• Armitage and his co-authors argue for ten conditions for governance institutions that 
will foster collaboration and social learning as the basis for adaptive co-management 
(Armitage et al 2009, pg. 101); 
• Ostrom (2009) addresses the technical challenges of combining knowledge systems 
in order to operationalise learning-based governance structures; and 
• Berkes (2009) explains how learning and knowledge sharing work and on this basis 
argues for bridging organisations as a form of institutional innovation. 
Power is assumed to be dispersed across the governance system, and specific issues related to this 
are considered in each paper. Armitage and his co-authors (2009) emphasise that the socially based 
forms of governance required under SES conditions can take a long time and note that such forms of 
governance also depend to some degree upon the political will of the state or bureaucracy involved 
(Armitage et al 2009, pg. 97). Both Berkes (2009) and Armitage et al (2009) raise the importance of 
understanding and addressing power imbalances through participatory governance forms (Armitage 
et al 2009, pg. 98; Berkes 2009, pg. 1693). Ostrom (2009) argues self-organising governance 
innovations are the means to address the shortcoming of existing top-down legislative governance for 
managing the resource commons problem (Ostrom 2009, pg. 421). 
In each paper, the participants are resource users, reflecting the resource problem framing noted 
above, although in Berkes’ paper the terms ‘resource user’ and ‘communities’ are used somewhat 
interchangeably to reflect the diversity of social groupings necessary for governance (2009, pg. 1693, 
1697, 1698). Resource user participation is held to be central to generating innovative governance 
solutions as a function of social learning (Armitage et al 2009, pg. 97; Berkes 2009, pg. 1694; Ostrom 
2009, pg. 421). In each paper, resource user and community participation are both held to be 
important for governance for the SES context occurs (Armitage et al 2009, pg. 97, 100; Berkes 2009, 
pg. 1696, 1700; Ostrom 2009, pg.421). 
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Once again, in this set the logic for participation is instrumental and foundational: participation of 
resource users is essential for innovation and dealing with complexity and change in the SES context. 
Empirics and how to transform governance –Defeo et al 2009; Gelcich et al 
2010; Gutierrez et al 2011 
Each of these four papers assumes the SES framing in common with each of the previous sets. Each 
is also concerned with how to effect the transformation of governance to meet the SES framing of 
resource problems. In each paper, the problem to be solved is a single-sector resource problem at the 
local level but framed in the SES context of interdependency and complex dynamics. 
Defeo and his co-authors (2009) focus almost exclusively on the technical threats to sandy beach 
ecosystems but nevertheless finish their paper with the assertion that that local stakeholders’ 
participation in governance is ultimately essential (Defeo et al 2009, pg. 9). Gelcich et al (2010) and 
Gutierrez et al (2011) contribute empirical analysis of case studies to understand enabling factors and 
conducive conditions for governance innovation and transformation. Cinner and his co-authors (2012) 
also focus at the local level and introduce a greater level of detail on power relations within the 
governance context and the interdependencies between ecological outcomes and social and 
economic outcomes. 
In these papers, social processes are reaffirmed as critical success factors in transforming 
governance: community-based leadership, social cohesion and social capital, and co-generation of 
knowledge through resource user partnerships with scientists (Gelcich et al 2010, pg. 16 794, 16 795, 
16 798; Gutierrez 2011, pg. 386, 387). These social processes are regarded as both pre-conditions 
and active transformative mechanisms for shifting governance from a technical top-down use of 
regulation and management levers to effective network-based engagement of resource users in 
determining the new needs to produce sustainable fisheries (Gelcich et al 2010, pg. 16 794; Gutierrez 
et al 2011, pg. 386, 388).The predominant participants in these papers, as with the previous papers, 
are local level resource users and also reference ‘communities’ (Gelcich et al 2010, pg. 16 798; 
Gutierrez et al 2011, pg. 386). 
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The conceptualisation of participation in these final four papers is consistent with all previous sets: 
participation is assumed (ontological) and so therefore necessary, underpins the social processes that 
define how a social-ecological system works, and is instrumental in achieving adaptation to 
ecosystem problems. 
Summary comments 
Taken together, the 14 papers show the development of the influence of the SES paradigm across 
the marine research and practice. Starting with the problem of resource failure and coming to terms 
with what ‘sustainable management’ actually means and how it can be achieved, the systems 
approach opened a new way of looking at the problem – from resources sector to linked social and 
ecological systems. This was a major shift in thinking about human uses and the changing marine 
environment. It gave rise to a rich scholarship seeking to understand and explain how human and 
ecological systems together will respond to climate change and find opportunities for minimising 
negative impacts of climate-driven changes and the human problems of over-exploiting marine 
commons (including species). Underpinning all the papers is the framing of SES governance and 
policy as social systems and social processes: social learning, deliberation, knowledge co-generation, 
all leading to changes in human interactions with the ecosystem to achieve ‘sustainability’. 
The development of the conceptualisation of participation through these papers is depicted in Figure 3 
below. 
 
Figure 3: Depiction of the development of the dominant conceptualisation of participation from instrumental to ontological 
under the influence of the social-ecological systems theory 
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The conceptualisation of participation is ontological within the SES theory in that it defines how the 
world works. On this ontological basis, participation is then also an instrumental dimension of the 
social processes of governance and policy. Participation is the means by which social processes 
work. This conceptualisation of participation is consistent across these papers that have been highly 
influential for marine governance research and the practice reflected in the research. This indicates 
that by 2011 this conceptualisation had become embedded as a dominant and deep-seated norm for 
marine governance. 
Who participates, how and why: deductive analysis of the most 
influential texts 
In this section, the results of the deductive analysis using NVIVO software are set out according to the 
coding framework. The codebook used for this analysis can be found in Appendix 4. 
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Who (participant types) 
Across the data set, the participant types were consistently actors most directly associated with the 
marine resource in practical, and primarily economic, ways: ‘resource user’, ‘user-groups’ and 
‘stakeholders’. Closer analysis of the generic terms ‘users’ and ‘user-groups’ showed these most 
often referred to the fisher, as small-scale enterprise, and commercial fisheries as corporate actors. 
The term ‘stakeholders’ appeared commonly across the set, though in slightly differing ways: 
sometimes interchangeably with resource users such as fishers and in other cases to capture a range 
of mostly unspecified other interests most prominently as non-government organisations representing 
conservation concerns. This indicated a growing awareness of the rights, stakes, interests, values 
and even identities of non-fishers across the period. It also indicated, however, that fishers or actors 
commercially connected at a local level to a resource remain the primary participant type in focus for 
marine governance research. The second most prominent participant type across the set was the 
state represented as terms such as ‘policy officer’ or, more often, ‘managers’, ‘management’ or 
‘resource managers’. This is unsurprising because these are the central actors in the existing 
hierarchical governance system. 
How (forms of participation) 
Social processes focused on building social capital and trust, collectively generating rules and 
practices and generating social learning, arose as the predominant forms of participation consistently. 
Specific institutional forms of such social processes were not specified but rather, common across 
each paper was a focus on social learning, sharing power through knowledge generation to deal with 
uncertainty and building productive relationships between and among actor groups. Engaging with, 
building and extending through networks of relationships figured prominently and indicated 
assumptions about how social processes work. Specifically – and perhaps institutionally – how this 
might happen was largely left unspecified. By 2009, greater attention was paid to the mechanics of 
how such social processes might be structured institutionally and also an emphasis on tailoring 
institutional arrangements and forms of participation to local conditions to enable institutional change 
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that ensures governance rules and processes reflect the dynamics and particularities of a given 
social-ecological system (or society) (Armitage 2009; Jentoft 2007; Ostrom 2009) 
A growing call for the state to make space for self-organising institutions and shift flexibly to respond 
by sharing power to set rules and make decisions was evident across the set. The state appeared 
across the data set via the policy actors as audience and participant of the SES social processes 
approach. Reference to the state was primarily oblique but consistent, for example, or as the 
‘resource management system’. Attention to how a bureaucracy, i.e. policy actors, negotiates the 
recommended participatory processes was minimal and primarily by reference to sharing power and 
developing dynamic links with social networks. This included developing inclusive links with the 
directly politicised processes of interest formation and interest coalitions. 
Why (problems to be solved by participatory approaches) 
The overarching concern common across the papers was that of marine ecosystem change under 
climate change and increased human exploitation of marine ecosystems. Social change readiness 
and the capacity of societies to adapt to either radical or incremental ecosystem change were the 
common primary drivers. There was a high degree of consistency in the descriptions of specific 
problems-to-be-solved that were regarded as necessary for humans to adapt to changing ecosystem 
conditions. There were: 
• reducing conflict in order to avoid over-exploitation and enable new forms of resource use; 
• building social capital and other ‘social resources’, particularly trust and interpersonal 
connections and shared norms, across stakeholder networks in order to: 
o reduce non-compliance and enable new forms of resource use to develop, and 
o increase the capacity of a society to adjust to new ecological conditions; 
• increase the legitimacy of changes to resource use and subsequent changes in livelihood 
impacts. 
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The reasons for participation, then, reveal strong concerns about impending significant ‘disruptive’ or 
‘unwanted’ change, and at times a distinctly compassionate tone to the resolutions (‘nurture renewal’). 
Furthermore, participation in social processes is proposed as the solution to addressing those 
concerns. 
Summary comments 
Across each of the three deductive categories (who, how, why), participation was conceptualised as 
the foundational and instrumental means for addressing impending changes in the marine ecosystem. 
Social processes of learning, knowledge co-generation, building trust and relationships were the 
central forms of participation. The social processes are focused on reducing conflict over use of 
marine ecosystems and facilitating new behaviours and ways of thinking about interactions with the 
marine ecosystem in the context of ecosystem change. Descriptions of how participation should be 
structured were not specific in terms of institutional design but rather reflected through extensive 
discussion of social learning, knowledge co-generation, social capital and trust building. Relationships 
with the state as the asset regulator were treated largely as a backdrop to the requirement for sharing 
power and authority across governance networks to reform existing government systems. In practical 
terms, the focus was on stakeholders or resource users implying close proximity to the marine 
ecosystem and is the key legitimacy criteria for participatory actors. 
Marine governance as social and local: automated conceptual analysis 
The two most dominant themes (Figure 4) were ‘social’ and ‘local’ and were significantly stronger than 
the remaining three as can be seen in Table 3). The shared area between these two dominant 
themes is large and comprises the top four concepts (marked with asterisks in Table 3). 
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Figure 4: Automated analysis of the dominant themes: The results are colour-coded to indicate strongest to weakest 
associations: red is the most dominant theme, followed by yellow-green and on through the colour wheel to green and then 
the ‘cooler’ blue and purple (Leximancer User Guide 2018, pg. 12). 
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GOVERNANCE 
SOCIAL 
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Table 5: Detail the composition of the themes 
Theme 
Domain 
Ranked 
Number 
of text 
elements 
Concepts comprising the theme 
(number of concepts in brackets)  
Social red (1) 1311 
Social*, systems**, management***, governance****, resource, 
change, adaptive, ecosystem, ecological, ecosystems, resources, 
complex, dynamics, users, institutions, processes, use, 
environmental, conditions, understanding, stakeholders, information, 
diversity, variables (25) 
Local yellow (2) 861 
Local, knowledge, learning, co-management, users, institutional, 
different, groups, process, important, levels, communities, rules, 
conditions, government, community (16) 
Coastal green (3) 760 
Coastal, fisheries, MPAs, human, marine, areas, natural, economic, 
example, research, species, impacts, beaches, large, beach (15) 
Fishing blue (4) 310 Fishing, time, people, success, fishers, MPA (6) 
Governing purple 5 112 Governing (1) 
Concept ranking: * Rank 1 **Rank 2 ***Rank 3 ****Rank 4 
 
The dominance of the overarching theme ‘social’, in the red bubble, is clear. This theme was 
generated from 1311 text elements (‘hits’ in the key for Figure 4 above, and summarised in Table 5 
above) and comprises 25 concepts, including the top 4 concepts: ‘social’, ‘systems’, ‘management’, 
‘governance’ as shown in Table 5.  
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Figure 5: Detail of the links between concepts that comprised the themes. This figure retains colour-coding of the theme 
dominance from Figure 4 (above). Here the larger grey dots also indicate the more dominant concepts and the grey lines 
represent the co-occurrence relationships between concepts. 
The concept ‘systems’ is a strong hub within the theme connecting ‘social’, ‘change’, ‘need’, 
‘governing (via ‘system’), ‘variables’ and ‘governance’ (via ‘complex’). A linked cluster extends from 
‘social’ through ‘ecological’ to ‘understanding dynamics’ and on to ‘change’ also. These two clusters 
reflect SES interests and also reflect a conceptualisation of governance as fundamentally social. The 
only actor concept in this red portion of this theme is ‘stakeholders’. 
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The shared area between ‘social’ and the ‘coastal’ (green) theme concepts of ecology and 
environment are linked with ‘economic’ via ‘resilience’ as a ‘social’ concept. These linked concepts 
also indicate the strength of social-ecological systems research and associated this body of work 
more firmly with coastal zone research compared with fishing (lime green theme). 
The shared area between the two top themes, ‘social’ and ‘local’, encompasses a little under half of 
each theme and includes two of the strongest concepts: ‘social’ and ‘management’. In this shared 
‘social–local’ area the foundation concept ‘social’ connects stepwise to ‘local’ concepts ‘resource use’ 
to ‘rules’, ’information’ and ‘institutions’ in one direction. The links between ‘different knowledge’, 
‘institutional’ and ‘adaptive’ in the lower section of the shared area (with ‘adaptive’ the strongest of 
these concepts) also reflect the social-ecological social processes interests. A small cluster around 
‘management’, a weak hub connects the ‘social–local’ area to the fishing theme (lime green), but the 
connection is via a single lower-ranked concept. The only actor cohort in the shared area is ‘resource 
user’, closely associated with the weaker ‘management’ concept. 
The second most dominant ‘local’ theme (orange) was generated from 861 text elements and 16 
concepts. The foundation concept ‘local’ is a hub connecting ‘government’ and ‘co-management’ out 
alone in the ‘local’ area. Secondly, ‘local’ connects ‘communities’, ‘community’ and ‘fishers’ into a 
shared area with the ‘fishing’ theme (lime green), noting that these three concepts refer to actor 
cohorts, unlike most other concepts across any other theme. A third ‘spoke’ of the ‘local’ hub connects 
to the weaker ‘management’ links in the shared area (noted above). The fourth more closely 
connected ‘spoke’ links through ‘groups’ to the ‘different knowledge’ - ‘institutional’ – ‘adaptive’ links in 
the lower part of the shared area. There only actor cohort in the theme area (excluding the shared 
‘social–local’ area) is ‘government’, but this is not well linked (single connection with ‘co-
management’). 
Finally, the central concept node ‘social’ also extends through ‘system’ to the ‘governing’ theme 
(bright blue). This theme, although lowest ranked, is quite distinct from the others and close analysis 
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of the text elements and sources for this theme were derived exclusively from Jentoft 2007 and 
Jentoft et al 2007. 
Summary comments 
The two dominant themes, ‘social’ and ‘local’ and the concept clusters in the shared ‘social’–‘local’ 
area are the strongest themes from marine governance literature. They reflect, and resonate with, the 
inductive qualitative analysis that identified the prominence of social-ecological systems research and 
the primary concerns of change and adaptation. The governance and management concerns of the 
social-ecological systems approach are clearly identified as social processes, reflecting the 
ontological assumption identified in the inductive reading discussed earlier. The clusters show both 
management and governance, but also learning and adaptation are central social processes. Clearly 
also, these are conceptualised as ‘local’ processes. Which actor cohorts comprise ‘local’ is less 
coherent or more scattered across the themes. The dominant participant concepts from the analysis 
are ‘users’ and ‘stakeholders’, again consistent with both the inductive and deductive analyses 
discussed above. While the concept of ‘stakeholders’ is related to governance and institutions, the 
concept of ‘users’ is more closely related to management. As noted above, three actor concepts 
(communities, community and fisher) appeared in the ‘fishing’ theme (lime green) but not substantially 
linked to the major theme social and local or strongest concepts. The disconnect between specific 
actor cohorts is intriguing and suggests that while governance and management processes have 
been reconceptualised as social, rather than policy or political, processes, who is involved is implied 
or assumed to be clear to the reader. Participation does not directly figure in this analysis. It is, 
however, implied the predominance of ‘social’ and presence of the social processes, i.e. social 
processes necessarily comprising people doing things together. The conceptualisation of participation 
then can be inferred from the social–local themes and the social processes present as the core 
concepts; that is, it is foundational and instrumental, necessary but not necessarily discussed directly. 
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Discussion 
How is participation conceptualised in marine governance? (research 
question 1) 
Four closely interrelated findings were common across the analyses conducted in the previous 
section (inductive–interpretive; deductive; automated conceptual analysis). Firstly, the link forged 
between social and ecological systems across the texts placed the social-ecological system as the 
central focus of human action, and research. Secondly, and extending from the first, is that the driving 
purpose of governance and policy is behaviour change and specifically adaptation to significant 
impending marine ecosystem and species changes. This is a significant shift in governance objective 
compared with, for example, maximising marine resource exploitation (e.g. see discussion in Jentoft 
et al 2007), and signals a more fundamental change in the politics of human–marine ecosystem 
interactions within the governance literature (sensu Bacchi 2012). Thirdly, is the reconceptualisation 
of policy and governance as primarily social processes, rather than political processes: social learning 
and knowledge building, for example, were key processes apparent in the material. This third finding 
extends logically from the previous two: if radical change is impending, the adaptation becomes the 
objective, and the research indicates governance and policy as key behaviour controls must drive that 
change. Fourthly, the strong link between social processes and the local context stood out strongly: 
participants were fishers, communities or marine stakeholders engaged directly in social processes, 
primarily at the local level. Participation did not emerge as a specific term used but is implicit. It is 
reasonable to infer from the findings that for social processes to take place, people must participate. 
Further, it can be inferred from the social–local connection in combination with the conceptualisation 
of governance and policy as social processes of social learning and knowledge sharing. The 
conceptualisation of participation, then, is implicit and foundational. 
Taken together, this set of texts marks a paradigm shift to social-ecological systems thinking (Hughes 
et al 2005) that has grown from a confluence of three sources: commons research and theory (Dietz 
et al 2003; Ostrom 2007; Ostrom 2009); fisheries management challenges in the face of the failure of 
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major fisheries stocks (Gutierrez 2011; Hughes et al 2005; Jentoft 2007); and the development of 
ecology science into SES (Adger et al 2005; Armitage et al 2009; Christie 2004; Cinner 2012; Folke et 
al 2005). By paradigm, I refer here to a framework or system of shared assumptions, concepts, 
questions, methods, practices and values that structure inquiry (sensu Kuhn 1962). To better 
understand the dominant conceptualisation of participation, it is necessary to first to understand this 
underpinning paradigm. Lying at the heart of this paradigm is a profound concern about significant 
marine ecosystem changes and potential collapse under climate change, and the implications of 
these for human societies. Starting with the problem of resource failure and coming to terms with what 
‘sustainable management’ actually means and how it can be achieved, the systems approach opened 
a new way of looking at the problem – from resources sector problems to linked social and ecological 
systems. The elements that comprise this paradigm are synthesised from the analysis above and 
described in Table 6 below. These provide ontological, epistemological and axiological foundations of 
the paradigm that alter how marine governance researchers and practitioners think about human uses 
of marine ecosystems, how they think about decision-making processes and institutions, and so also 
the conceptualisation of participation. 
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Table 6: The elements of the SES paradigm as they relate to participation. The paradigmatic statements were generated by 
synthesising the findings from the three analysis steps: inductive, deductive and automatic conceptual analysis. 
Paradigmatic statement Paradigmatic element 
 
1 
Reality is created in dynamic systems: social and ecological, and coupled social-
ecological. 
ontology (nature 
of reality) 
2 Ecological and social resilience are integrally and unavoidably interlinked.  ontology 
3 Social and ecological systems are complex and share similar complexity traits: complexity, diversity; dynamics; vulnerability8. ontology 
4 This means we live in uncertainty, we cannot predict precisely, we must work with and respond to information and knowledge as it is developed. 
axiology (what is 
true because of 
the ontology) 
5 
The complexity of both social and ecological systems, and they complexity of how 
they are connected, means there are limits to governability (what can be governed, 
how it can be governed, and how much governing will be able to address the problem 
or interest at hand), and efforts must focus on the full range of social processes. 
epistemology 
(nature of how we 
can know and do 
things) 
6 
Social systems are created through and comprise social processes and group dynamics.  
Individuals have agency within social processes, and work as groups through 
interactions, and through our agency we create systems and institutions. 
Change can only be created and/or secured through social/group processes (like trust, 
social capital, social learning). 
ontology 
7 
Iterative, reflective processes of learning and responding are how we understand and 
operate. 
Learning through sharing different knowledges, and through engagement and dialogue 
is an essential social process for the dynamics of social-ecological systems (change; 
complexity). 
Institutions and social processes must continually change and have varying degrees of 
resistance, permeability, flexibility. 
epistemology 
8 
Knowledge production must be participatory and communicative, driven by 
stakeholders, directly applicable to ‘real world’ problems, but also the arbiter of what 
is possible (ecological limits, ecological regime changes, planetary boundaries) – 
science is one form of knowledge creation (albeit a higher status), but in particular the 
epistemology 
                                                     
8 Vulnerability is also cast as resilience or adaptive capacity. 
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knowledge from ecology sciences (including modelling) define, in this paradigm, the 
nature of reality (see opening statements). 
All forms of knowledge are equally essential in understanding the social-ecological 
system, responding to changes and to decisions to be made 
Knowledge and learning are social processes through which behaviour and practices 
will be modified. This is the foundation of governance. 
9 
Governance is a dispersed activity comprising these social processes (above) that 
spread power across the social system in order to effect behaviour changes. 
This means: 
- governance comprises social learning, consensus, compromise, negotiation, 
trade-offs across social systems (including government) and so 
- governance must be, can only be, participatory.  
axiology 
 
The theory of change9 underpinning the SES conceptualisation of governance, set out in Table 8 
below, shows the prevalence of connective social processes in defining how governance happens: 
bridging organisations, social capital, participatory science and so on. 
  
                                                     
9 A theory of change is the if-then causal logic that explains how actions will, or are plausibly likely to, lead to 
desired outcomes, e.g. see https://www.wkkf.org/resource-directory/resource/2006/02/wk-kellogg-foundation-
logic-model-development-guide (accessed September 2018) 
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Table 7: Schematic of the theory of change that animates the SES paradigm 
If we combine these elements, then …  … we will produce these effects 
Inputs  + Actors  + Processes  ⇒ Outputs ⇒ Outcomes ⇒ Objectives 
Knowledge
s 
 
Citizen groups, 
interest groups 
(informal), 
representative groups 
(formal), scientists, 
resource users, 
facilitators, policy 
officers/actors [other 
terms from the set?] 
 
Social learning and 
iterative decision-making 
 
Social capital; 
Trust; 
Adaptive learning 
cultures; 
Culturally based 
monitoring and 
compliance (alongside 
legislative); 
Flexible responsive 
adaptive institutions; 
Inclusive decisions; 
New economic forms 
(livelihood); 
New forms of and rules 
for exploiting ecosystems. 
Process legitimacy; 
Output legitimacy; 
Ecosystem 
balance/productivity
, resilience or 
conservation of 
biodiversity; Social 
adaptation to 
ecosystem change 
Human 
wellbeing; 
Ecosystem 
resilience and 
biodiversity 
Science Ecology and modelling sciences 
Interests, 
stakes, 
values 
Social processes 
(contestation, resistance, 
deliberation, negotiation) 
Political coalitions 
Institutional 
forms 
Bridging or boundary orgs 
and bridging processes; 
integrating processes (e.g. 
marine spatial planning) 
  
 
  105 
  
  
  
  
   
Legitimate decision-making is constituted through these social processes and pushes up through the 
social system to be ultimately captured in legislation, policy or a related instrument of authority. The 
SES theory of change constructed here describes the basis upon which management, in the first 
instance (Defeo et al 2003; Christie 2004), and later governance (Jentoft 2007; Jentoft et al 2007) is 
reconceptualised and positioned against the hierarchical government paradigm (see statement 9, 
Table 6 above). Governance then becomes much more than a set of bureaucratic and institutional 
processes for legitimately allocating resources or exploitation rights. It becomes a broad-based 
definition of society as dynamic. It becomes a set of dynamic social processes in which policy actors 
and ‘governors’ are facilitators in a system where power is assumed to be dispersed across all social 
actors, because that is how society is constructed. 
Underpinning the paradigm is the framing of governance and policy as social systems and social 
processes: social learning, deliberation and behaviour change. The notion of governance becomes 
all-encompassing, an expression of how social as well as ecological life is interconnected, 
interdependent and dynamic, but with top predators – or top power holders – also dependent on other 
in the system. The problems to be solved become adapting to new ecological conditions, including 
limits to what can be derived from the marine ecosystem, and in turn driving a need to develop new 
social and economic conditions. Decisions must be made in the context of uncertainty, not only the 
familiar uncertainty of traditional scientific methods, but also a kind of radical uncertainty based on 
unknowable emerging reality (complexity and dynamics). Decision-making processes must be made 
by drawing on a range of knowledges and perspectives and must also directly and immediately 
change the behaviour of people in the social-ecological system. They must be participatory, systems 
based, and social-learning based. They must build the social connective tissues such as social capital 
and trust. The resolutions and solutions then depend upon direct and ongoing participation of all 
social actors. 
Governance becomes more than a set of bureaucratic and institutional processes for legitimately 
allocating resources or exploitation rights. Governance becomes a broad-based definition of society 
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as a set of social dynamic processes in which policy actors and ‘governors’ are facilitators in a system 
where power is dispersed across all social actors not by right but because that is how society works. 
A diversity of flexible forms of participation is fundamental in response to the interconnectedness, 
diversity, flexibility, complexity and dynamism of social-ecological systems. Effective governance, i.e. 
governance that can positively influence the adaptive capacity of communities and the resilience of 
ecosystems in the face of radical change, requires the introduction of civil society governance 
networked to corporate/private or market governance and hierarchical top-down government. The 
state, formerly the central legitimate actor in rule-setting, monitoring and compliance, becomes one of 
a number of influencing actors. Power is dispersed across the social or governance system, and the 
policy process can only be networked, negotiated, iterative and emergent. The conceptualisation of 
participation is implicit in this framing: participation is an instrumental dimension of the social 
processes of governance as a reflection of how the social-ecological system works. Participation is 
how the social processes work: it is foundational, essential and instrumental. This instrumentalism is 
ontological in that it defines the nature of how things are: participatory forms must be implemented 
because that is how the social-ecological world works; to effect the required change (to reflect the 
social-ecological interdependencies) participatory forms of governance and management must be 
implemented. It is also aspirational and positively transformative. From this analysis, the axioms of the 
SES paradigmatic conceptualisation of participation appear as follows in Table 9. 
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Table 8: Axioms which constitute the dominant conceptualisation of participation influencing the marine governance 
literature 
Axiom  Explanation 
Participation is 
ontological 
(Axiom 1) 
Participation is the fundamental social process. Participation produces the social 
resources (such as social capital and trust, norms of sustainability and resource use 
and social sanctions) that underpin governance of marine social-ecological systems. 
This means that governance institutions must be and can only be participatory 
because change can only be created through social/group processes. Representative 
mechanisms disrupt the operation of the social processes. Institutional design must 
be predicated on social processes such as coalition building, consensus, 
compromise, negotiation – these are the central social decision-making 
mechanisms. 
Institutional power 
is dispersed 
(Axiom 2) 
Power is already dispersed across social networks and so governance structures 
must connect corporate/private/market governance, hierarchical top-down 
government (bureaucracy) and civil (community) domains. The policy process 
(management) can only be negotiated and iterative because all actors hold power. 
This also means that the state (bureaucracy) formerly the central power holder in 
decision-making, rule-setting, monitoring and compliance, becomes one of a 
number of influential actors for these activities. 
Governance is social 
(Axiom 3) 
Institutional design must enable social processes such as knowledge co-production, 
social learning, consensus, compromise and negotiation as the decision-making 
mechanisms that reflect dispersed power and deliver the social resources that 
underpin the functioning of the social-ecological system, and will lead to social 
behaviour change and control, and the allocation of resources. 
 
Under this social-ecological systems paradigm. then, this conceptualisation of participation becomes 
a norm. A social norm comprises a set of rules and standards of behaviour that reflect shared values 
and shared assumptions about what is good and right, what should and should not be done or said 
(Elster 1989; Lapinski and Rimal 2015). Norms, therefore, create social order but can also limit and 
constrain what can be said, thought or done, and work against groups seeing old problems in new 
ways (Lapinksi and Rimal 2015). The SES participation norm reflects the precepts of participatory 
democracy theories: that direct participation is the privileged means through which agency can be 
experienced; agency is experienced through social processes of deliberation; and that participatory 
forms will address the shortcomings or failures of the representative state mode of governance and 
disperse decision-making power across the social system. Given this, the participation practices and 
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processes within marine governance are likely to be vulnerable to the challenges inherent in 
participatory democracy theories and practices: the problem of scalability beyond the local; the 
problem of exclusion and the questions about who decides who’s in and who’s out; and a reliance on 
representative mechanisms treated pragmatically rather than as a linked and significant power 
relation. 
Further, the SES ontological instrumentalism also closely aligns with the technocratic logic of 
participation identified in the more recent empirical literature as discussed in my Introduction (pg. 17). 
The justification for participatory processes under the technocratic logic resonates strongly with those 
of the SES ontological logic of participation: increasing legitimacy through involvement of ‘interested 
publics’; information sharing so ‘interested publics’ can understand the decision-making compromises 
of the state; arguments for empowerment through having a say or being heard regardless of the 
impact upon actual decision making (Weber 2018; Flannery et al 2018). It may be at this point of 
tension where failure of the participatory practices occurs. If so, citizen disillusionment and distrust in 
marine governance may be explained by the tensions between the technocratic and SES ontological 
logics and their divergent drivers – consolidating power in the former and dispersing power in the 
latter. 
Finally, the focus on ‘stakeholders’ and a broad general ‘interested publics’ category, in the material 
analysed above, is a strong clue that in practice the stakeholder resolution (discussed in Chapter 3) is 
also in play within marine governance. If so, then it follows that under the influence of the norm of 
participation, the core role of representation in the facilitation of political participation is likely to be 
overlooked in marine governance. This proposition will be explored further in the case studies in 
Chapters 6 and 7. Now, however, I turn to applying the lens of participation–representation to the SES 
axioms to explore the extent to which it assists in problematising participation and the link with 
representation any further. 
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Applying the lens of participation–representation: authorisation; 
dissent and exit and accountability (research question 2) 
The lens of participation–representation, established in Chapter 3, comprises three conditions that 
help identify, explain and analyse how the inextricable connection between participation and 
representation is constituted. The conditions are authorisation, dissent and exit, and accountability 
and are discussed in detail in Chapter 3 (see pg. 69) and summarised in Table 9. 
Table 9: Participation–representation lens 
Condition Explanation 
Authorisation The authorisation condition is the ability of the represented to ‘appoint’ and in some 
way legitimise the representative in a way that recognises the active relationship 
between them.  
Dissent and exit The dissent and exit condition refers to the capacity of or opportunity for the represented 
party (group or individual) to dispute, change or withdraw from the representative 
relationship. This capacity is the sign that the individual or group to be represented is 
free from coercion, and therefore that the representative relationship is facilitating 
agency by agreement.  
Accountability In this lens, accountability encompasses the ability of the represented to take 
responsibility or be held responsible for the actions of the representative, i.e. to engage 
in some way in the actions of the representative.  
 
The conditions are conceptual and practical component parts that address the power relations 
inherent in the inextricable connection between participation and representation. It is these conditions 
that explain the extent to which ‘the citizen’s’ political participation is facilitated by the representative 
mechanisms that are inevitably in play. Therefore, the conditions also provide insight into the 
democratic legitimacy of whatever is being analysed. In this section, I have applied this lens to the 
SES participation norm to probe how throughput legitimacy and agency is likely to be addressed in 
the SES paradigm. The analyses in this chapter are purposefully focused on the conceptual and so 
do not discuss specific material practices or empirical cases. Accordingly, in this section I have 
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provided exploratory inferential analyses of the implications of the three conditions for the SES 
conceptualisation of participation established above. 
Authorisation 
Under the SES paradigm, participation of people is assumed to be direct and deliberative (Axiom 1 
participation is ontological; Axiom 3 governance is social). Change and governance take place 
through direct involvement in social processes, not formally representative processes, institutions or 
relationships (Axiom 2 dispersed power). This means that, conceptually, authorisation of any 
representative institution, process or relationship does not need to be overtly addressed under this 
paradigm. In practice, if the representative mechanisms are utilised pragmatically to deliver the 
participatory precepts (as per the stakeholder proxy resolution identified in Chapter 3), authorisation 
may be assumed to be either residing within the formally representative mechanisms of the 
stakeholder resolution or residing with the stakeholder selection processes conducted by participation 
professionals. 
Dissent and exit 
Firstly, under the influence of the precept that participation is ontological (Axiom 1), the dissent and 
exit condition is likely to hold limited significance as an indicator of democratic legitimacy. This is 
because direct self-presentation is the privileged conceptualisation of participation, and implicit within 
this conceptualisation is that the self-representing citizen is, by definition, free from coercion. 
Secondly, under the SES axioms the representative relationship is absent – or at best an 
overshadowed and instrumental necessity, but not of conceptual significance. If so, it follows that 
presence or absence of the dissent and exit condition within instrumental representative mechanisms 
at play would similarly lack conceptual significance under this paradigm. This would mean, then, that 
at least in principle, representatives could be taken as an instrumental proxy for a perceived 
constituency regardless of the opportunity to dissent or change the terms of the representative 
relationship between representatives and the broader constituency. Furthermore, it can be inferred 
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from Axiom 3 (governance is social) that dissent from structures, policies or other content is likely to 
be treated as a systems issue that requires incorporation and resolution through social processes of 
knowledge co-production, social learning and behaviour change and adaptation. The objective of 
adaptation and living within ecosystem boundaries within the SES paradigm is assumed and debate 
or dissent will be incorporated within the governance system as a problem solvable through 
deliberation and social learning. 
Accountability 
Once again, given the conceptual absence of representative mechanisms or relationships, it can be 
inferred that the accountability condition is not relevant under the SES axioms. This is because 
people are directly involved in the governance processes, and these are social processes of 
knowledge generation, learning, deliberation and adaptation – the opportunity to take responsibility for 
the governance actions and decision is direct and unmediated. Once again, if the pragmatic reliance 
on formally representative practices is in play in marine governance, it must be inferred that 
accountability is dealt with via the formally representative system that produces ‘stakeholders’. 
Alternative forms of accountability for those not involved in the formal representative system are not 
addressed. 
Synthesis 
The analysis here is necessarily inferential, given the axioms are specifically designed to parse the 
SES paradigm to explain the dominant conceptualisation of participation. Nevertheless, this analysis 
indicates the conditions for testing the democratic legitimacy of the participatory forms are unlikely to 
be addressed under the SES paradigm. Rather, viewed through the lens of participation–
representation, it appears that the democratic legitimacy of participatory forms under the current SES 
paradigm is settled under the axiom that participation is ontological, and so also that decision-making 
and governance are directly participatory and therefore also legitimate. The pragmatic reliance on 
representative resolutions to facilitating participation was also inferred for each condition. This 
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reliance has a set of challenges established in Chapter 3. Firstly, the chain of representative 
relationships and the trustee mode that defines the representative relationship implies there will 
always be a ‘represented’ despite the privileging of participation. In turn, this raises questions about 
the extent to which that represented person or group can experience political agency if the conditions 
are unclear and the representative relationship is not addressed overtly. Secondly, given the direct 
and deliberative theory of change underpinning the social processes, how would the ‘represented’ 
person or group experience the transformations and agency if their participation is mediated through a 
representative. Thirdly, if the representative mechanisms are pragmatic resolutions rather than 
explicitly authorised by potential ‘represented’ people and groups, who is choosing, selecting, 
deciding and ultimately authorising the participation of some and the exclusion of others. If this is not 
potentially represented people or groups, it would be difficult to argue the participatory processes are 
democratically legitimate. 
Given the axioms of this paradigm were elicited from highly influencing research within marine 
governance, I contend that these same assumptions are likely to be determining the assessment of 
the democratic legitimacy of diverse, self-organising and direct participatory institutions under the 
SES paradigm. Alternatively, it may be the case that implicit within the SES paradigm is an alternative 
account of legitimacy to the democratic account established in Chapter 3. Identifying such an 
alternative account is a substantial undertaking and so lies outside the scope of this project but is an 
important direction for future research. Finally, I suggest that the methods innovations introduced here 
have provided an empirical basis for the findings and strengthened the applicability of my findings to 
more than one context. This means that the findings are worth further empirical analysis in specific 
contexts. 
Conclusions 
In this chapter, I have established that across the body of marine governance literature the social-
ecological systems paradigm has become the dominant framing for how we think about change in the 
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governance of the marine environment. I have shown that the SES paradigm also implicitly changes 
how we think about participation. The social-ecological systems approach is built on the notion that 
human systems are foremost social processes, and the research has continued to demonstrate 
success factors for positive adaptive social processes such as social learning, deliberation, trust and 
social capital. The paradigm incorporates both marine governance research and practice and also 
refers to all human societies, regardless of differences in political, cultural or ecological differences. 
The conceptualisation of participation is implicit as a powerful norm that is ontologically instrumental. 
This means that participation is effective and necessary – even foundational – as an inevitable and 
productive condition of how the world is, but it is not conceptualised as a political right per se. This 
also means that the logical approach to policy and governance under the SES paradigm is directly 
participatory. The SES norm goes further than political theories of participation as it incorporates 
empirical research on social adaptation and behaviour modification extending from the social-
ecological systems research agenda for resources management and ecosystem adaptation. 
Secondly, my examination using the lens showed that the SES marine governance norm privileges 
participation and reflects participatory democracy theory. Consequently, the power relations between 
participation and representation are not directly addressed. Importantly, how legitimacy is addressed 
is not clear. That is, the processes of authorisation, dissent and exit and accountability are not clear 
but rather are absorbed by the precept that participation should be encompassing and direct, with the 
implication that they should not be mediated by representative mechanisms. However, it is likely that 
in attempting to deal with the scale and exclusion problems of participatory democracy theories, 
marine governance processes are likely to retain a pragmatic dependency of representative 
mechanisms, despite the precepts of the SES paradigm, like the participatory democracy theory 
ignoring them as not appropriate to governance as a direct social endeavour. 
These findings reflect those of the participatory democracy theory and practices identified in the 
previous chapter: the denial of representative political processes as sources of legitimacy and political 
agency; the inability to scale to large, diverse and plural societies – or in this case, social-ecological 
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systems; and the problem of exclusion inherent in participation. The SES paradigm has absorbed the 
precepts and incorporated the empirical research of behaviour modification towards an objective set 
by resources sciences (e.g. collapsing stocks, species redistribution) or conservation (biodiversity and 
survival of productive ecosystems). SES is politically normative with a distinct perspective on political 
relations, but this is not formally articulated. Furthermore, the SES paradigm appears to be largely 
disconnected from the critiques of participatory democracy theory; rather, the precepts of direct 
democracy and the implications for the shift to network governance are uncritically adopted. Under 
the SES paradigm, the remit of marine governance stretches beyond policy to include social and 
economic goals and even the wellbeing and future viability of ‘communities’ and human society. 
However, legitimacy is not constituted according to the democratic principles of participation 
established in Chapter 3 (sensu Pitkin 1967 and Scharpf–Schmidt). If governance has become a set 
of social processes stripped of the political and institutional drivers of the existing system, and 
participation has become more ‘how the world works’ than a foundational principle for a democratic 
polity, how then is legitimacy demonstrated or enacted? As noted above, fully addressing this 
question and articulating the political theory of the SES paradigm both lie outside the scope of this 
particular research but are important directions for future research.  
Further, I suggest that the axioms of the SES paradigm and the implicit conceptualisation of 
participation push participation from ‘input’ legitimacy, e.g. consultation in the Scharpf–Schmidt 
model, to throughput legitimacy, i.e. participation as the governance process itself. If so, then the 
problem of exclusion in a more populous polity, as opposed to the ‘local’ driver in the SES paradigm, 
will become a more pressing problem of legitimacy in larger, more populous democratic contexts. 
Further, if the stakeholder resolution or similar representative mechanisms are at play in addressing 
this problem in the applied context, then the exclusions and the lack of clear authorisation, dissent 
and exit, and accountability resolutions inherent in the SES paradigm will undermine the legitimacy of 
an initiative or institution built on the axioms of the SES paradigm. If so, this would also mean that the 
initiatives will fail to engage the desired constituencies in the processes of change and adaptation to 
the changing marine conditions that are at the core of the SES approach to marine governance. In the 
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following two chapters I turn analysing the presence of the SES marine participatory norm in the 
applied context. In these chapters, I also test the utility of the lens for explaining the limits of 
participatory marine governance. The two case studies allow us to test how the lens works in practice, 
as well as providing insights for building SES participatory governance theory. 
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Chapter 5. 
Case study methods and materials – testing the 
conceptual in the applied context 
In this methods chapter, I set out the details of the third step in the overarching research design for 
the problematisation of participation: two case studies from the applied context. To recap, in Chapters 
3 and 4, I examined conceptualisations of participation in the theoretical literature and in the empirical 
marine governance literature. I now turn to examining participation in the applied context to 
understand if conceptual findings have relevance for and can explain of participatory marine 
governance. Before I turn to the case studies, in this chapter I describe the details of the methods 
used in the next two chapters 
On the basis of my findings from Chapters 3 and 4, I contend that participatory governance practices 
in the marine context are likely to be subject to a lack of democratic legitimacy as a consequence of 
the influence of the SES norm of participation. To examine this proposition, I used the case study 
method to examine two instances of participatory governance in the marine context. In Chapter 6 I set 
out my examination of the case of the southwest Bay of Fundy Marine Advisory Committee in New 
Brunswick, Canada, known as the MAC. The MAC was a purposeful effort at introducing integrated 
management for the multi-use and high conservation value southwest area of the Bay of Fundy, in 
New Brunswick. In Chapter 7, I present my examination of the case of the West Coast Community 
Aquaculture Forum, in Tasmania, Australia. The Forum was an experimental partnership between the 
local community and the aquaculture industry for governance of social and economic aspects of the 
shared use of Macquarie Harbour – uses that lay outside the legislative and regulatory framework for 
salmon aquaculture in the Harbour. The guiding questions for both the case studies were: (1a) How 
did the dominant conceptualisation of participation influence the structure and activities of the 
participatory initiative (if at all)? (i.e. the social-ecological systems participation norm as per Chapter 
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4) and (2c) What does application of the participation-representation lens explain, if anything, about 
the dominant conceptualisation of participation in the applied context? 
To address these questions, I conducted a three-step examination of each case study. In brief, the 
first step was an in-depth inductive analysis of each initiative as represented through a) participants 
recounting their participation through semi-structured interviews and b) documentation from the 
initiative (terms of reference, minutes, newsletters and reports). From this work, I generated the 
materials for deductive analysis using the findings from Chapters 3 and 4. In the second step, I 
brought the analytical frame of the participation norm (the three axioms) to the analysis of the 
inductively generated materials. In the third step, I analysed the presence or absence of the three 
conditions of the participation–representation lens (authorisation, dissent and exit, accountability). 
This combination of inductive and two steps of deductive analysis enabled me to consider 
participation in participants’ own terms and then problematise those experiences and practices of 
participation using the analytical frames from my previous findings (Bacchi 2012; Fereday and Muir-
Cochrane 2006). In the following section I describe the basis for selecting case studies and methods 
for data collection and data analysis. 
Case study selection 
I used the case study as an appropriate method to explore how people who were actually involved in 
participatory initiatives thought about and acted in constructing and operationalising institutional 
efforts at participatory marine governance. The purpose of my case studies was to hone in on 
experiences of civil or ‘community’ participation in the governance process to extend the 
problematisation process. To do this I selected two cases as exemplars, or instructive cases, that 
enabled me to explore how participatory initiatives were designed and examine the intentions and 
institutional rules and practices (Stake 2013). For the findings from the case studies to be instructive, I 
needed cases that were sufficiently similar in context, purpose and scope to enable me to account for 
the particularities and differences that are inevitable in case studies (Stake 2013). 
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I decided at the outset that an Australian case study was appropriate because I am an Australian 
researcher and my research centre has a particular interest in Australian marine governance. Further, 
I required sufficient similarity between the cases to ensure the differences or particularities could be 
accounted for in the analysis of the findings The four criteria I set for case study selection were as 
follows: 
• An initiative or effort at shared governance of the marine ecosystem, or key aspects of it, with 
a commitment to citizen participation in the governance initiative. This was the essential 
criteria as it was the core research focus; 
• In addition, an initiative that had been operating for more than three years to ensure 
establishment processes had been consolidated and the initiative had at least two years of 
consistent operation for analysis. 
• Multiple-use marine ecosystem. The multiple-use criterion was set to ensure the initiative was 
dealing with a diversity of interests and preferences, reflecting the key challenges of 
democratic societies; 
• Australian or a marine nation with a comparable cultural context and political structure, with a 
preference for Canada predominantly English speaking, federal constitutional monarchies 
with three levels of parliamentary government and comparable bureaucratic systems. 
Early in my research planning, I established that Australia and Canada shared similar experiences of 
increasing industrialisation of marine industries in multiple-use marine ecosystems. Further, these 
marine nations share cultural histories, have comparable three-level political systems and are mature 
democracies (Sharman 1990). This ‘similar systems’ approach to the choice of location of the case 
studies enabled me to focus on the processes of participation while taking into account the influences 
of the broader institutional influences. Specifically, in both cases I was able to focus on how sub-
national regions (states or provinces) dealt with changes in marine resource management and how 
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communities were formally engaged in the processes through participatory practices. While the sites 
were similar, there were also differences between the cases, particularly in relation to First Nation 
access to the marine system.  
The selection of case studies for similar cultural, historical, legislative and political systems brings a 
potential limitation with respect to generalisability to other democratic nations with different such 
systems. I acknowledge this limitation, and also decided that for this first step in examining and 
problematising participation, it was necessary in this thesis to control for as many cultural, historical 
and institutional factors as might be possible in case study analysis. The selection of case studies 
from Australia and Canada provided sufficient similarity and sufficient differences that could be 
accounted for within the scope of this doctoral project. To mitigate this limitation to some degree, the 
content analysis was built from a broad range of empirical material from a broad range of cultural and 
political systems and across marine activities, as discussed in Chapter 2 Research Design (see pg. 
28). Further, the focus of my research has been the local-level institutions of direct participation and 
so the findings are likely to have some application in any context with a commitment to democratic 
process and the participation of community members and citizens to address the governance of share 
marine ecosystem. 
I reviewed grey literature on participatory initiatives in Australia and Canada and while doing so I also 
learnt about the Southwest New Brunswick Marine Advisory Committee (MAC) in east coast Canada 
from a visiting Canadian researcher, Dr Rob Stephenson. On Rob’s advice, I contacted MAC 
participants and garnered their interest in the research aims. Given the participants were interested, I 
settled on the southwest Bay of Fundy, New Brunswick, Canada, as my first case study. For my 
second case study I settled on the West Coast Community Aquaculture Forum centred on Macquarie 
Harbour in Tasmania primarily because of a number of similarities between New Brunswick and 
Tasmania that met the case study criteria I had set (as dot pointed above). The similarities between 
the two cases were: 
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• comparable socio-economic and demographic profiles; 
• highly valued waterway for both commercial, cultural and conservation values; 
• the growth of salmon aquaculture as an influencing factor in the drive for participatory 
governance. 
Alongside these similarities, the study site and participants were easily accessible to me and I had 
some connection with the Forum in the early months of its establishment when I was working as an 
independent consultant (see Appendix 5 for details). 
As the Forum did not have a web presence, I contacted an aquaculture industry member and asked 
them to contact the Forum Chair on my behalf and request permission to share the Chair’s email 
contact. The aquaculture representative checked with the Chair and gave me verbal assurance that I 
had permission to email the Chair. I did so with a request for her to raise the prospect of the Forum as 
a case study for this research with Forum members. I included the research information and consent 
form for the Forum members’ consideration. I attended a Forum meeting in August 2018 to answer 
questions about the research project, and the Forum members reiterated their interest in the research 
and willingness to participate in the research. This was recorded in the Forum minutes. It must also 
be noted that in 2013 I had previous experience with the Forum and many of the Forum members, 
including aquaculture company representatives. As a professional consultant, I assisted community 
members and the aquaculture company representatives to set up the Forum in 2013. My specific role 
and responsibilities in that process are detailed in Appendix 5. Although I had no connection with the 
Forum between 2014 and 2018 when the fieldwork was conducted, I was aware that it had continued. 
It was this knowledge and previous connection with the Forum that led me to select this as a potential 
case study. This previous contact with the Forum members presents the potential for bias in my 
analysis because I had previous knowledge of the initial intentions for the Forum and previous 
connection and knowledge with most of the participants. It is not possible to mitigate for this; however, 
this inductive–deductive design provided some level of accounting for the potential bias. Additionally, 
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using the same coding rules for both case studies also provided a degree of accounting for the 
potential bias. 
Materials 
Documentation 
In both cases, permission was obtained by email from members to collect and analyse the initiative’s 
documentation. MAC documentation was collected in electronic format from two civil servants who 
had been involved in the administration of the MAC. MAC documentation comprised one report 
(2009), 25 sets of minutes from 2010 to 2017 and one terms of reference document and covered the 
years from the 2009 until the final meeting in August 2017. Forum documentation comprised 13 sets 
of minutes from 2013 until 2018, and two versions of terms of reference (2014 and 2018). The 
documents covered the years of operation from early 2013 until the time of the research in August 
2018. They were collected in electronic format from three Forum members who had previously held 
administrative roles, including the Chair at the time of the research (2018). In both cases after an 
initial familiarisation reading, I coded the material inductively using NVIVO 10 (for Mac) software to 
gain a picture of the concerns, discussion points, interests, meeting processes and decision-making 
processes. The details of the coding and analysis are laid out in the section below (pg. 125). 
Interviews 
Sampling strategy 
Interviewees were identified through a purposive sampling strategy for key informants for three 
cohorts: people who were involved in the case study initiative as members; Indigenous nation leaders; 
and people who live in the area with work- or lifestyle-related associations with the water but who 
were not members of the case study initiative. 
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Working with key informants is an established technique to gather rich information (Fujii 2018; Qu and 
Dumay 2011) and so was selected as an appropriate means to gather data on perceptions and delve 
into the experience and recollections of the initiative members. I selected members of the case study 
initiative as key informants because understanding the aspirations, intentions, processes and 
practices of the case study initiative through the experiences of people who were involved was a 
primary source for generating the data required for the analysis as per the research design (see 
Chapter 2, pg. 34). 
Once I commenced the interviews in my first case study fieldwork, I identified a sense of being inside 
an initiative ‘bubble’ as I had connected with a strong core of members who had been closely involved 
with the initiative. I was concerned this may introduce a risk of subtle unintentional bias. To address 
this, I decided to conduct a small set of interviews with non-member residents. I chose to include a 
small cohort of people who live in the area with work- or lifestyle-related associations with the water 
but who were not members of the initiative to provide alternative perspectives on the engagement 
between the initiative and members of the broader community. 
Recruitment 
I generated a list of potential interviewees from the publicly available information about each initiative 
and publicly available information on key stakeholder groups likely to have had an interest in each 
initiative. Table 10 below shows the sample for each case study. 
 
 
Table 10: Interview sample 
Cohort 
MAC, SW Bay of Fundy, Canada 
Number of people interviewed  
Forum, Macquarie Harbour, Australia 
Number of people interviewed 
Participants of the initiative  13 
10 
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Non-participant informants 14 
9 
 
For the Canadian case study, I worked with a locally based case study mentor, Dr Rob Stephenson, 
who introduced my research to the members of the initiative by emailing a copy of the research 
information, a consent form and a short covering email. Following this introductory step, I emailed 
each person on the list and obtained agreement for interview from 13 people.  
The Peskotomuhkati are the indigenous Nation of the southwest region of the Bay of Fundy10. As is 
appropriate when engaging with the First Nations in a Canadian context, I contacted the Chief of the 
Peskotomuhkati to request an interview. After an initial in-person meeting to discuss the research 
concerns, the Chief decided he was willing to discuss his perspective on the existing approaches to 
integrated marine with me, and for this discussion to be included in my research analysis. While it 
must be noted that First Nations people from other areas were included on the MAC membership list, 
I made the decision not to interview those First Nations members out of respect for the Chief’s 
position, and on the basis of his experience with the MAC membership process. For community 
members who were not members of the initiative, I conducted a web search for associations and 
groups that were likely to have connection with the southwest Bay of Fundy or the MAC. I directly 
contacted organisations via email with the research information and consent forms. I also engaged 
non-members directly through social discussions that led to interviewee interest in participating in the 
research. In total, 14 non-members agreed to an interview from these recruitment steps. Twenty-
seven interviews were conducted in total in September 2017. 
For the Australian case study, I contacted one of the aquaculture companies involved in the initiative 
and requested permission to proceed with contacting the Chairperson of the initiative because it had 
no web presence. The aquaculture representative checked with the Chairperson and gave me verbal 
                                                     
10 The Peskotomuhkati territory includes the watershed of the Skudic (St Croix) River and Passamquoddy Bay. 
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assurance that I had permission to email the Chairperson. I emailed the Chair with a request for her to 
raise the prospect of the Forum as a case study for this research with Forum members. I included the 
research information and consent form for the Forum members’ consideration. I was advised by email 
that I had permission to proceed. I attended a Forum meeting in August 2017 and Forum members 
reiterated their interest in the research and their willingness to participate in the research, and this 
was recorded in the Forum minutes. I contacted each Forum member by email with an invitation to 
participate in an interview. Ten people responded, and ten interviews were conducted with Forum 
members. I conducted a web search for Aboriginal groups with Country connection to the area, and 
in-person advice was sought from an Elder on potential interest in the study research. As a result of 
this engagement, I was invited to keep the Elder informed of the research for future discussion.  
For community members who were not members of the initiative, I generated a list of potential 
interviewees from the Forum minutes and publicly available information on key stakeholders likely to 
have had an interest in the Forum. I emailed each person on the list and obtained agreement for 
interview from four people in official roles with specific formal interests in the case study area. I 
subsequently interviewed each of them. Each of these respondents had formal permission to speak 
on behalf of their organisational interests, and the specific limits to confidentiality and anonymity were 
discussed. Each respondent was willing to participate with full awareness of the limits to anonymity 
and confidentiality, and each was afforded the opportunity to review the transcripts to manage the 
limits of anonymity and confidentiality.  
Non-member interviewees were recruited at a public community event with the permission of the 
event organisers. I set up a small stall branded to confirm the research as University sponsored, and 
with the information and consent forms available. From here, interested passers-by were invited to 
talk with me for up to ten minutes (or as long as they wished) in an audio-recorded semi-structured 
interview. Five interviews were conducted from this process. In total, 19 interviews were conducted. 
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Interview design 
The semi-structured interview protocol comprised six open questions designed to gather the 
perceptions of key informants and elicit rich detail of the operations, effects and experiences of the 
Forum as follows: 
1. Interviewee’s connection with marine environment: personal or professional connection 
with the case study waterway 
2. Interviewee’s particular interests and/or concerns with respect to the case study waterway 
3. Interviewee’s connection with the case study initiative 
4. Interviewee’s perspective on achievements and strengths of the case study initiative 
5. Interviewee’s perspective on challenges and limits of the case study initiative 
6. Any other comments. 
The first two interview questions were designed to open the discussion, to build rapport and to 
understand the informants’ connection and core concerns with respect to the waterway. Questions 3–
5 were designed to lead outwards from the respondents’ connection and core concerns to 
consideration of the case study processes. At each question, I asked follow-up questions to 
encourage people to expand on topics, including asking for examples to illustrate their point. The final 
question was designed to signal the end of the interview, and to enable people to tell me anything 
they felt was relevant with respect to governance of the waterway or the case study initiative. 
Coding and analysis 
The following sections describe the steps I took to analyse the documentation and interview material 
and produce my findings as set out in the case study chapters (Chapters 6 and 7): 
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• Step 1: organising the material to generate a rich and coherent picture of the initiative 
(inductive coding); 
• Step 2: interpretively analysing the conceptualisations of participation within the picture 
material (from Step 1) (deductive coding); and 
• Step 3: interpretively analysing the presence or absence of the conditions (authorisation; 
dissent and exit; accountability) from the picture material (from step 1) (deductive coding). 
Step 1: Organising the material to generate a picture of each initiative 
In this first step I intentionally came to both the documentation and interview material to understand 
how the initiative operated and, drawing on Geertz (2008), to generate a rich and coherent 
understanding of the case study initiative. 
A coherent and rounded picture of the initiative was essential to the research because it formed the 
material, which I then analysed for the conceptualisations of participation and analysed for the 
connections between the conceptualisation of participation and the presence of absence of the 
conditions. I took the minutes and the interview material to represent how the initiative operated and 
what people held to be significant about how the initiative operated (practices, processes and 
activities). I took the terms of reference documents to represent the institutional structure and rules of 
each initiative. The coding work for this step was conducted to organise the material and enable me to 
infer the links among the coded material and so generate the coherent picture of the initiative as 
reflected in the minutes and terms of reference (documentation) and experiences of the initiatives 
reported to me through interview. I used NVIVO for MAC 10 for this coding. A selection of verbatim 
statements from the interview transcripts are included in the first analysis section in each case study 
chapter, as quotes to provide a sense of the discussions in the words of the interviewees themselves. 
Each quote is referenced – the quote references refer to the sample cohorts and actor type as set out 
in Table 11. 
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Table 11: Explanation of the quote references used in the case study section.  
Cohort as reference prefix + Actor Type reference 
M - refers to a member of the 
initiative 
 COMMUNITY refers to people who were members of the 
community with no formal alliance with a sector or 
representative body 
N- refers to a person who was 
not a member of the initiative 
 PROFESSIONAL refers to people who held formal 
professional roles with a sector or a representative body 
 
e.g. M-GOVT refers to a civil 
servant who was a member of 
the case study initiative. 
 N-GOVT refers to a civil 
servant who was not a member 
of the case study initiative. 
 GOVT refers to people who were members of the civil or public 
service, i.e. the bureaucracy with a portfolio responsibility 
related to the southwest Bay of Fundy marine ecosystem and 
coastal zone 
 INDUSTRY refers to people who were employed in a 
commercial marine-related company 
  
 
Documentation 
After an initial familiarisation reading, I used the codes set out in Table 12  to organise the material 
into topics and concerns; membership rules and processes; meeting processes; actions conducted 
under the umbrella of the initiative; processes or practices that made connections between the 
initiative members and the broader community; and decision-making processes. The codes and 
coding rules for this step are set out in Table 12 below.  
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Table 12: Coding rules for analysis of the documentation from each case study. In both cases, the material coded comprised 
text from minutes, reports and terms of reference documents.  
Code (deductive) 
Explanation/rule - Text that … 
Actions completed 
… indicated that an action planned (evidenced in previous minutes) had 
been completed. 
Communications 
… referred to intended or actual communication with non-members 
about any aspect of the initiative. Includes intended messages, forms of 
communications and responsibility for communications with non-
members 
Community member 
concerns and questions 
… reflected any concerns held by community members that the text 
clearly shows the community member or members would like addressed 
through the initiative or questions put to industry members or 
government decision-makers by community members that pertained to 
governing the multiple uses of the marine and/or coastal environments 
and/or that pertained to other topics deemed by the members to be 
relevant to the objectives of the initiative. 
The text must include evidence that other members of the initiative 
deemed the topic important and this can include listing as an agenda 
item as evidence that the membership had deemed the topic relevant to 
the business of the initiative. 
Events  
… described intentions, planning, implementation or evaluation of events 
that were intended to connect the broader community with the work and 
objectives of the initiative 
Information provision 
… described any instances of any member providing information to other 
members on issues that pertained to governing the multiple uses of the 
marine and/or coastal environments  
Membership  
… described any rules, decisions, principles, definitions or processes 
that pertained to membership of the initiative 
Process 
… described any rules, decisions, principles, definitions or processes 
that explain or describe how the initiative should operate 
Purpose 
… described the intended objectives, processes and activities for the 
initiative 
Text that described why the intended objectives, processes and 
activities were significant to members and/or why the intended 
objectives, processes and activities were held to be important for the 
broader community. 
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Interview material 
Following Fuji 2018 and Yanow 2007, I examined how participants described the initiative through 
interviews. I manually transcribed each of the interviews verbatim and each person interviewed was 
invited to review the transcript of their interview. Using NVIVO 10 for MAC, I then coded each 
interview transcript in two rounds as set out in Table 13. 
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Table 13: Coding frame for two rounds of inductive coding of the case study interview material. For every instance of coding, codes were applied to groups of sentences or single sentences 
from interview transcripts. Each transcript was coded comprehensively by which I mean that text segments could be coded for more than one code. 
Interview questions Round 1 Organising codes 
Explanation/rules 
Round 2 Theming 
codes 
Explanation/rule 
Text in which an interviewee described… 
Please tell me about 
your connection with 
the marine 
environment: personal 
or professional 
connection with the 
case study waterway. 
Interests and values 
Where a person described 
personal or professional use, 
attachment or what the waterway 
means to the respondent 
Economic  … professional interests in marine-related industries but were not on water, 
e.g. seafood processing, transport 
Commercial marine … professional interests in on-water marine-related industries of any form or 
scale, e.g. individual fishing quota or commercial-scale fishing 
Recreational … personal non-commercial use of the waterway or coastal zone as having 
significance or meaning for them  
Lifestyle and amenity … personal attachment to the coastal zone and/or waterway as part of their 
quality of living and sense of identity and/or as having significance or meaning 
for them 
Environmental … professional or personal interests in the conservation or environmental 
values of the coastal zone and/or waterway 
Government … professional responsibilities in any aspect of the marine and coastal 
environment and/or living marine resources (flora and/or fauna) as a 
government officer from any level of government 
Science … professional responsibilities in any aspect of the marine and coastal 
environment and/or living marine resources (flora and/or fauna) as an 
employee of an academic and/or research organisation 
What are your 
particular interests and 
concerns with respect to 
Concerns or issues of interest 
Where a person described 
personal or professional use, 
Positive community 
impact of marine and 
coastal activities 
… any topic that related to any positive economic, cultural, lifestyle 
developments and/or changes and/or opportunities as a result of marine-based 
activities 
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the case study 
waterway? 
attachment or what the waterway 
means to the respondent 
Ensuring local level 
economic benefits 
from marine and 
coastal activities 
… any topic that related to distribution of economic benefits from the 
exploitation or use of marine and/or coastal ecosystems at the local level 
Human uses on 
marine environment 
(negative impacts) 
… any concern that current and/or increasing and/or greater diversity of human 
uses of marine and/or coastal ecosystems are impacting on or will negatively 
impact on the ecosystem functioning of marine and/or coastal ecosystems 
Marine debris … a concern about waste and rubbish from marine-based human activities 
being left in marine and/or coastal ecosystems 
Negative impact of 
salmon aquaculture 
operations on marine 
ecosystem 
… a concern that current and/or increasing activities related to salmon 
aquaculture that are impacting on or will negatively impact on the ecosystem 
functioning of marine and coastal ecosystems 
Negative community 
impacts of marine 
activities 
… any topic related to any negative economic, cultural, lifestyle developments 
as a result of marine-based activities 
Please tell me about 
your connection with 
the case study initiative. 
Involvement 
Where a person described their 
understanding of their role or 
position in the initiative (if 
involved) or any other role or 
position with respect to the 
initiative (e.g. marine scientist 
who was aware of it but not 
involved) 
Member … a person or group that was currently or had been a member of the case study 
initiative 
Non-member but 
aware 
… a person or group that had not ever been a member of the case study 
initiative but was aware of the initiative either through a member or as a 
consequence of their professional role  
Non-member no 
awareness 
… a person or group that had not ever been a member of the case study 
initiative and had not ever heard of the initiative  
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Your perspective on 
achievements and 
strengths of the case 
study initiative  
Strengths 
Where a person described 
factors, experiences or 
characteristics of the initiative 
that influenced the process or the 
outcomes of the initiative 
positively  
Having people at the 
table who were 
willing to engage in 
dialogue 
… any positive impacts of changes for the initiative of members showing 
willingness to listen to other points of view, voice perspectives in non-
aggressive ways and/or in ways that promoted continued engagement and/or in 
ways that did not cause other members to leave or stop discussing any topic 
Having direct 
connection between 
community members 
and industry people 
… any positive impacts of changes for the initiative of having people from 
commercial marine companies as members of the initiative 
… any positive impacts of changes of having items and topics of interest 
and/or reported importance to community members and/or importance to 
initiative members addressed through the processes and/or activities of the 
initiative 
… any positive impacts or changes for the initiative of having people from 
commercial marine companies reporting and/or explaining and/or sharing 
information about items and topics of interest and/or reported importance to 
community members and/or importance to initiative members addressed 
through the processes and/or activities of the initiative  
Members’ 
commitment to the 
initiative  
… any positive impacts or changes for the initiative of members continuing to 
engage and contribute to the activities, discussions or processes of the initiative 
regardless of reported or perceived difficulties, disappointments or challenges 
Achievements 
Where a person described 
outcomes or outputs or 
characteristics of how the 
initiative operated that they held 
to be significant, positive or that 
indicated to them progress 
Built positive working 
relationships and trust 
… any instances of members showing willingness to listen to other points of 
view; voice perspectives in non-aggressive ways and/or in ways that promoted 
continued engagement and/or in ways that did not cause other members to 
leave the initiative or stop discussing any topic 
Addressing marine 
debris 
…  any actions or activities that work towards reducing marine debris in the 
waterway  
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towards the goals or objectives 
of the initiative 
Improved information 
sharing 
… any instances or initiative processes that enabled items and/or topics of 
interest and/or reported importance to community members and/or importance 
to initiative members addressed through the processes and/or activities of the 
initiative 
… any positive impacts or changes as a result of any kind of information 
sharing through the initiative on any items and/or topics of interest and/or 
reported importance to community members and/or importance to initiative 
members addressed through the processes and/or activities of the initiative  
Community member 
control of the 
initiative 
… any instances of initiative processes or decisions that were determined by 
community members and/or for which community members assumed 
responsibility and that reflected community member interests and/or reported 
and/or perceived interests of members of the broader community  
Your perspective on 
challenges and 
limitations of the case 
study initiative 
Challenges 
Where a person described 
factors, experiences or 
characteristics of the initiative 
that influenced the process or the 
outcomes negatively  
Nothing practical 
achieved 
… any instances of any initiative decisions and/or agreed actions and/or 
commitments on topics of interest and/or reported importance to members of 
the broader community and/or importance to initiative members that were not 
addressed and/or actioned and/or resolved in line with the decision and/or 
agreed action 
Change in purpose … any instances of formal and/or informal changes in agreed initiative 
objectives and/or purposes and/or intentions and/or processes that were 
perceived and/or demonstrated to have had a negative impact on the initiative 
processes and/or actions and/or relationships to achieve the desired outcomes 
and/or purposes of the initiative 
Power not evenly 
distributed 
… any instances and/or actions in which the respondent perceived that some 
actors were able to override actions and/or decisions of others 
… any instances and/or actions in which the respondent perceived that some 
actors were able to inhibit other actors from voicing their opinions and/or 
taking actions 
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… any instances and/or actions in which the respondent perceived that some 
actors were able to inhibit other actors from voicing their opinions and/or 
taking actions  
Lack of information 
sharing 
…any instances in which any kind of information on items and/or topics of 
interest and/or reported importance to community members and/or importance 
to initiative members were withheld through the processes and/or activities of 
the initiative  
Limitations 
Groups of sentences, single 
sentences or fragments of 
sentences in which a person 
described factors or 
characteristics of the initiative 
that got in the way of the 
initiative achieving its goals or 
objectives 
Lack of formal 
accountability for 
commitments 
… any instances and/or examples of the lack of ability (absence of rules and 
associated meaningful consequences) of initiative members to sanction other 
members for not implementing and/or completing actions and/or not providing 
information as per commitments 
Slow pace for getting 
things done 
… any instances in which agreed actions and/or processes and/or other 
changes were reported as taking more time to be implemented and/or 
completed than the interviewee thought to be reasonable  
Media … any instances or examples that indicated that formal public media interest in 
and/or reportage of activities and/or topics related to marine activities and the 
marine ecosystem at the centre of the initiative restricted and/or changed 
and/or limited the activities and/or processes and/or relationships of the 
initiative 
Local government … any instances or examples and/or observations and/or thoughts that 
indicated that relationships with and/or absence of relationships with local 
government officials restricted and/or changed and/or limited the activities 
and/or processes and/or relationships of the initiative in negative ways and/or 
ways that restricted the capacity to achieve the objectives of the initiative 
Any other comments 
you’d like to make?  
Other comments 
Any groups of sentences, single 
sentences or fragments of 
Context specific 
topics 
… any instance, story, example, observation and/or thoughts that pertained to 
the operation of the initiative should be coded using the organising codes 
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sentences uttered by people in 
response to this question that 
related to the operation of the 
initiative 
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In the first ‘familiarisation’ round, I used the interview questions to organise the material as set out in Table 
13 (above) in the column titled ‘Step 1 Organising codes’. I then coded the organised material inductively 
as themes that represented commonly expressed perspectives on the initiative. The themes I generated 
are set out in the column titled ‘Step 2 Theming codes’ in Table 13.  
Generating the picture of the initiative 
To generate the picture of the initiative, I firstly wrote out descriptions of the common occurrences (how 
many meetings, attendance, topics etc.). I then read the coded material from both sources multiple times to 
identify descriptive themes with respect to what issues were described as significant and in what ways 
those issues were significant. I captured these themes in written form as presented in the case studies (first 
sections of analysis). I intentionally represented this material as fully as possible to reflect as faithfully as 
possible the experiences of the initiatives as reported to me by those involved. As noted in the opening 
comments for this step, the rich picture was also the basis for the deductive and interpretive analysis of 
Steps 2 and 3 (following). Because of this, I also decided it was important to ensure as full a picture of the 
material as possible was presented for maximum transparency of my qualitative analysis in Steps 2 and 3. 
Step 2: Analysis of the conceptualisations of participation 
To enable my analysis of the conceptualisations of participation at play in the case study initiative, I 
interpretively analysed the picture material from Step 1 using the axioms from Chapter 4 as the deductive 
guide or analytic frame. The rules I applied to this coding are set out in Table 14 below. 
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Table 14: Deductive analytic guide for the interpretive analysis of conceptualisations of participation in the applied case study 
context. The source of this analytic guide was the findings from the Chapter 4 study (pg. 100). 
Deductive analytic guide  Interpretive strategy 
Axiom 1 Participation is ontological 
Participation is the fundamental social process. 
Participation produces the social resources (such as social 
capital and trust, norms of sustainability and resource use 
and social sanctions) that underpin governance of marine 
social-ecological systems. This means that governance 
institutions must be and can only be participatory because 
change can only be created through social/group 
processes. Representative mechanisms disrupt the 
operation of the social processes. Institutional design 
must be predicated on social processes such as coalition 
building, consensus, compromise, negotiation – these are 
the central social decision-making mechanisms. 
Material that referred to why participation is 
valued or important 
Material that referred to the outcomes, impacts or 
results of efforts at facilitating participation 
Material that referred to how participation could 
be, should be or was facilitated 
Material that referred to any representative 
relationships or arrangements 
Material that referred to how decisions or 
agreements could be, should be or were made 
Links between any of this material 
Axiom 2 Institutional power is dispersed 
Power is already dispersed across the social networks. 
Governance – the connections between major actor 
cohorts – is the core institutional structure at the centre of 
the polity, as conceptualised within the SES paradigm. 
Governance structures must connect 
corporate/private/market governance, hierarchical top-
down government (bureaucracy) and civil (community) 
domains and the policy process (management) can only 
be negotiated and iterative because no single actor is or 
should be dominant. This also means that the state 
(bureaucracy), formerly the central power holder in 
decision-making, rule-setting, monitoring and 
compliance, becomes one of a number of influential 
actors for these activities. 
Material that referred to which actors should be or 
were involved in the initiative 
Material that referred to why actors should be or 
were involved in the initiative 
Material that referred to limits to decision making 
and why the decision making was perceived to be 
limited 
Material that referred power or influence and how 
that was perceived to be distributed 
Links between any of this material 
Axiom 3 Governance is social 
Institutional design must enable social processes such as 
knowledge production, social learning, consensus, 
compromise and negotiation as the decision-making 
mechanisms that reflect dispersed power and deliver the 
social resources that underpin the functioning of the 
social-ecological system, and will lead to social 
behaviour change and control, and the allocation of 
resources.  
Material that referred to effective, preferred or 
desired processes for the initiative 
Material that referred to why the preferred, 
effective or desired processes were regarded as 
such 
Links between any of this material 
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Step 3: Analysis of the presence or absence of the conditions 
To enable my analysis of the presence or absence of the conditions that comprise the participation–
representation in the case study initiative, I interpretively analysed the rich picture material from step 1 
using the lens of participation–representation generated in Chapter 3 (pg. 69) as the deductive guide or 
analytic frame as set out in Table 15 below. The analysis is set out in each case study chapter (Chapter 6, 
pg. 163; Chapter 7, pg. 200). 
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Table 15: Deductive analytic guide for the interpretive analysis of conceptualisations of participation in the applied case study 
context. The source of this analytic guide was the findings from the Chapter 3 study (pg. 69). 
Deductive analytic guide  Interpretive strategy 
Authorisation 
The ability of the represented to 
‘appoint’ and in some way legitimise 
the representative in a way that 
recognises the active relationship 
between them. 
Material that referred to how initiative participants could be, should 
be or were appointed to the initiatives or otherwise became known as 
members of the initiative 
Material that referred to why the methods, principles, practices and 
processes by which people became known as members of the 
initiative were held to be appropriate (or not – according to the 
material) 
Material that referred to the perceived, assumed or actual relationship 
between initiative members and other people from the broader 
community (and/or absence their absence) 
Material that referred to why any perceived, assumed or actual 
relationships between initiative members and people from the broader 
community (and/or the absence of these) were held to be appropriate 
(or not) and significant (or not) 
Material that referred to how any perceived, assumed or actual 
relationships between initiative members and people from the broader 
community (and/or the absence of these) should, could or were 
conducted (or not) 
Links between any of this material 
Dissent and exit 
The capacity of or opportunity for the 
represented party (group or 
individual) to dispute change or 
withdraw from the representative 
relationship. This capacity is the sign 
that the individual or group to be 
represented is free from coercion, and 
therefore that the representative 
relationship is facilitating agency by 
agreement. 
Material that referred to how people (members or non-member people 
from the broader community) could, should or did dispute, change or 
withdraw from any perceived or actual representative relationships or 
processes 
Material that referred to how any efforts or actual instances of dispute, 
change or withdraw from any perceived or actual representative 
relationships or processes were addressed or interpreted by initiative 
members and non-members 
Links between any of this material 
Accountability  
This condition extends the ‘reporting 
back’ definition that we more readily 
recognise as accountability in 
common usage. In this lens, 
accountability encompasses the ability 
of the represented to take 
responsibility or be held responsible 
for the actions of the representative, 
that is to engage in some way in the 
actions of the representative. 
Material that referred to ways, methods, practices and/or relationships 
by which people from the broader community were or could have 
been connected to the activities, decisions and/or other outputs and/or 
actions of the initiative 
Material that referred to how any methods, practices and/or 
relationships by which people from the broader community were or 
could have been connected to the activities, decisions and/or other 
outputs and/or actions of the initiative were described 
Material that referred to how people who were interviewed described 
what was significant (or not) regarding any methods, practices and/or 
relationships by which people from the broader community were or 
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could have been connected to the activities, decisions and/or other 
outputs and/or actions of the initiative 
Material that referred to why any perceived, assumed or actual 
relationships between initiative members and people from the broader 
community (and/or the absence of these) were held to be appropriate 
(or not) and significant (or not) 
Material that referred to how any perceived, assumed or actual 
relationships between initiative members and people from the broader 
community (and/or the absence of these) should, could or were 
conducted (or not) 
Links between any of this material 
 
I now turn to the case studies of efforts at participatory marine governance in the following two chapters. 
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Chapter 6. 
Aspirations for integrated management: southwest 
Bay of Fundy, New Brunswick, Canada 
This chapter presents the first of my two case study analyses of citizen or community participation in 
marine governance. The initiative at the centre of this case study was an ongoing effort to introduce a 
participatory approach to integrated management (IM) of the southwest area of the Bay of Fundy (see 
Figure 8 below), by establishing a new body known as the Southwest New Brunswick Marine Advisory 
Committee (MAC).  
Developing institutional forms of marine governance that bring together actors from all parts of the 
governance system continues to pose challenges to policy makers and researchers alike and yet seems to 
hold a key for improving ecosystem governance (Stephenson et al 2019). The MAC approach to the 
southwest Bay of Fundy was a conscious effort at reforming existing democratic and bureaucratic 
management and decision-making processes. The MAC members sought to address the challenges of 
balancing human uses and conservation while ensuring social and ecosystem resilience to changing water 
conditions under climate change.  
There are many dimensions to the IM efforts for the southwest Bay of Fundy, including a resource policy 
component. In this case study, however, I concentrate on how the ‘conceptual’ (i.e. principles and 
aspirations) and the ‘applied’ (i.e. what people in a marine social-ecological system actually did) worked 
together in the effort to create a participatory form of integrated governance in southwest New Brunswick.  
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Figure 6: Bay of Fundy, Canada – the southwest Bay of Fundy at the centre of 
the Marine Advisory Committee is highlighted in red. 
 
Image courtesy of www.bayoffundy.com accessed September 2017 
Case study context: southwest New Brunswick and the 
Bay of Fundy 
The province of New Brunswick is the largest of Canada’s so-called Atlantic ‘Maritimes’. It is situated 
between Quebec (to the north), Nova Scotia (to the south and east) and Maine (USA, to the west), and has 
two marine borders – the western shore of the Bay of Fundy and the southern shore of the Gulf of Saint 
Lawrence. Home to the indigenous Wabanaki, or ‘people of the dawn’, for at least 10 000 years (Bourque 
2001; Black 2002), the land and its peoples were subject to a steady stream of European immigration from 
the early seventeenth century. The contemporary Province of New Brunswick has its roots in an imperial 
‘theatre of war’ framed by French–English competition for land and state-making (Clark 1959), and a 1725 
Treaty with the Wabanaki (Coates 2003; NBAPC 2017). The English largely defeated the French in this 
contest, leaving a French-speaking population of French and a large number of American immigrants from 
the end of the 1783 American War of Independence (Barkley 1975; Stewart 1990). New Brunswick was 
one of four provinces that formed the federation of Canada (1867) and remains Canada’s only formally 
bilingual province (GNB 2017). Negotiations over governance and reparation between the Canadian State 
and First Nations have continued since the 1725 treaty (Government of Canada 2018). For the 
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Peskotomuhkati of southwest New Brunswick, Canadian recognition of First Nations status was hard won 
in 2016 after decades of persistent advocacy11. 
Today, New Brunswick is one of Canada’s poorer provinces, with lower than average incomes, higher 
Provincial debt than most other provinces and slow GDP growth (Conference Board of Canada 2018). The 
Province derives the majority of its revenue from taxes and intergovernmental equalisation and transfer 
arrangements (Conference Board of Canada 2018). The New Brunswick economy is based on resources, 
particularly mining, forestry and fishing, with smaller but significant sectors in tourism, agriculture and 
small-scale manufacturing and growing sectors of oil refining and natural gas (GNB 2018). In 2015, marine 
industries represented 7.8% of Provincial GDP12 (DFO 2018c) with shellfish fisheries and aquaculture 
significant industries in New Brunswick (DFO 2018c; FAO 2010). In 2017, New Brunswick fisheries were 
valued at $C546 225m, of which lobster represented well over half ($C286 826m). In 2017, New Brunswick 
salmon aquaculture production was 23 867 tonnes, worth $C227 843m (DFO 2018a). Growth in other 
marine industries continues, with marine shipping and transport, marine ecotourism and emerging marine 
industries, such as sea cucumber, among the most significant (DFO 2018c). 
The maritime economy of New Brunswick is derived from the provincial waters of the Bay of Fundy – a 
distinct marine geological system that lies between the Canadian provinces of New Brunswick and Nova 
Scotia (see Figure 8 above). The Bay of Fundy stretches south to the American state of Maine, marking the 
American–Canadian border where the Bay system merges into the broader Gulf of Maine marine system 
(IHO 2012). Geologically, the Bay is a ‘bathtub’-shaped deep. It experiences some of the highest global 
tidal ranges (Shaw et al 2012) with tides of up to 14 metres and current speeds of up to 6 metres per 
second at the head of the Bay in Minas Passage in Nova Scotia (IHO 2012). 
                                                     
11 https://qonaskamkuk.com/peskotomuhkati-nation/ accessed February 2017 
12 Gross Domestic Product 
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The system is subject to marine warming, ocean acidification and species redistributions as part of the 
larger North Atlantic system13 (Filbee-Dexter et al 2016; Koopman et al 2014). The upper Bay of Fundy is 
of globally recognised social and ecological significance, listed under the UNESCO Biosphere Programme 
(UNESCO 2017). The southwest area of the Bay of Fundy, shown circled in red in Figure 6 above, 
encompasses the Passamaquoddy Bay, a range of smaller bays and inlets and the Fundy Isles (Deer 
Island, Campobello Island and Grand Manan Island). This southwest area is the ecological context for this 
case study. The area is a particularly productive ecosystem with significant biodiversity and environmental 
values, resulting from the upwellings and seafloor geology marked by significant peaks and troughs and 
deep waters (Murison and Gaskin 1989). 
The southwest area is also the site of a range of human uses of the marine environment and is dotted with 
coastal communities highly economically and culturally dependent on marine activities, as discussed 
above. Responsibility for governance of the marine environment is split across the Provincial and Federal 
jurisdictions, and across departments according to the marine activity. The complexity of the governance 
regime means decision-making balancing the human uses, declining fish stocks and ecosystem 
conservation and resilience concerns has been similarly complex (Chang et al 2014). Calls for integrated 
and participatory management have continued to grow over the past decade (Kearney et al 2007; 
Stephenson et al 2018; Charles 2012), and it was in this context that the Southwest New Brunswick Marine 
Advisory Committee was established. 
The Southwest New Brunswick Marine Advisory 
Committee 
In this section I set out a picture of the operations and experiences of the Forum generated from the 
documentation and interview materials as described in Chapter 5. The subheadings in this section 
represent the themes from the inductive analysis of the materials. This section provides the core material of 
                                                     
13 Incorporating southwest Nova Scotia and the northern end of the Gulf of Maine 
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the case study that I subsequently analyse using the analytic devices generated in previous chapters. The 
rationale and detailed methods are set out in detail in Chapter 5. 
The development of a participatory initiative 
The (MAC) was developed from two protracted consultative phases into a pilot to explore the potential 
effectiveness of a standing community committee on integrated marine planning for the southwest Bay of 
Fundy. The MAC was jointly established by Federal and Provincial agencies and a group of active marine 
stakeholders in 2010 and continued until early 2017. The MAC’s formal purpose was to provide 
‘community’ advice to the levels of government on decisions and regulation of overlapping uses of the 
marine estate in the southwest New Brunswick area: 
The purpose of the Marine Advisory Committee is to provide advice and recommendations 
to federal and provincial governments on relevant policies, processes, strategic matters, or 
issues of significant public interest related to new and existing activities from a non-sector 
community-based perspective. 
MAC Terms of Reference, November 2013, Purpose, pg. 1 
The Federal agency partner in the MAC was the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO), Oceans and 
Coasts Management division. The Provincial agency partner was the Department of Agriculture, 
Aquaculture and Fisheries (DAAF). MAC meeting minutes (January 2010; February 2012) and Terms of 
Reference (2013) show commitment from the founding members to bring all parties together to ‘manage’ 
marine activities in an integrated way that could take into account ‘community’ values and interests. 
Phase I Stakeholder forum 
People interviewed for this case study reported that the MAC was developed from a much longer 
stakeholder–government/s engagement process beginning in the late 1990s. Phase I, the Bay of Fundy 
Stakeholder Forum, ran from the late 1990s to approximately 2004. Interviewees also reported that the 
stakeholder forum establishment had been triggered as an effort to deal with escalating conflict over 
access to water and the impacts of aquaculture on water quality. They also reported that towards the early 
2000s, the conflict had toned down as herring and inshore fisheries were giving way to lobster fisheries as 
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the more lucrative fishery. In this environment, people reported that the focus of the group broadened to the 
coastal zone management and integrated management approaches emerging from the policy and science 
communities. 
Phase II Community involvement in marine resource planning 2004–2009 
The focus on integrated management gave rise to a six-year period of stakeholder and government marine 
planning known as the Southwest New Brunswick Marine Resource Planning Initiative (MRP) – Phase II. 
This is set out in The Preferred Future of the Bay: Recommendations Toward a Community Based Plan for 
the Management of Marine Activities and Space in Southwest New Brunswick Bay of Fundy 2009 
(Preferred Future Report 2009), pg. 4.  
Interviewees reported that the government partners jointly funded a professional facilitator during this 
period to consult directly with a wide range of community groups and members through a comprehensive 
round of community workshops and meetings throughout 2007 and 2008. Interviewees involved in the MRP 
process reported that the consultations showed that people were keen on the notion of locally based 
control and direct community participation in integrated management of the area (see also Preferred Future 
Report 2009, pg. 7). However, the MRP phase did not result in a plan for marine resource use but focused 
on the governance process itself, as set out in the final report (Preferred Future Report 2009). 
Phase III Marine resources planning – deliberation and transition 2009–2012 
Both government sponsors accepted the Preferred Future Report 2009 recommendation for an interim 
deliberative period to establish the Phase III Marine Planning Advisory Council (Minutes January 2010). 
Both government agencies also committed to engaging the relevant range of bureaucratic agencies 
required to establish the overarching vision of a regional management council (Minutes January 2010). 
Meeting minutes from this period show intensive and protracted work developing the terms of reference 
(TOR) through reporting and review between the MRP members and the Federal and Provincial agencies 
(Minutes October 2010; all minutes 2011; all minutes 2012). 
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The Southwest New Brunswick Marine Advisory Committee 2013–2017 
By November 2013, the members had agreed on the TOR and the MAC commenced. The 2013 TOR 
established the MAC’s purpose, membership rules, secretariat and operations, and decision-making rules. 
Founding MAC members comprised people who had been involved in the stakeholder forum and a 
selection of new members. The minutes do not consistently address the appointment of new members (e.g. 
see changes in Committee Members across Minutes February 2012, July 2012, December 2012, 
September 2013, May 2014, but see also e.g. Minutes April 2016 for an account of membership changes). 
People reported in the interviews that potential new members were to be recommended by MAC members 
and were appointed by the Government partners (see also Minutes May 2014). Central to the membership 
criteria was the stipulation that members were not to formally represent existing marine interests, but rather 
to speak as general community members (TOR; see also e.g. Minutes February 2012 and May 2014). 
Operationally, the MAC processes were administered by a secretariat comprising representatives from both 
government partners, a government official and a community member as co-chairs and a representative 
from the federal marine science agency. MAC decision-making was to be by consensus, and perspectives 
were to be generated using the community values criteria (CVC), a tool generated from the Phase II MRP 
consultations.  
The MAC met at least twice in most years until September 2016. In July 2017, the Secretariat advised MAC 
members by email of its decision to dissolve (‘sunset’) the committee and to discuss future options for 
community engagement in oceans and marine management with former MAC members. Four primary 
reasons were given in the email to the MAC members for this decision: 
• inability of the DFO and Provincial departments to integrate advice provided by the MAC; 
• continued differences among members in their interpretations of the TOR and scope of the MAC; 
• scheduling problems for senior public officers (DFO and Province); 
• lack of fit between MAC geographical scope and various relevant federal agency responsibilities. 
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Non-government MAC members who were interviewed reported surprise at the advice and indicated that 
no discussion about the intention to decommission the MAC had taken place. The Government Secretariat 
officers invited members of the defunct MAC to a final review and closure meeting (see Minutes October 
2017). The minutes for that meeting showed that no resolution to the four issues was found, and no future 
action had been planned. After nearly ten years of sincere effort, the participatory integrated management 
pilot was over. 
Participant perspectives on the operations and activities of the MAC 
In this section I set out the themes that reflected participant and non-participant perspectives on the 
strengths, achievements, limitations and challenges of the MAC. In setting out these themes here, this 
section provides insight into how the principles of the MAC and the actual processes and relationships of 
the MAC came together. This material is then further analysed in subsequent sections to problematise the 
conceptualisations and practices of participation. 
The MAC ‘Marine debris project’ as an example of what’s possible 
People who were interviewed reported that the marine debris project was regarded as a success with 
respect to participatory or collaborative governance of a shared issue. The project sub-committee also 
produced a report that identified the absence of legislative responsibility for marine debris at any level of 
government and provided recommendations to the MAC’s government sponsors to address this gap (e.g. 
see Minutes September 2016). Respondents agreed that it brought people together, resulted in useful 
action and attracted investment: 
Now the one success we had, partial success, was – we stumbled on to, somehow or other, 
– marine debris ... It came out of the groups and just came to light ... So we were casting 
about for things we heard about, things we thought about, and marine debris has been on the 
radar of fisherman’s (sic) associations for some time, and aquacultural debris has been top 
of mind for quite a while. M-COMMUNITY 
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Everyone felt that it was the right thing to do, and it was low risk. They were willing to support 
it. So we did grab that low-hanging fruit to say ‘let’s test how we work together on that.  
(M-GOVT) 
Built trust and robust working relationships 
It was clear from the interviews that a number of MAC members regarded building trust and establishing 
working relationships as productive, valuable outcomes from the MAC process (see also Minutes 
October 2017): 
And people started opening up to the notion that it’s multi-sector – it’s not sector specific and 
it was quite a process. And within the steering committee itself it became less adversarial and 
more collaborative. (M-INDUSTRY) 
So there was good stuff that came from that [marine debris working group], and there was 
good relationship building between people who were likely to be opponents on things.   
(M-COMMUNITY) 
Three activities were linked to building trust and understanding between previously antagonistic parties. 
These were: 1) the intensive community planning process (MRP 2004–2009); 2) the dialogue that 
characterised the deliberative transition phase (2010–2013); and 3) working on the marine debris project. 
‘We didn’t do anything’ 
Almost without exception, interview reflections on the MAC after the changes to its role in 2013 indicated 
that MAC members thought no actions of significance were undertaken other than marine debris, and that 
little or no influence was exercised through the MAC process. A long list of potential items of interest was 
apparent in the minutes and also identified by MAC members through interview. These included the 
conservation of unique areas, the introduction of marine protected areas, changing benthic conditions and 
the expansion of shipping and other marine industries (Minutes February 2010, July 2012, December 2012, 
September 2013, January 2014, May 2014, April 2015). Despite these interests, the MAC substantively 
acted on only one issue, marine debris, as discussed in the previous theme. Several people reported in 
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interviews that even the marine debris project had limited success because, despite accepting the report, 
the government partners did not respond in practical ways to the legislative gap identified in the report: 
It’s the same with marine debris. Nobody’s – so we said we want somebody that we can call 
and say this is an issue, we want it – how we’re going to deal with it, and who? – we have to 
start necessarily delegating responsibility … But no power. No ability to do anything ... So 
that was – we did, I thought, an excellent job on that, but it went nowhere. (M-COMMUNITY) 
This experience suggests that the MAC had no capacity to influence legislative change, contributing to 
disillusionment with the MAC as expressed by this member: 
Have you heard about the marine debris group? I CAN’T celebrate something like that. 
[Researcher: why?] Everyone knows the problems with the marine debris and the solutions, 
and we didn’t need to spend, I mean, this is a little bit cynical but to celebrate something that 
simple, like surely they didn’t need the expertise of the people around that table to know what 
to do about marine debris. I think any of us, or any one of the political people there could 
have sat down in half an hour and done that. That’s maybe a bit too cynical but I just think – 
talk about the easiest thing conceptually that you could tackle. [Researcher: so not just low 
hanging fruit?] It’s already fallen. So to hold that up as an example of what the MAC can do I 
just think WOW we haven’t set our sights very high if that’s all we have to celebrate.  
(M-COMMUNITY) 
Marine protected area (MPA) planning was regularly discussed at the MAC table from as early as January 
2011. The minutes also show that after protracted effort (e.g. see Minutes January 2011, December 2012, 
September 2013, December 2014, April 2015), the MAC members hosted a workshop in an attempt to 
generate advice to the Federal agency Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) on MPAs (Minutes 
December 2015, April 2016, July 2016). Few interview respondents mentioned this work, and one 
respondent argued this was not an achievement (also see Minutes September 2016, October 2017): 
Because I think there was quite a bit of frustration from the MAC members centered around 
MPAs, marine protected areas, because when it came to the MPAs we have quite a long 
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workshop, one day, hosted by the MAC and as I recall [NAME] was there, and it was quite 
an intense day of oceans and southwest New Brunswick ... but at the end of it, just 
discussions really. (M-INDUSTRY) 
There was some evidence of the provision of advice to civil servants on some issues in the minutes (e.g. 
Minutes May 2014). Ultimately, however, interview respondents reported that the principal activities of the 
MAC ended up being passive: listening to presentations by external representatives, receiving updates on 
a few items (e.g. Minutes December 2014, April 2015, April 2016, September 2016, October 2017), and 
general discussion on key issues affecting the marine environment (e.g. Minutes May 2014, Minutes 
December 2015). Members explicitly expressed frustration that the MAC did not take any action or provide 
‘community perspective’ advice about the substantial issues confronting the region, in particular planning 
for marine protected areas, for example: 
We have had presentations given, nice presentations by various people, and it gave us good 
information, and we’d talk it out. And then we’d all go home. Revert. Rarely would we draw a 
conclusion. (M-INDUSTRY) 
We spent our time searching around trying to find something. And what it turned into was a 
lobbying group that anybody who thought they might get a toehold for their idea came to us 
and gave us a big presentation of two or three hours what they were going to be doing, and 
all this stuff ... It was, it was frustrating. (M-PROF) 
I think you will probably find that all of us are pretty discouraged and frustrated with the 
process. (M-GOVT) 
A number of non-government MAC members argued that this revealed the MAC’s lack of authority and 
influence, despite the good intentions articulated in the TOR and the repeated assurances of Secretariat 
members, for example: 
I was always so afraid that they would hold the MAC up to say we have consulted with the 
public through the Marine Advisory Council [sic]. Whoa! If – it’s – we only meet twice a year 
– three times maybe. And that’s not enough. You know. You go, you have your discussions, 
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people go home, they forget all of this stuff, and then four months later they come back again 
and you almost start over. (M-INDUSTRY) 
... and I found that as the process went along, it just got pulled back more and more, you 
know – ‘we’re not going to change the regulation’ even though people were saying – the 
Deputies and Federal Government – were saying ‘if we need to change legislation we’re 
going to make this happen, do whatever, think outside the box, we’ll make it happen’. Well 
after year one, it was ‘well we’re not going to change legislation. (M-COMMUNITY) 
Several respondents also noted that after a few years of meetings, the political commitment to the MAC 
reduced; for example: 
… and then there was a change in government. There was an election and so the political 
and governance commitment just basically faded. (M-GOVT) 
This meant that while, in the early years, quite high-level civil servants championed the MAC, later 
responsibility for the MAC was allocated to middle managers who were given charge of administration and 
internal reporting but could effect little influence on other government agencies. 
Negative impact of the change of direction after 2013 
The structure approved in 2013 provided for the MAC to offer advice to relevant government agencies on 
major marine planning issues. This was quite different from a Preferred Future Report 2009 
recommendation for a fully funded community governance body that had reach across all levels of 
government and influence over any aspect of marine and coastal activity. The decision disappointed a 
number of members, as can be seen in the following: 
Because that MAC was not what four years of marine planning process and investment was 
supposed to lead to. It was really a very non-functional group. Really … This is just another 
advisory committee that is now asked to advise on policy when asked by the government. 
Not on activities occurring in the Bay of Fundy marine planning area using the criteria. (M-
PROF) 
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I’m sure other people would dress it up differently but if you set up something that is supposed 
to incorporate community input into decision making and you can’t even discuss it [MAC 
process] – to me that was – I almost resigned when they gutted it so much that I didn’t think 
it could work. (M-COMMUNITY) 
Both in the minutes and interviews, it was clear that non-government MAC members continued to hold the 
participatory and influencing aspirations of the Preferred Future Report 2009 model: 
I’ve just so much respect for them (members) so I think in some ways the marine advisory 
committee is a collection of all these people that have valid perspectives and pieces of 
information that if we could put them all together in a way that isn’t already predetermined it 
would be a really, really dynamic and healthy and helpful process. (M-COMMUNITY) 
Minutes, from the first few years in particular, showed ongoing process debates and efforts to keep to those 
aspirations (Minutes February 2012, December 2012 and also October 2017). Respondents reported the 
change of direction also resulted in a lack of clarity among members over how to generate advice, and 
what consensus would mean in practice (see also for example Minutes January 2010, February 2010, April 
2010, May 2011, February 2012, October 2017). The comments from some interviewees below indicate 
that the MAC got caught up with inward-focused design and process topics and so, in turn, failed to 
address any substantial issues related to the waterway (except marine debris as discussed earlier). 
Interviewees indicated this ongoing internal focus was a significant factor in disillusionment with, and then 
sunsetting of, the MAC: 
One of the things that did get quite a lot of discussion was around the role. Which I think was 
one of the nails in the coffin of the initiative near the end – what are we actually doing? 
 (M-GOVT) 
I mean a lot of these things worked really well in the classroom, or you know when you’re 
talking to people who understand what all the issues are and so on, so you can have a great 
discussion. But really, making it happen on the ground is difficult and I think we’ve sort of 
shown that here. (M-COMMUNITY) 
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The advisory committee could not decide to give advice. Not even – like it was not even like 
they couldn’t agree on the advice – they couldn’t agree on whether or not they should be 
giving advice. (M-GOVT) 
Power differential emerged which limited scope 
The interview responses showed that in the early days, the MAC was fuelled by good intentions on the part 
of all participants to develop a deliberative model for generating solutions to conflict over access to the 
water. While the Secretariat continued to ask the membership to identify topics for planning or action, in 
practice the Secretariat was reported to have limited the scope of permissible topics: 
So really it all sounds great. We could all work on things, like community values criteria, and 
say this is the right stuff that we feel reflects the interests in the area. When it came to 
application and implementation it just did not work. It could not work. (N-GOVT) 
And we had been talking about marine protected areas during the whole planning process 
and up until then. And for some reason, it just – we were no longer involved in marine 
protected areas. … they just decided not to … I don’t want to sound too negative, but that 
was a huge blow to that process [the MAC]. (M-COMMUNITY) 
Over time, and as topics for work and discussion were tabled, the limits to what government officials could 
reasonably handle under existing bureaucratic structures became increasingly clear (see also previous 
point Negative impact and Minutes October 2017). The language in the interviews indicated that non-
government MAC members experienced the scope limitations imposed by the Secretariat as an 
unexpected power differential, which felt at odds with the initial spirit and intentions of the MAC; for 
example: 
But there was also sharing power, isn’t a thing that governments naturally love to do … we 
were told to think big, think big brave thoughts and we can change things. But when it came 
down to it a lot of people who work for government are very traditional, they understand how 
things have been done, rather than how they might be able to be changed. So just the idea 
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of sharing power with a bunch of uninformed community people – or even informed 
community people – wasn’t comfortable. (M-COMMUNITY) 
And I distinctly remember times when somebody brought up something, and you could almost 
see the government people kind of looking at each other and thinking what should we do with 
this, should we shut this down. (M-INDUSTRY) 
Applying the axioms of the SES participation norm to the 
MAC 
The participation norm is a significant element of the SES paradigm, the coherent ontological and 
epistemological shift to systems thinking in marine research, as discussed in Chapter 4. Under the SES 
paradigm, participation is firstly ontological, rather than only optional, strategic or instrumental. I also 
showed in Chapter 4 that representative mechanisms evident in SES practice are treated as pragmatic 
resolutions to ensuring manageable institutions and processes but are overlooked conceptually under the 
powerful influence of the participation norm. If the norm is influencing the MAC, this suggests the MAC may 
also have treated representative mechanisms as separate from participatory aspirations and mechanisms, 
and may also therefore lack democratic legitimacy, as discussed in Chapter 4. In this section, I address the 
research sub-question: (1a) How did the dominant conceptualisation of participation influence the structure 
and activities of the participatory initiative (if at all)? (i.e. the dominant SES participation norm as identified 
in Chapter 4)? 
 The purpose of this analysis is to understand the influence of the SES paradigm in actual instances of 
marine governance and so problematise notions of participation in the applied context. I did this by setting 
out my analysis of the activities and structures of the MAC using the three SES axioms as laid out in Table 
14, Chapter 5, pg. 137 above. The analysis is set out using each axiom as a subheading. 
Participation is ontological (Axiom 1) 
The core animating principle of the Preferred Future Report (2009) model is that of participation of all 
actors that comprise a society and directly reflects the first axiom of the participation norm. Each of the 
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following statements from the Preferred Future Report (2009) asserts participation is essential and needs 
no justification: 
The proposed planning approach establishes an Advisory Council of representatives of ocean 
sectors and communities of interest to ensure local participation and transparency in marine 
management and development.  
Preferred Future Report 2009, pg. 5 
Implementing a marine plan in southwestern New Brunswick Bay of Fundy requires dedicated 
support from all levels of government, industry, Aboriginal communities, stakeholders, 
citizens, academia and science.  
Preferred Future Report 2009, pg. 4 
In the deliberation phase (2010–2012), MAC participants embedded the participatory intentions and 
assumptions of the 2009 Preferred Future model into the MAC’s structure. As discussed above, MAC 
members worked to maintain the core principles of the original 2009 Preferred Future vision. MAC 
members interviewed also noted that the MAC kept going despite the lack of practical action, and the 
members, including government members, stayed with the debate on principles long after other groups 
may have dissolved. The primary purpose, community participation, remained a strong value and aspiration 
all the way through (e.g. see Minutes October 2017). As discussed above (Negative impact, pg. 149), this 
persistence reflected the sense within the group that it was an important idea, that some kind of 
participation was essential. Participation for MAC members was not an optional extra: it was a reflection of 
how the world should be, for ‘true’ marine governance. 
The way participation should be constituted for the MAC was specified in the ‘hats off’ rule. The ‘hats off’ 
metaphor was first used in February 2010 (Minutes February 2010), and referred to the TOR rule that 
members were not to formally represent the interests of or forward a specified agenda on behalf of any 
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organisation or set of constituents to which they may formally belong14. This rule sought to have MAC 
members draw on their experiences and knowledge of their networks, and to speak from this experience on 
their own behalf as knowledgeable community members (e.g. Minutes February 2012). The rule specified 
that they were specifically not to represent or take the position of any formal organisation they may belong 
to either as a member or as staff. Those who supported this rule explained the rationale as follows: 
I guess maybe in terms of relationship building, at first. I think maybe it brought people into a 
table where they would be forced to not be the aquaculture representative versus the – you 
know. I think it created a sense of ‘well we need to work together collectively’ as opposed to 
just ‘let’s take out positions in these, let’s make our positions known.’ I think it brought people 
perhaps a bit more willingness to come together and sort of say ‘Ok, here’s something that 
we have to recognize is beyond our own interests – there’s a greater whole here than our 
own individual interest’. (MAC GOVT) 
But I don’t think that concept was well understood. I can offer you my honest opinion as a 
fisherman. As a fisherman my opinion on the use of certain grounds is going to be different 
than you as an aquaculturist or you as a conservationist. And I can’t say, because I am a 
fisherman it’s ingrained in me, but I feel I can represent the fishing point of view without – and 
this is a subtle point – but if I’m in the employ of a fishing association and go to a meeting, 
and they tell me before I go, ‘you are not to compromise on A, B or C – we are paying you’. 
You do not compromise its position, then I can’t leave my hat at the door. [Researcher: but 
you as a fisherman can take a different course? Is that what you’re saying?] Yes I can. I’m 
not going to do anything to harm the fishery but there are areas for compromise … And I 
                                                     
14 The statement reads: ‘Advisory Committee members will provide individual perspectives, knowledge and 
expertise from their diverse backgrounds, but will not represent specific sectors or interests.’ 
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might see areas for compromise my fellow fishermen don’t. But in a sense the fishing industry 
has to deal with this because they’re – the way – people are not happy when you have two 
opposing positions and the government steps in and says this is what it is. That does not help 
us to apply our local knowledge to the solution. Right. (M-INDUSTRY) 
The ‘hats off’ rule was clearly a denial of representative mechanisms. True participation, under the ‘hats off’ 
rule, must be direct and not inhibited by formal representative responsibilities. This is an expression of the 
separation of participation and representation inherent in the SES axiom that participation is direct and only 
self-presentation is an appropriate form of agency. 
Dispersed institutional power (Axiom 2) 
The recommendations in the Preferred Future Report 2009 explicitly stated that marine governance via 
formally constituted stakeholders’ involvement in government-dominated process was insufficient for good 
governance. Rather, it is stated in the report that civil or ‘community’ processes must be integrally 
connected to existing forms of governance as expressed in the first Preferred Future objective: 
The proposed planning approach allows for more participation in decision-making, conflict 
resolution, and transparency of processes. It provides a common set of decision criteria which 
will guide decision makers for all marine activities, existing and new.  
Preferred Future Report 2009, pg. 5 
The concept of the regional office, governed by all actors including government, as ‘the window’ for ‘the 
public’ was an attempt at a very practical expression of dispersing power among the actors (Preferred 
Future Report 2009, pg. 5). In the rationale for this model, narrowing the gap between the existing forms of 
governance and ‘the community’ is asserted but not justified for any other reason than the principle in itself: 
Alleviate disconnect between public and centralized offices (e.g. Fredericton).  
Preferred Future Report 2009, pg. 13 
Here, alleviating the disconnect is presented simply an expectation that meets the needs of the public and 
requires no further explanation. 
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The functions of the proposed community governance structure were to assess activities and proposals 
and directly advise the respective Ministers: 
Purpose (Function): Make recommendations to Provincial and Federal Ministers on marine 
activities and applications within the marine planning area. 
Preferred Future Report 2009, pg. 10 
The link was to be from ‘the public’ to the Minister, sidestepping the bureaucracy and mirroring the access 
of private lobbyists but underwritten by legislation. 
Authority: Will operate independently of government but will be established, supported and 
given authority under a new or current act which will define their boundaries, membership 
and resources.  
Preferred Future Report 2009, pg. 11 
Such a legislative basis would effectively enshrine the notion of ‘the community’ as a distinct and directly 
influencing form of governance alongside that of the bureaucracy. In this way, not only is government 
linked institutionally to other actors but it is also judged to be just one of a number of influencing actors 
necessary for marine governance. The following point from the Preferred Future Report 2009 purpose 
statement lists each cohort or social actor alongside each other with no hierarchy or priority, and asserts 
that each is essential: 
Ensure communities, including Aboriginal communities and municipalities, are involved in 
decision-making processes leading to true integrated marine management.  
Preferred Future Report 2009, pg. 9 
Lining up the cohorts non-hierarchically implied that the governance systems ought to be dispersed away 
from individual agencies in some way. The assumption is that government is insufficient for governance of 
the marine commons. In asserting that government is merely another actor alongside First Nations and ‘the 
community’, the Preferred Future Report (2009) model reflects Axiom Two – that power must be dispersed, 
and actors institutionally connected as equals for ‘true’ marine governance. 
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Although not the recommended Preferred Future Report (2009) model, the MAC model did retain the 
commitment to addressing the public interest and providing an avenue for the voicing of ‘non-sector 
community-based perspective’ (e.g. Minutes February 2012). The MAC TOR purpose statement retained, 
as can be seen in the quote below, the principle that the participatory process was required to ensure 
community perspectives could be channelled directly to the formal decision-makers as integral to integrated 
marine governance, and that this needed no further justification: 
The purpose of the Marine Advisory Committee is to provide advice and recommendations 
to federal and provincial governments on relevant policies, processes, strategic matters, or 
issues of significant public interest related to new and existing activities from a non-sector 
community-based perspective.  
MAC TOR 2013 Purpose (emphasis added) 
To facilitate the community voice, the MAC TOR specified a ‘community’ membership category, but did not 
specify how this should be fulfilled. In practice, people who were known to the existing MAC members as 
being closely involved in some kind of marine activity, or to have some level of marine-related expertise but 
not officially engaged in representing any interests, were appointed as general community members. MAC 
members reported that the ‘community-at-large’ role was to capture an imagined ‘community perspective’: 
I’m a community-at-large person, I don’t have any particular position for any organisation … 
that’s how I first even became involved in this process because they were looking for 
someone to come in as an advisor to the process of trying to come up with this community 
values criteria. (M-COMMUNITY) 
I never thought of representing them in particular. I don’t work for a particular environment 
group, although I’m involved with lots of them. Or a member or that kind of thing. I just – I 
mean I think I primarily thought of myself as a community member at the table. (M-
COMMUNITY) 
I would say me because of my background. I think if somebody else came in they (employer) 
wouldn’t have (let them participate in the MAC). You know, I’ve lived here. And I’ve lived here 
for over thirty years. (M-GOVT) 
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They were individuals with experience bringing it to the committee, but they weren’t asked to 
be representative OF the community. [Researcher: In fact it seemed the other way around, 
they were asked specifically not to represent a community?] Yes. They were chosen because 
of their understanding of what things were. Because they (MAC) didn’t want them to have to 
feel they were obligated to report back to certain institutions to get advice. I mean they lived 
in the area, they see what’s going on in the area, therefore their thoughts were good enough 
to be taken as this was what we should do. (M-GOVT) 
They were to represent without actually representing. The community-at-large membership category was 
clearly an effort to ensure ‘the community’ was at the table to enable deliberation on marine activities. In 
practice, this membership category, as with the ‘hats off’ rule discussed above, was an uneasy denial of 
representative mechanisms over direct participation – reflecting the influence of Axion One participation is 
ontological. At the same time, the TOR clearly stipulated that ‘non-sector community perspectives’ must 
have an institutionally significant role that was to be substantially connected to the other forms of 
governance, i.e. to have influence – reflecting also Axiom 2. 
Governance is social (Axiom 3) 
This axiom had only limited resonance within the MAC and there were not any direct references to this 
principle in either the rule or the perceptions reported by members. The ideal model of governance set out 
in the Preferred Future Report (2009) recommended deliberative and participatory processes to generate 
social processes deemed appropriate for dispersed integrated community-based governance: education, 
input, support and involvement. These principles reflected to some extent the axiom that governance is 
social. The consensus rule of the MAC as it was actually constituted in 2013 pointed to the preference for 
socially based, deliberative approach to decision-making and advice provision. The consensus rule was set 
out across two clauses in the MAC TOR 2013 as follows: 
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The Community Values Criteria (CVC) and local knowledge provided by its members through 
interaction and communication with local community members will be used to help guide the 
Committee in developing its consensus-based recommendations or advice.  
Purpose statement, MAC TOR 2013 
Final recommendations or advice to government departments will be established by 
consensus and when differing views may exist, these will be recorded and also 
communicated to departments.  
Membership statement, MAC TOR 2013 
Further, members were to be selected not only for their knowledge and experience but also for their 
personal capacity to compromise and deliberate. This criterion was specified in the MAC TOR as follows: 
Individuals will be appointed on the basis of their knowledge and expertise relative to the 
MRP Area and their ability to participate and contribute in a constructive fashion.  
Membership statement, MAC TOR 2013 
These two rules point to a preference for social capacities as the basis for the MAC; however, this is a 
limited link to the axiom. Rather, the focus of the Preferred Future Report (2009) model is primarily 
institutional, as discussed in the previous axiom. With respect to the MAC as it was constituted after 2013, 
the practices and processes were primarily meetings with discussion items and presentations; in other 
words, also primarily procedural rather than social in the sense of this third axiom. 
Applying the lens of participation-representation: 
authorisation; dissent and exit; accountability 
In this section, I address the second case study research sub-question: (2c) What does application of the 
conceptual lens explain, if anything, about the dominant conceptualisation of participation in the applied 
context.  I do this by applying the lens of participation-representation to the intentions, assumptions, 
reported experiences of the MAC members and the MAC institutional rules and practices. In Chapter 3, I 
identified the three ‘conditions’ from political representation theory that help explain and analyse the 
democratic legitimacy of participatory mechanisms: authorisation; dissent and exit; and accountability. 
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These three, together, comprise the participation–representation lens as described in Chapter 3 (pg. 69). 
The lens is directly relevant to the MAC because the overt purpose of the MAC was fundamentally 
democratic in intention: to facilitate the influence of non-sector community-based perspectives on marine 
planning, decision-making and monitoring. The structure of the MAC, given this purpose, should facilitate 
the participation of those non-sector community-based perspectives and somehow deal with the complexity 
of converting a plurality of potential interests, values and perspectives into a process. I address each 
condition in turn. I finish this section with an analysis of the community values criteria (CVC) tool using the 
three conditions. The CVC was held by MAC members to be a significant if controversial activity and output 
and represented a particular case of participation and representation in its own right. My analysis of the 
CVC did not fit neatly within the three conditions separated out as themes. It was, however, an important 
component of the MAC that also goes to the centre of my research concerns: participation and 
representation. 
Authorisation 
There were two problems of democratic authorisation for the MAC: the appointment of members, and the 
hats off rule. The formal authorisation process for MAC members belonged with the Secretariat. The TOR 
is specific on this count, stipulating that membership be by Government appointment. In practice, 
appointment of members rested jointly with the government and citizen co-Chair and recommendations for 
members could be suggested by the MAC at any time (e.g. Minutes February 2010). No description of the 
process of identifying people for recommendation was apparent in the TOR and the minutes showed few 
instances of discussion at the MAC table of membership (e.g. Minutes February 2010, April 2016). The 
MAC membership list, as the practical definition of ‘communities’, specified twelve marine interest areas of 
which ‘communities’ was just one (MAC TOR 2013 Committee Composition and Membership, pg. 1). This 
represented the MAC’s effort to capture the plurality and diversity of the broader southwest of New 
Brunswick community. In practice, how to constitute the ‘communities’ category was left to the 
interpretation of the MAC members and Secretariat through their recommendations for potential members. 
Potential ‘communities’ members were suggested by MAC members, but not from outside the network of 
MAC members (e.g. Minutes February 2010, April 2016). Furthermore, only those known to the existing 
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MAC members were appointed as ‘communities’ people, the so-called ‘community-at-large’ members. As 
discussed above, in their own words these ‘community-at-large’ members were identified informally by 
reputation from within the MRP and MAC network and did not have specified or clear connection with 
members of the broader community. Neither was it clear to interviewees why some people were invited as 
members and others were not: 
And then I know from others on the MAC that my name was put forward several times, there 
was apparently someone from the [GOVERNMENT] that opposed me joining … So I think 
my participation was blocked for a while. Eventually I was asked to join and I did. (M-PROF) 
I would say I have above average knowledge of it (MAC) … I would have the most knowledge 
of anyone who’s not on it. [Researcher: Why are you not on it?] Why am I not on it? I know! 
That’s a great question. (N-PROF) 
The ‘authorisation-by-appointment’ process presents problems. People who live in the broader community 
clearly were not responsible for authorisation of participants who represented ‘community perspectives’. 
Potential ‘communities’ constituents had no role in authorising MAC members who were nevertheless 
appointed to speak as ‘communities’ – that is, represent people who live in the community. Indeed, the 
institutional rule for the appointment of MAC members (appointment by Secretariat) actively prohibited 
authorisation of community-at-large members by everyday people from the community. 
The ‘hats off’ rule was put in place, as discussed earlier, to enable members to engage freely in debates, 
deliberation, consideration of alternative viewpoints and generation of consensus advice. In other words, 
the ‘hats off’ rule was designed to privilege direct participation of ‘communities’ over participation of formally 
prescribed ‘marine stakeholders’. MAC members acknowledged that formal stakeholder representatives 
backed by formally constituted associations would be prohibited by their association rules and 
responsibilities from engaging in deliberation and consensus decision-making. Not only that, but 
conceptually, formal representative positions would not have been consistent with the MAC purpose of 
generating ‘non-sector community-based perspectives’. 
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Despite the democratic intention, very few respondents hailed the ‘hats off’ rule as a successful approach 
to participation and it was contentious from the earliest meetings of the MAC (Minutes February 2010). The 
impact of the ‘hats off’ rule resulted in significant ethical problems for MAC or would-be MAC members. In 
one of the early MAC meetings, the Chief of the Peskotomuhkati was invited to join the MAC in his capacity 
as a marine scientist, but not as a leader of the First Nations. Some MAC members reported this occurred 
because, at the time, the Peskotomuhkati had not been formally recognised by the Canadian Federal 
Government as a First Nation and so his legal status in the Canadian system created a problem for the 
Government Secretariat members (this was to come subsequently). The Chief’s dissent, and then exit, was 
recorded in the minutes as follows: 
[Co-Chair] introduced [NAME], who briefly attended the meeting to address the committee 
and explain his position as Chief of the Schoodic [sic] Band of the Passamaquoddy [sic] Tribe 
and give his reasons for declining the invitation to participate as a Steering Committee 
member. [NAME] stated that he came to offer his apologies to the SC for not accepting their 
generous offer to join the committee however this is not a luxury he feels that he has since 
he cannot come to this table and leave behind his culture and who and what he represents. 
Minutes February 2010 
The experience of the Chief reflected in these minutes draws attention to the personal nature of 
representative roles – that they are either closely associated with the person’s identity and also, in ethical 
terms, a formal responsibility they cannot and should not shirk or compromise. This was echoed by other 
people interviewed, as follows: 
Well I gotta [sic] say sitting around a table I never want people to take their hat off. I just think 
that’s – like how do you take your hat off? You live here, you know things. You know things 
about the biology, you know things about the fishing, or you know things about tourism or 
conservation, and I think that’s the very thing – we do invite people to come – I think the only 
way – like (you’re saying) you don’t want them to come and only speak FOR their 
organisation, you want them to speak for THEMSELVES with the knowledge of the particular 
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area of expertise – I don’t know how! If you call that hats off, from the ties you have to a 
particular organisation – I don’t know. (M-COMMUNITY) 
There were good people there, and they were chosen for a reason. [NAME] was there and 
he had a vested interest, but they were like ‘[NAME] was not brought here to represent the 
[ORGANISATION]’. This is the weird part about it. But he had a link to the [INTEREST]. They 
wanted it to be [NAME], this guy from [AREA] with a connection to the [INTEREST]. When in 
actual fact there was no way on God’s green earth that [NAME] could put aside his connection 
to his work. This is the hats off thing ... It sounds ok. But when you dig at it a little, it’s 
ridiculous. (N-PROF) 
In practice, a number of other MAC members who joined at various times were also interest group 
representatives, rather than only individuals with ‘knowledge and expertise’. This meant, for example, that 
an employee of a traditional fishery association with formal responsibilities for negotiating fishery interests 
was required to act in the MAC, as a general citizen who also cared about traditional fisheries. That person 
– the individual – could not, however, table any formal positions or progress any organisational agenda. 
The following account of the ‘hats off’ shows the tension arising for MAC members in such a position: 
It was this funny thing where we were told to remove our ‘hats’. So I was supposed to remove 
my ‘hat’. So I said like are you expecting me to take today off work? Do I have to take a 
holiday to come here? Really? I need my Executive Director’s consent to be here, and really, 
how the heck do I take my hat off? ... But if it’s (advocacy) within my job, and if I’m here, well. 
(M-PROF) 
Other respondent accounts also draw attention to this challenge: 
Well, the first thing is I don’t think it’s ever going to really work if you’re going to have multiple 
– if you’re going to be pulling in a membership from different sectors of interest, some of 
which conflict with each other, appoint somebody and them tell them that when they are at 
this table they don’t represent their interests, they represent themselves and their knowledge 
– and their knowledge of that sector but not represent – it was impossible! How can you 
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actually ask somebody to do that? ... What we had set up was - and everyone knew it. But 
‘oh yeah ok’ you know – but everyone knew that it was really their sector. So I’d rather just 
call it clear. (M-GOVT)  
… we didn’t really dwell on it so much after the planning stage. I think people sort of realized 
that even though you were sitting there trying to have your ‘hat at the door’ you were still part 
of whoever you are. So although we weren’t theoretically representing a community there 
were certainly people who thought I represented a community of people. (M-COMMUNITY) 
The MAC members implemented the ‘hats off’ rule to overtly sever the formal and contractual authorisation 
of the majority of the members to represent the interests listed in the TOR, even while also attempting to 
incorporate their ‘expertise and knowledge’. The MAC rules or practices did not create legitimate 
alternatives for authorisation of the members by potential constituents but rather retained authorisation 
inside the MAC with the Secretariat and continued to hold to a fiction of a separation between participation 
and representation. This tension created significant ethical concerns, and yet was not ever resolved 
conceptually or in practice. 
Dissent and exit 
The appointment of members, and the ‘hats off’ rule revealed that dissent and exit were conceptually and 
functionally absent from the MAC. Firstly, given the absence of community authorisation processes for 
individuals to represent the membership categories, there can be, by definition, no formal opportunities for 
potential constituents – individuals or groups – to dissent or exit the representative relationship. Even if this 
had not been the case, people in the community would have to know about the MAC in order to repudiate 
the choice of members appointed to speak on their behalf, or dissent from any advice generated. MAC 
members reported they believed no one beyond the network of MAC members knew about the MAC; for 
example: 
For better or worse people have NO idea. You talk to the average person they would have 
no idea there is such a thing as a marine advisory, the people that do know about it, lots of 
them would probably be pretty suspicious about it and think well this is just going to be 
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manipulated and a tool of government to impose stuff on us. You know, through the complicity 
of these people (MAC members). So nobody’s going to notice that the MAC disappears. (M-
COMMUNITY) 
Similarly, non-member people indicated in their interviews no awareness of the MAC, as can be seen in the 
following quotes: 
I probably should know about it. It sounds like an important thing and we need it. We definitely 
have an interest, I thought that was why you wanted to talk with me. (N-PROF) 
I have not heard of it. But that does not mean that other people haven’t. I’m just not in those 
circles. (N-COMMUNITY) 
These two respondents were active in public community life, had lived in the region for a considerable time, 
and reported strong connection with the waterway and high levels of concern for the balance between 
human uses and marine conservation. Neither had heard of the MAC, and so, in turn, neither had 
opportunity to dissent from the structure of activities of the MAC, let alone exit the implied representative 
status of ‘community-at-large’ members. 
Secondly and significantly, the experience of the Chief of the Peskotomuhkati, discussed in the previous 
section, illustrates the way this absence of dissent and exit impacts. The MAC response to his dissent 
(against the ‘hats off’ rule) and exit (from MAC) was to invite representatives of First Nations from other 
waterways (Minutes February 2012 and September 2013), rather than address the ethical problem to which 
the ‘hats off’ rule had given rise. In his own words, seen in the quote following, the Chief objected strongly 
to the response of the MAC members to his experience: 
And whether or not we were recognized, there’s an obligation there. That was easy for them 
[MAC members] to say that without recognition we can’t talk to them [First Nations] – so 
there’s the artificial part of what they were doing, started right from the get-go. Then they 
suggested that maybe I could come into the room – that would then make me one of their 
stakeholders because that’s the ways they were behaving in the room. And I also said, as an 
indigenous person I will not take my culture into the room because I will not put the culture of 
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my people up for – and I know it was an advisory committee but somehow advisory 
committees seem to give advice that, well I guess to a governance level – and it’s no longer 
advisory if it becomes, if not law, then it becomes some sort of rule or regulation or whatever, 
a licensing agreement or etc. etc. So I would not be in that forum, my culture would be up for 
discussion with fisherman, with fishermen, who – there was so much conflict in that room. So 
that’s why I maintained with government they needed to have that discussion with me before 
it went into that room. So I would not enter the room, for that I was criticized because you 
know if you want to be part of it, then you should participate. So their attitude was, ‘you know 
well ok’ so they brought in people of the Wolastoq, and they’d already given them rights to 
my territory. This was another disaster – how do you displace one indigenous people, people 
who are indigenous to a territory, with another native people? Given them access to your 
rights and say that ‘ok we now have the “aquaculture salmon” replacing the “indigenous 
salmon”’? Chief of the Peskotomuhkati of Skutik 
The ‘hats off’ rule, then, created a significant ethical problem and objection from the Chief of the First 
Nations people of the area. Notwithstanding this, the MAC members did not adjust the MAC position on 
First Nation’s participation – it did not, for example, take an ethical position on the Pekotomukhati’s rights. 
Nor did the MAC members adjust the ‘hats off’ rule in the face of his substantial objection to this form of 
participation and representation, dissent and consequential exit. The dissent and exit condition was not 
only conceptually absent, it was also practically absent – with deeply concerning ethical results.  
Accountability 
There were three points at which accountability failed in the case of the MAC: passive public 
communications; non-specific ‘connection’ with communities; and the ‘hats off’ rule.  
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Firstly, the MAC Secretariat maintained a website15 housing MAC documents and records. It was a 
passive communication tool with capacity for community members to email comments to the MAC. 
Throughout the deliberation and transition phase, the role of communications was raised regularly (Minutes 
April 2010, August 2010, October 2010, January 2012, February 2012); the minutes showed no evidence 
that this had happened and by 2014, for example, mention of community interface and communications 
was reduced to closing ‘roundtable’ comments (Minutes December 2014). 
Secondly, the TOR stipulated that MAC members retain some form of connection with people relative to 
their primary area of expertise and knowledge, as follows: 
Advisory Committee members will be expected to regularly interact and communicate with 
members of the public from their area relative to Advisory Committee activities and to 
maintain an understanding of the community values and views relative to issues.  
TOR 2013 Committee Composition and Membership 
This appears to be an effort to specify active accountability between MAC members and people who live in 
the community in an informal ‘mingle and absorb’ form. There was no evidence in the minutes that MAC 
members pursued this systematically or purposefully, nor were they held accountable for doing this. 
Indeed, in the previous discussion of ‘community-at-large’ members, the connection was assumed and 
non-specific. This instruction was not a clear mechanism for brokering active connection between the MAC 
and other community members who might share particular marine interests or values. 
Thirdly, while the ‘hats off’ rule has been thoroughly examined throughout this section, there is one final 
comment to make. The ‘hats off’ rule was overtly designed to sever the formal active accountability 
responsibilities of MAC members who also held other formal representative responsibilities outside the 
MAC. MAC members in formal representative roles, however, could not ethically suspend their 
responsibilities for a deliberative process. They could not, and arguably should not, have traded off 
                                                     
15 http://bofmrp.ca/home/ 
  
 
  172   
    
     
principles, stakes or interests on behalf of their members without recourse to extensive consultation (and 
which may not result in a trade-off or compromise positions anyway). 
Applying the conditions to the community values criteria (CVC) 
The CVC was not used at any stage for generating advice, despite its design for that purpose and its status 
in the TOR as the key decision-making tool. Models and artefacts like the CVC are common in participatory 
processes and so I have analysed the CVC to understand how the three conditions (authorisation, exit and 
dissent, and accountability) might assist in evaluating the legitimacy of such models and artefacts. 
The TOR purpose statement specified that the CVC was to be the primary tool for generating the advice: 
The Community Values Criteria (CVC) and local knowledge provided by its members through 
interaction and communication with local community members will be used to help guide the 
Committee in developing its consensus-based recommendations or advice.  
Purpose statement, MAC TOR 2013 
The CVC was built from a solid participatory and co-productive basis, through wide-ranging community 
consultations conducted during 2008 and 2009. Community concerns were elicited from workshops and 
summarised in the CVC template to produce a workable model of the marine values of the region, which 
was then validated in subsequent workshops. Firstly, then, it could be argued that the CVC was clearly 
authorised by community members it aimed to represent. It was because of these participatory foundations 
that MAC members decided to use the CVC as the basis for MAC deliberations. The assumption in this 
decision was that the legitimacy of the CVC, authorised during the consultative, co-production process, 
would carry through to the work of the MAC. MAC members, by this logic, could use the CVC to assess 
proposals or policies with an assurance that they were legitimately reflecting community values. The logic 
of this authorisation process is appealing, and to some extent satisfying. It may be that the logic of this 
authorisation process – widespread consultation or co-production – holds promise for establishing 
authorisation outside the electoral mode. 
  
 
  173   
    
     
In practice, however, the following accounts of trying to use the CVC vary in their assessment of the tool 
but all indicate that its promise was not fully realised. 
If there was a discussion it was never at a very concrete level. We never really put it into 
practical terms, it was always kind of those things people looked at and said ‘mmmm’. (M-
GOVT) 
Uhhhh, [long pause] that seemed very academic to me. I think it was obviously worthwhile 
doing, but it took a long time and it seemed overly complicated. (M-INDUSTRY) 
It has the potential if done properly, with the proper ground rules, it does have the potential I 
think of providing a tool of a framework for organising advice. Or an assessment. (M-
COMMUNITY) 
So you had this matrix with the CVC. So once we had that matrix we came to a MAC meeting 
with government. The governors, Provincial people, thought ’we have an approach here’. To 
use a matrix and apply a numerical value to each of the criteria – to whatever was the 
discussion at the time. So we tried setting up a numerical matrix to say ok on a score of one 
to five what does the MAC feel about the CVC – well we had 20 people around the table 
trying to come to consensus on is it a 1, 2, 3 or 5. Well, that process did not work at all. Didn’t 
work. (M-PROF) 
Like I just think it’s a dumb idea. I just think it’s – honestly I just think it’s stupid. You cannot 
ever reduce this, I see the appeal of it. Because it looks very scientific, it looks very formal, 
you’re attaching values to things and then you can make decisions, but it’s – it can never 
capture the complexity of this area … Ok let’s take something less controversial at the 
moment, say tidal power. And they could say well if the proposal is to put a turbine in this 
location, whatever, wherever that location is exactly, then let’s go through this community 
values criteria and we’ll come up for scores. Like – we’re not – there’s no way we’re going to 
agree on what – you know like, we may hammer out something that no one in the end agrees 
with – like on all the points of the values criteria. But we’ll come out with something that looks 
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like a decision based on a process that looks like it’s credible but in the end the decision is – 
does it really reflect? (M-COMMUNITY) 
These accounts indicate that any initial legitimacy the CVC had only held so far. Once the issues under 
consideration became high stakes, for example MPAs, it became difficult for MAC members to take a 
stance on, or deliberate over, differences. This suggests that, secondly, in practice, accountability for the 
application of the tool must be actively exercised for any decisions made to be regarded as legitimate. 
Thirdly, once the CVC was converted to a representative template and separated from its participatory 
basis, neither dissent nor exit from the representative relationship encapsulated in the CVC were possible 
for general community members. 
No plan to review, revalidate or update the CVC was apparent in any MAC documentation. Neither was 
there evidence of intention to validate with the broader community any assessments made by the MAC 
members using the CVC. Even if MAC advice generated using the CVC had been published on the 
website, as noted above, this form of community interface was passive and so would not have constituted a 
meaningful opportunity for either accountability or dissent and exit. 
In practice, then, as with the other design elements of the MAC, the CVC did not meet the conditions for 
representative mechanisms to facilitate participation of community members. 
Discussion and conclusions 
The MAC was a network of people committed to managing the shared waterway for the challenges of 
climate change that were already being experienced, and to support the future of the coastal communities 
along the shores of the Bay of Fundy. MAC members overtly set out to enable ‘non-sector community-
based perspectives’ to influence the planning, management and decisions for southwest Bay of Fundy. The 
MAC was established as a specific effort to move away from what the MRP members regarded as the 
conflictual politics that had resulted from the existing formal representative approaches to marine 
governance. They sought to find a participatory and deliberative alternative, in what they thought to be an 
apolitical, deliberative environment. MAC members were driven by good intentions; they exhibited good 
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working relationships, trust, expertise and persistence. MAC members clearly experienced tensions with 
the rules and structures they had developed, and yet struggled to address these tensions. MAC members’ 
evaluation of the initiative showed a high level of persistence and hope, despite little progress towards the 
objectives they had set. It was, as one member concluded, worth a try: ‘But you sort of think ok, let’s just 
give it a go. Let’s just see how it goes. But it didn’t. There you go.’ While they were able to voice the 
tensions and continue to puzzle over what form a participatory process could take, without the conditions 
for legitimacy they were unable to address the legitimacy gaps. 
How, if at all, did the SES participation norm influence the MAC? 
I have shown that the MAC members’ Preferred Future Report 2009 model of community governance was 
strongly influenced by the three axioms of the participation norm. Had the Preferred Future Report 2009 
model been implemented after the deliberation phase, the influence of the participation norm on the MAC 
would have been specific and direct, as it was clearly designed with participatory intentions and processes. 
While this was not the case, the MAC members’ commitment, aspirations and intentions carried the 
participation norm through to its structures and activities. The MAC was constructed to create space for 
alternative aspirational politics of direct participation of the ‘community’, in line with the promise of the 
participation norm. The structures of the MAC, in particular the ‘hats off’ rule, sought to separate 
representative mechanisms in favour of the ontological participation and deliberative axioms of the 
participation norm. The ‘hats off’ rule was a clear instance of privileging direct participation over 
representative mechanisms, reflecting the suspicion of representative mechanisms at the heart of 
participatory democracy theory. Further, despite the members’ aspirations for direct participation, the MAC 
structures ended up relying on representative processes to deliver participatory aspirations, also consistent 
with the SES participatory norm, as established in Chapter 4. 
Not only were the axioms of the SES participation norm present in the MAC, but the MAC was also held to 
lack legitimacy and did lead to people’s disillusionment with the process. Furthermore, there was evidence 
that the MAC did not have connections with potential constituencies. This case study then supports the 
proposition at the close of Chapter 4 that the influence of the SES participation norm will lead to lack of 
legitimacy in a larger populous polity and will be implicated in disillusionment. The appeal and drive of the 
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norm for MAC members obscured the inevitable presence of representative mechanisms, and this was also 
implicated in the lack of legitimacy the MAC process suffered. Equally concerning, the impact of the resort 
to unacknowledged representative mechanisms in the MAC was to prohibit substantial connection with the 
actual communities of Southwest New Brunswick. This was the clearly the impact of the ‘hats off’ rule, 
which denied the intrinsic link between participation and representation for participants with professional 
marine-related responsibilities. It was also, however, the impact of the reliance on a few hand-selected 
‘community-at-large’ representative as proxies for the diversity of citizens of the broader polity.  
There are two concerning implications of this lack of connection with constituencies and citizens. Firstly, it 
means that the MAC was not just lacking in democratic legitimacy; it was anti-democratic in that it excluded 
rather than included people – a serious problem in a democratic nation. Secondly, from an SES adaptation 
perspective, it means that the MAC failed to facilitate the conditions for enabling social adaptation to 
changing environmental conditions. This means the SES participation norm mitigates against the 
achievement of SES objectives. These are concerning findings and point to the significance of being able 
to identify the norm and how it influences institutional rules and practices. 
What does the participation–representation lens explain, if anything, 
about the democratic legitimacy of the case study initiative? 
In practical terms, a deliberative ‘non-sector community-based perspective’ was to be created through the 
three structural/structuring elements of the MAC: 
1. Secretariat appointment of members; 
2. ‘hats off’ deliberation rule; and, 
3. the community values criteria (CVC). 
In an effort to avoid traditional representative processes, these three elements functioned to shape the 
participation–representation relationship between the individual MAC members and the ‘community’ whose 
perspective was to be created by the MAC members’ deliberations. The appointment of members, sourced 
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from within the existing network of actors and authorised by the Secretariat, prohibited any community-
based authorisation processes. The intention of the ‘hats off’ rule was to disrupt the formal authorisation of 
MAC members but proved to be an ongoing dilemma. The lack of authorisation processes between 
community members and ‘community-at-large’ members also meant a lack of institutional processes for 
dissent and exit from the MAC. The lack of authorisation processes also led to the absence of 
accountability between community members and MAC members. The CVC, built on solid participatory 
foundations, was converted into a rating tool for use by a small non-representative and non-accountable 
group that, in the end, created a problem that contributed to the inability of the MAC to produce advice. As 
the institutional architecture of the MAC, these three structuring mechanisms moved MAC members away 
from any connection with potential cohorts, and, therefore, created legitimacy gaps. 
By using the participation–representation lens to examine the MAC’s institutional structure, the problem of 
who speaks for whom, and how this could be justified was brought into relief. The MAC rules did not 
explain how individuals with ‘knowledge and expertise’ required for deliberation were authorised, or even 
by whom that authorisation might be exercised. This means that while we might know who was speaking, 
we cannot tell for whom, and we are a long way from being able to determine if potential constituents 
authorised the representation of the voice, values or interests exercised through the MAC. Lacking the 
language of the conditions, and under the powerful influence of the participation norm, MAC members 
struggled to articulate this legitimacy gap. While the MAC institutional rules may have produced a simple 
approach to generating ‘non-sector community-based perspectives’, when analysed using the 
participation–representation lens, it can be seen that the MAC structure and operational elements did not 
produce a democratically accountable approach. 
It was intended that the MAC would comprise individuals with expertise and knowledge, free from formal 
representative political processes, to deliberate on community perspectives. It was not the intention to 
sever the democratic legitimacy of the MAC. My examination of the MAC using the analytic lens shows, 
however, that the severance of democratic legitimacy was nevertheless the effect. Under the influence of 
the participation norm, MAC members created an initiative with a number of legitimacy gaps. Without a 
clear focus on authorisation, accountability, and dissent and exit, the MAC operated as an elitist process in 
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the guise of a deliberative, participatory initiative. Under the influence of the participation norm, existing and 
recognisable representative mechanisms were purposefully avoided, separating participation from 
representation. The MAC’s structure and design were ultimately representative but not in ways that could 
facilitate the participation of community members in generating the ‘non-sector community-based 
perspectives’. In this, the MAC reflected the critiques of participatory democracy theory as well as 
demonstrating the legitimacy gaps inherent in the SES governance theory established in Chapter 3. 
Finally, the absence of the dissent and exit condition in the MAC case posed a significant problem for the 
MAC. On considering this finding, I suggest that strengthening the dissent and exit condition may lead in 
unexpected directions, as the function of this condition is to reformulate the very assumptions about who 
might be or might become a potential constituent, and which forms of representative mechanisms are 
acceptable, and which are not. This means that if the conditions are firmly in place and delivering greater 
levels of throughput legitimacy, the agenda, focus and activities of a participatory initiative may change 
significantly from the founding purposes. If so, this will bring additional challenges to governing the 
ecosystem and indeed may broaden the scope of governance, as theorised by Kooiman (2003). The shift 
in Forum focus from improving communications to community development and social impacts indicates 
the dynamic potential for participatory initiatives to move in unexpected directions. The implication of this is 
that participatory governance may trigger unexpected social and political changes, and if so ensuring 
strong democratic legitimacy of such initiative becomes an even greater imperative. While the notion of 
shifts in social and political objectives is aligned with the drive of SES governance and the associated 
participation norm, it is not yet clear that communities are ready for this level of dispersal of governance 
influence (e.g. Fudge 2018; Waters and Barnett 2018), and the case of the MAC supports this supposition. 
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Chapter 7. 
Community and industry governance of salmon 
farming in Macquarie Harbour, Tasmania 
This chapter presents the second of two case studies of citizen or community participation in marine 
governance. Here I examine a community–industry initiative to provide the opportunity for community 
perspectives to be considered in the expansion of salmonid aquaculture in an iconic Australian waterway, 
Macquarie Harbour in the Australian island state of Tasmania. The initiative was put in place to enable ‘the 
community’ and the aquaculture industry members to consider how to maximise positive impacts and 
minimise negative impacts for the community of the expansion. The initiative, referred to as the Forum, is 
an example of emerging forms of hybrid network governance that directly connect civil and private actors in 
negotiating with respect to the balance between non-state civil and private interests. Hybrid forms of 
governance are growing in significance for addressing matters of shared marine use (Vince and Haward 
2017). 
The unit of analysis for the case study was ‘the Forum’, that is, the regular roundtable meetings of 
community and industry members. At the time of writing, the Forum had been meeting for four years, 
including during a period in which a significant fish overstocking resulted in severe and negative 
environmental, industry production, legal and social acceptability impacts. This chapter is not designed to 
analyse the overstocking event or its impacts; rather, this event is treated as part of the trajectory of the 
Forum. The experiences of the Forum members during this time are instructive in that the extreme event 
brought into relief some of the institutional tensions, limits and challenges of the Forum as a participatory 
industry–community governance process.  
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Case study context: Macquarie Harbour, Tasmania, 
Australia 
Macquarie Harbour (the Harbour) is a sheltered estuarine embayment and the second largest natural 
harbour in Australia, with a surface water area of 276 km2 (see Figure 7). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Images from Land Tasmania, Tasmanian State Government https://maps.thelist.tas.gov.au/listmap/app/list/map 
 
Macquarie Harbour lies within a high rainfall catchment comprising temperate eucalypt forest and cool-
temperate rainforest (DPIPWE 2004). The hydrology of the Harbour is complex, shaped by the combination 
of a deep central basin, a narrow shallow oceanic inlet (known as the Hell’s Gates) and in-flows of two 
major rivers controlled by hydro-electric power generation up-river (Ross et al Sept 2017). These features 
and the impact of high rainfall and distinct seasonal wind, tide, atmospheric pressures and oceanic currents 
result in a stratified estuarine water column. This comprises a deep, slow-moving bottom layer naturally low 
in dissolved oxygen and subject to oxygen ‘recharge’ from ocean in-flows; a mid-bottom layer down to 
15 metres susceptible to oxygen depletion and slow to recharge from either oceanic or freshwater in-flows; 
and a surface layer down to approximately 5 metres depth of fresh water from river in-flows (Ross and 
MacLeod 2017). The benthic system is also low in flora and fauna diversity and abundance due to low light 
penetration of the dark tannin-rich surface water (EPA 2018). Macquarie Harbour, then, is commonly 
Figure 7: Macquarie Harbour (encircled in red and detailed in right hand image) the marine 
ecosystem at the centre of this case study 
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described as a complex and unique ecological system (Ross et al 2017). It is also a dynamic social system 
that is intimately connected with the marine ecosystem. 
The Harbour has been an important waterway for human societies for at least 35 000 years (Natural and 
Cultural Heritage 2017). The Harbour, known by Tasmanian Aboriginal people as Meebberlee, was part of 
the traditional Country of the Mimegin and Lowreene people of the northwest nation, and a site within the 
Aboriginal trading and ceremony system along the southwest–northwest coasts of Tasmania (Alexander 
2006). In 1821, British colonists established a penal settlement, timber supply and port authority on the 
shores of the waterway. Despite active resistance, both the southwest and northwest Aboriginal nations 
were largely decimated by 1834, leaving only a few Aboriginal families remaining in the area (Ryan 2012). 
The town of Strahan, on the Harbour shores, was established in 1877 by non-Aboriginal settlers as a 
shipping port for the harvest of unique Huon pine (Kerr and McDermott 2004), and for copper, silver and 
gold mining in the nearby mining town of Queenstown until 2014. In the early 1980s, the Harbour was the 
site of an environmental campaign to protect the highly valued Franklin River, the unique Tasmanian cool-
temperate rainforest ecosystem and significant Aboriginal cultural artefacts (Crowley 2003). During this 
fierce fight, economic development and conservation values were pitted against each other, polarising not 
only Tasmanians but Australians more broadly, and created important political ripple effects internationally 
(Hutchins and Lester 2006). In 1982, UNESCO listed the area as World Heritage, effectively scotching the 
State Government plans for further hydro-electric developments (Mertha and Lowry 2006). Notwithstanding 
this, active hydro-electric dams are as significant in the Macquarie Harbour catchment as the protected 
rainforest system. Macquarie Harbour is neither pristine nor fully commercialised, yet it is important for both 
conservation and commercial values. This is because approximately a third of the Harbour is included in 
the Tasmanian Wilderness World Heritage Area (TWWHA), and the remaining water is zoned to support 
9500 tonnes of cage-grown salmon (EPA 2018). The Harbour supports wilderness-centred marine tourism, 
salmon farming, commercial fisheries and recreational boating and fishing. The Harbour is also highly 
valued as a recreational site, for fishing, boating and camping, for both locals and visitors. Tourism, the 
largest employing industry in Strahan and the local area, is dominated by one very large provider, paired 
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with a cluster of smaller-scale tourism ventures that depend on the Harbour’s wilderness reputation and 
environmental values (REMPLAN 2018). 
Salmon aquaculture is the second largest employing industry in the area with just under 200 people 
estimated to be employed between the three farming companies, Petuna Group, Tassal Group Ltd and 
Huon Aquaculture Group P/L (TSIC 2017). Small-scale salmon farming began in Macquarie Harbour in the 
late 1980s and grew steadily across southeastern Tasmania after a period of market-driven rationalisation 
reduced the industry statewide to three major companies, Tassal Group Ltd, Huon Aquaculture Group Ltd 
and Petuna Seafoods Ltd (TSGA 2018). These three companies were joint proponents for an ambitious 
expansion of farming levels in Macquarie Harbour in 2011 under a collective industry arrangement 
(DPIPWE 2012). Between approval of the expansion in 2012 and the time of this research in 2018, the 
proposed expansion of salmon aquaculture farming was implemented, and the Harbour system suffered 
almost immediate and negative benthic and nutrient effects (Knight et al 2015; Ross et al 2017). 
Throughout 2016 and 2017, the aquaculture industry tore itself apart with intra-company legal and public 
media fighting over responsibility for the negative impacts (e.g. Morton 2018; Salmon 2017), and 
Tasmanian society was shaken by emerging evidence of degradation of the Harbour. 
In 2014, the Tasmanian Salmonid Growers Association (TSGA) established and chaired a community–
industry forum that operated in this heightened atmosphere. The became known variously as the 
‘Aquaculture Industry–Strahan Community Forum’ (Minutes 2014), the ‘West Coast Community0 
Aquaculture Advisory Forum’ (Minutes 2015 and 2016), the ‘West Coast Salmonid Aquaculture Community 
Advisory Forum’ and the ‘Strahan West Coast Aquaculture Community Forum’ (Minutes 2017 and 2018), 
hereafter referred to as the Forum. 
The West Coast Community-Aquaculture Advisory Forum 
In this section I set out a picture of the operations and experiences of the Forum generated from 
documentation and interview materials. The subheadings in this section represent the themes from the first 
step analysis of the materials.  
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The development of a participatory community–industry governance 
approach 
In late 2013, the salmon aquaculture industry association, the Tasmanian Salmonid Grower’s Association 
(TSGA), commenced a trial of ongoing community-based engagement, which continues today. ‘Community 
consultation’ was a requirement under the State Government licence for the approved aquaculture farming 
expansion, although the extent or form of consultations were not (Marine Farming Planning Act 1995; 
Tassal et al 2011). People who were involved at the time reported through interview that the intention for 
ongoing connection between the industry and the community grew from public consultations for the 
proposed expansion. The intention to develop ongoing connection with community members was also 
explained in terms of a growing sense at the time among industry members that the industry operators 
could improve their understanding of how their operations affected local communities. Paired with this, it 
was reported that at that time industry members were also seeking to understand how they could improve 
the positive contribution of industry activities to community development, as reflected in this comment from 
a founding participant: 
So we were in an era in our industry where consultation was being discussed openly, where 
we were critical of the government’s consultation processes, at the federal and state level. It 
was basically consultation after decision, and we didn’t want to be replicating that with the 
process with Macquarie Harbour. (M-INDUSTRY) 
The Forum members confirmed an initial Terms of Reference (TOR) in May 2014, which provided the 
structure of the Forum, and the minutes show the members of the Forum were the same community 
members who had been involved in the initial discussions (Minutes March 2014, April 2014, November 
2014). Forum members revised the TOR during 2017 and approved new TOR in early 2018. At the time of 
writing in April 2019, the Forum was still meeting as an active and engaged group. 
Purpose and structure 
The purpose of the Forum was described in the interviews as two-fold: to provide a means for dialogue 
between the aquaculture industry and the Strahan community; and to identify common interests and work 
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together on common concerns (also TOR 2014 and TOR 2018). At the inaugural Forum meeting, the 
primary focus was on communications regarding the planned process to relocate aquaculture operations 
from the waterfront in the centre of the town (Minutes April 2014), a longstanding issue at the time for 
Strahan residents because of its perceived impact on the tourism industry. By the time the TOR were 
confirmed in April 2014, the purpose and scope had broadened to community development and maximising 
the potential impacts of an expanded industry for the community, alongside the communications and 
information sharing piece (Minutes November 2014, November 2015). Table 16 shows that the ‘topics of 
interest’ scoping statement in both the 2014 and 2018 TOR included social, economic and also ecological 
concerns. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 16: ‘TOR Topics of interest’ that represent the scope of the Forum. The most regularly discussed topics as reflected in the 
Forum minutes as highlighted in bold text.  
TOR 2014 
‘Topics of interest for the group may include, 
but are not limited to:’ 
TOR 2018 
‘Topics of interest for the group may include, 
but are not limited to:’ 
Water quality monitoring results and broader 
implications 
Socio-economic opportunities 
Conservation opportunities 
Regional economic impacts 
Marine debris clean-ups 
Harvest schedules 
Water quality monitoring results and broader 
implications 
Socio-economic opportunities 
Conservation opportunities 
Regional economic impacts 
Marine debris clean-ups 
Harvest schedules 
Noise and odour [of aquaculture operations] 
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Relocation of the Huon Aquaculture and Tassal 
shore-based facilities 
Noise and odour [of aquaculture operations] 
Recreational fishing 
Research projects 
How the companies can be good neighbours and 
relevant, meaningful members of the community 
Other matters of interest to stakeholders 
Recreational fishing 
Research projects 
How the companies can be good neighbours and 
relevant, meaningful members of the community 
Other matters of interest to stakeholders 
 
According to the minutes, the most consistent items were harvest schedules (relevant to recreational use of 
the water, truck activity in the town centre); employment numbers (how many local people are employed 
compared to how many ‘drive-in/drive-out’ people); marine debris clean-ups; the establishment of childcare 
in Strahan (as socio-economic impacts); and truck movements through the town of Strahan (as a ‘good 
neighbour’ concern). These are shown in bold in Table 16 (above). The impacts of aquaculture operations 
on water quality is listed in each of the TOR, and first tabled in 2014 (Minutes April 2014). Water quality 
was not revisited, however, until well after evidence of severe degradation of water quality in the Harbour 
began to emerge in the public media (e.g. see Minutes December 2016, June 2017, September 2017, 
December 2017, April 2018). 
In both TOR, two criteria set the rules for Forum membership that introduce a tension between an 
aspiration for direct community participation and practical representative mechanisms that prescribe who 
can actually participate. Firstly, the overarching membership statement is expressed as follows: 
The Community Advisory Forum will be open to any stakeholder interested in productive 
engagement with the aquaculture industry operating on the west coast.  
Structure/Membership, TOR 2014 
This openness rule signalled an underpinning Forum value, for direct self-presentation (participation) for 
anyone from ‘the community’ with an interest in aquaculture operations in the broader local government 
area (i.e. ‘the west coast’). This underpinning value reflects the core precept of participatory democracy 
discussed in Chapter 3 (pg. 61). The membership criteria for the Forum are set out in Table 17 below. 
Table 17: TOR membership criteria as listed categories and the ‘Ideally’ clause (in bold)  
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TOR May 2014 
‘The Community-Industry Forum will be open to 
any Strahan resident interested in productive 
engagement with the aquaculture industry.’ 
‘The Forum will draw participants from the 
following:’ 
TOR April 2018 
‘Membership of the Community Advisory Forum 
will be open to resident stakeholders interested in 
productive engagement with the aquaculture 
industry operating on the west coast.’ 
‘Ideally, participants will be drawn from across the 
community, including:’ 
People who live and work in Strahan 
Young people (under 25 years old) 
Tasmanian State Parks and Wildlife [Tasmanian 
State Government Department] 
West Coast Council [local municipal government] 
Tourism sector 
Recreational water users (including fishing) 
School 
Sporting and recreational groups 
Progress and development groups 
Young people (under 25 years old) 
Parks and Wildlife [Tasmanian State Government 
Department] 
West Coast Council [local municipal government] 
Aquaculture (1 permanent representative from each 
company, and other specialists invited as required) 
Tourism sector 
Recreational Fishing Group 
Strahan Primary School 
Active Strahan16 
Strahan Streets Working Group17 
Community health 
 
As can be seen in Table 17 (above) the rule of openness was tightened further in 2018 to include a 
stipulation for residency. The overarching membership statement also signals a second underpinning value 
for ‘productive engagement with aquaculture industry’. This value is expressed as a rule that requires 
acceptance of the industry’s presence in the Harbour for a person to be included in the Forum’s definition 
of ‘the community’. The productive engagement rule immediately modifies the openness rule. It also 
circumscribes the allowable interests (those that accept aquaculture operations) and defines ‘the 
community’ as those who are committed to ‘productive engagement’. The second membership criteria 
appeared in each TOR as listed categories or interests that further define ‘the community’ for the purposes 
of the Forum. In the 2014 TOR, these categories were relatively open, i.e. ‘sporting and recreational 
groups’ and ‘progress and development groups’ but were replaced in the 2018 revised TOR with 
                                                     
16 Local health and fitness group 
17 Local activist group focused on ensuring safety and amenity re streets in the town 
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specifically known groups active in the area, for example ‘Active Strahan’18 and the ‘Strahan Streets 
Working Group’19. The groups listed in this way introduces specifically representative mechanisms 
alongside the (modified) openness rule, but in the 2018 TOR retained the commitment to ‘openness’ and 
self-presentation through the ‘ideally’ clause (in bold in Table 17 above). The two modifiers to the 
‘openness’ rule and value, then, introduce representative mechanisms into the foundations of the Forum 
that limit who is in and who is out of the Forum and sit in tension with the participatory intention and 
underpinning value. 
Forum meetings were held regularly across the four years but increased in frequency and reliability after 
the community members took secretariat control in late 2016. The first TOR (2014) stipulated that the 
Forum meet twice per year, increased to three per year in late 2014 (Minutes November 2014) and that 
each meeting be followed with a community newsletter. People reported a drop-off in aquaculture industry 
commitment in 2015 and 2016 and the minutes show that only two meetings were held in each of those 
years. It was in this period, 2015–2016, that the negative environmental impacts of the rapid increase in 
tonnage of salmon in the Harbour became publicly available (Salmon 2017). For some interview 
respondents, this context explained the lack of engagement with the community members during this 
period: 
I suppose the challenge for us is forthright transparency with the fish farms in a heightened 
media environment. That would be my summary. (M-COMMUNITY) 
For others the pull back from the Forum revealed a shallowness to the commitment of the aquaculture 
industry despite assurances otherwise: 
                                                     
18 An established health and fitness group 
19 An active group of citizens focused on addressing the safety and driving standards of large trucks transiting through 
the town 
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I think the fish farmers started to know that early on that it was creating issues, but they didn't 
really own up to it because it affected their money-making model of how many fish they could 
have in the Harbour and what was sustainable. (M-COMMUNITY) 
In 2017, the Forum members took control of the Forum and again increased the meeting frequency to hold 
the industry more accountable: 
And I remember getting increasingly frustrated that the aquaculture companies had an 
obligation to consult with the community, but these meetings were only being held when it 
suited them, when it suited [NAME]. And I remember sitting out there saying ‘look it's about 
time we had another meeting let's make it happen’ and then I went to the meeting and raised 
my concerns. About it shouldn't be ad hoc and we need it to be perhaps more regular and 
more responsive. (M-COMMUNITY) 
Responsibility for organising, paying for, chairing and generating the minutes of the Forum had rested with 
the TSGA. In the 2017 revision of the TOR, chairing responsibility was shifted to community members 
(TOR 2017) as an additional strategy to hold the industry members more accountable. People explained in 
interview that at the end of 2017 a revision of the TOR was prompted by the increased attention and 
attendance at the Forum of anti-aquaculture campaigning interests from outside the west coast community. 
In the heightened environment of 2016, Forum members explained they thought the productive capacity of 
the Forum was undermined by the original 2014 rule of openness. This was because Forum members had 
no way of dealing with people who didn’t live in the community but whom they feared were attending to 
disrupt ‘productive engagement’ (TOR 2014) with the aquaculture industry: 
It got tricky at one point. Somehow, and I don’t know how, this person turned up ... She set 
up the laptop and started taking notes. Very odd ... And she was pulled up on that and then 
asked to introduce herself and stop doing that [taking notes]. (M-COMMUNITY) 
And in the extraordinary circumstance the Forum becomes a tool, another part of the fight. 
And it devalued what it was. It caused angst between people in the community. We had 
chairmen's change [sic], people resigned [like] secretaries [sic], it just was a horrible situation 
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… So the terms of reference for the community forum got revised after that meeting – there 
was a ‘we can't let that happen again’ moment. We needed to revise the terms of reference 
and what was really good was that they got revised, two people within the community drafted 
them, and everybody agreed. There was a unanimous consensus that we can't let that 
happen again. (M-INDUSTRY) 
This problem of openness also triggered concerns about the Forum’s transparency and capacity to 
represent the broader west coast community. To deal with these tensions, Forum members introduced the 
following additional six changes to the original TOR: 
• The 2014 statement of independence requiring members to place ‘community interests’ above 
those of each individual Forum member’s interests was removed; 
• A six-monthly membership process was introduced to make clear how people could join the Forum, 
and ensure regular opportunities for new members to join; 
• A process for including the broader residential community in decisions and activities of the Forum 
was introduced; 
• The membership list was tightened to name specific established interest groups; 
• Attendance rules for the general public participation in the Forum were introduced; and 
• The number of meetings per year was increased from bi-annual to quarterly. 
Perspectives on the operations and activities of the Forum 
In this section, I set out the themes that reflected participant and non-participant perspectives on the 
strengths, achievements, limitation and challenges of the Forum. This section describes how the Forum 
operated based on reports from those who were involved and so provides insight into how the principles of 
the Forum and the actual processes and relationships of the Forum came together. 
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Practical positive changes 
People reported through interview two positive and practical changes that resulted from the Forum. Firstly, 
in response to the ongoing concern about marine debris, Forum members introduced annual marine debris 
clean-ups. In addition, the aquaculture industry established a marine debris hotline to deal quickly with 
debris in the Harbour (e.g. Minutes March 2017, June 2017, April 2018). People reported a positive shift in 
aquaculture industry attitudes regarding marine debris as a result of this activity. Secondly, the Forum was 
the site for the development of a community–industry protocol and agreement on truck movements through 
the town that addressed community members’ concerns about noise, volume and unsafe driving practices 
by commercial trucks through the town (e.g. Minutes April 2014, February 2015, November 2015, 
December 2017). 
Control and influence built through the Forum 
Several people reported that a transition in control of the Forum from the aquaculture industry to the 
community members represented a significant achievement. At some point in 2016 the community 
members took over chairing and providing of minutes for the Forum and took a directive role in putting 
together the newsletter. This positive outcome was reported to have been triggered by a negative one – an 
emerging pattern of cancellations and rescheduled meetings during the height of the negative media storm: 
… Then they were mucking around, the dates of the meetings kept changing, we’d sent them 
a couple of fairly rude emails – ‘Hang on we haven't had a forum for a while’. So I rang up 
and said ‘Why don't we chair this out. We'll make this a community thing’. (M-COMMUNITY) 
Notwithstanding this, people also reported the fact that once the community members took control of 
organising the meetings, the industry members showed up and remained committed to the Forum even in 
the face of personnel changes and the challenges confronting the aquaculture industry: 
I think you'd be pretty lucky to have the mining company’s community forum, where they go 
(sic) the level of community ownership that this lot are allowing to happen. So I think that's 
something I'm proud of them about and that's why I spend some energy on this. (M-
COMMUNITY) 
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Good faith, trust and robust relationships 
The sense of the aquaculture industry being part of ‘the community’ was encapsulated in the notion of 
aquaculture as a ‘good neighbour’ that came through the interviews. People reported a sense that the 
Forum had resulted in aquaculture industry becoming part of the life of the community: 
If we've got people who’ve got a company or an industry that works around here let's make 
sure it does good for us and for everyone. And if you got neighbours, let's work with your 
neighbours, and simply put they are our neighbours to some extent … We’re never all going 
to be perfect and they'll do some things in their house that I don't particularly like, or suit the 
way I live. But we got to rub alongside one another. (M-COMMUNITY) 
Several people identified that the trusting relationships built among Forum members was a key strength 
and achievement from the process. The relationships were described as robust and not always easy but 
sufficiently trusting that debates, problems and disagreements could be worked through without either party 
walking away from the Forum and without either party betraying the other: 
… and so there is strength and a bit of security for us in that I don't think that they’d throw us 
under the bus if we exposed our cards to them. There is a real reliance on that trust, but they 
do have a lot of power, underestimated. (M-INDUSTRY) 
This remained the case even through the period of 2016 and 2017 when community members learnt of the 
water quality problems and that information had been withheld. A key quality of the trust appears to be a 
willingness to stay at the table and remain in communication, rather than trust that each party would be 
always proactively truthful, as can be seen in the quotes below: 
And I think the Community Forum has worked well from an explanation point of view. I think 
they're getting more honest. But then – I don't know. And how do you know. But at least 
they're letting people ask, they're not clamming up and they're not saying ‘You don't need to 
know that’ or ‘we're not doing that’. And I have to say that they've been pretty good at putting 
their hands up and saying ‘look that was us’. (M-COMMUNITY) 
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The strength of this kind of trust appeared to keep the industry members at the table. Members reported 
the significance of this for them was continued access to information on issues of interest and the ability to 
tackle critical issues even in the face of withheld information; for example, in the meetings after the 
dissolved oxygen problem became public (e.g. Minutes December 2016. March 2017, June 2017): 
Look it's valuable. It certainly is valuable, and I do think that the companies in general – I 
don’t know, but I think they think they can get around them, the forum members, a bit. In my 
mind the saying is ‘keep the bastards honest’ and I do think that that [Forum] helps with doing 
that. I really do. But they're trying to get around, I think they're trying to do a few underhanded 
things without anyone knowing it at times. (M-COMMUNITY) 
The particular kind of trust might be thought of as a norm of good faith: a preparedness to face difficult 
issues and trust that the Forum would be largely a safe space even in the face of experiences of ‘betrayal’. 
This norm of good faith suggests a finely balanced flow of power within the Forum, as can be seen in the 
different perspectives reflected in the following quotes: 
The trouble with the forum is most people of the community forum don't feel, as an individual, 
that they can get up and push – like you got to get up and say your piece in front of the fish 
farms thinking ‘well what sort of reaction am I going to get’. And because of the negative 
press that's been happening we haven't wanted to – we feel maybe if we said ‘look we want 
you to start putting a couple of dollars into a major project’ in the end might they might say 
‘look Strahan – it's just too hard we're out of here’. It's a matter of how far you go.  
(M-COMMUNITY) 
If we – to me – if we upset that community: if we did the wrong thing in the environment; or if 
we killed somebody on the road – if we really upset them, they, in the media, could throw us 
under a bus. Just, you know. And their strength would be in a group. It's not the individual 
that we upset – we in this Strahan community are saying ‘this; this; this; this; and this is wrong 
with the salmon industry, this confirms that Macquarie Harbour is a train wreck and that 
industry needs to get out’. The cost to us as a business, that would shut us down.  
(M-INDUSTRY) 
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Information sharing – a strength with limits 
A number of members reported that they valued the Forum as a way to get good information about the 
industry and check on ‘the word around town’ (see also for example Minutes November 2014): 
I think that's probably when we see the value of a community forum. When that information 
flow is coming from the [COMPANIES] ‘this is happening, this is what we're actually doing, 
and this is what our plan is moving forward’. (M-COMMUNITY) 
The information-sharing function, however, also had clear limits. An important limit lay in the lack of 
recourse within the Forum structure to hold the aquaculture industry members formally accountable for 
information-sharing. Forum members’ awareness of this limit has been touched on in the previous sections 
(see discussion of good faith norm above). The most obvious material demonstration of this was that 
information about the negative ecosystem impacts was withheld from the Forum members right up until it 
became clear from the public media that something was seriously wrong: 
I particularly felt very betrayed. Because as you know, we've been giving up our time going 
to community consultative meetings, and the first time we hear that they have any concerns 
– they didn't even have the courtesy to tell us they were on Four Corners and give us a heads 
up to what, first time here is we have to watch it on Four Corners. So that's completely 
betraying. (M-COMMUNITY) 
Another quite subtle limitation to the information-sharing function was revealed through the interview, the 
perception of ‘levels’ of access to information. Some people reported the sense that some in the Forum 
knew more than others and it was not clear why this was the case, or how and when information was 
shared outside the Forum meetings: 
Some of them (Forum members) seemed to know about what was going on, but the 
members, others, didn't have a clue … You’ve got people that are fairly high up that are 
friends with people in Hobart, that do actually hear a bit more. Then you've got that middle-
level that have sons or daughters working at the fish farm and whatever. And then you’ve got 
what I call the lower level … I call it a three-tier level. (M-COMMUNITY) 
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Observations from others indicate they associated different ‘levels’ of knowledge with trust building through 
key relationships: 
And I think there’s a credit to [NAME], think [NAME]’s been pivotal in keeping that information 
flow in between forums really – with what's going on and being very transparent and honest. 
I think [NAME]’s really helped keep that relationship grounded. (M-INDUSTRY) 
However, for others this dynamic had an inadvertent negative effect on their perceptions of transparency, 
information-sharing and the efficacy of the Forum: 
There's various stages on that committee that I thought ‘oh this is a waste of time. I'm going 
to leave’ … because how can I make an informed judgement? And they're asking your opinion 
when you haven't got all the facts and you’re just in a meeting and you haven't even heard 
about what they're talking about. (M-COMMUNITY) 
 
Action on community development outcomes 
The slow pace of action for community development initiatives concerned a number of people who were 
interviewed. Notwithstanding some achievements like health services in the short term, reports in the 
interviews also revealed that despite effort none of the hoped-for major community development initiatives 
had been achieved: 
The fish farms promised all this employment, and oh well it was going to do this and going to 
do that, and it didn't deliver. (M-COMMUNITY) 
Well they said they'd be interested in supporting a major project but that's as far as it's ever 
got. (M-COMMUNITY) 
Public media – a challenge to Forum good faith and openness 
People reported that the public media attention on Macquarie Harbour during 2016 and 2017 created 
tensions for the Forum, and in some instances risked undermining the principles and intentions of the 
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Forum. Firstly, their comments and work at the Forum being taken ‘out of context’ by the media threatened 
openness and information-sharing commitments: 
Because you know we're all a bit gun shy about media. What you want is to be really open 
and say ‘Yeah’! (M-COMMUNITY) 
Closely related to this, people also expressed concerns that the drivers of the public media conflicted with 
the objective of the Forum, that is to create trusting relationships within which negative impacts for the 
community could be dealt with and positive impacts could be maximised (the good faith norm). 
People also explained that the public media attention drew an increased level of attendance at the Forum, 
but not only from local residents. One incident, recounted by a number of people and discussed above, 
indicated that a non-local person appeared without introduction and took notes on the discussions. People 
explained this was unnerving and the effect was that people suddenly felt the safety of the Forum; that is, 
the good faith norm, was at risk: 
That made a couple of those Forums really uncomfortable in that we couldn't be open with 
the room – like we would normally try to be as open as we could be. And then with in the 
Strahan locals it got really heated: ‘Who invited them in?’ … And that's really hard in that in a 
community forum you'd like to think that the door can be swung open that people can walk in 
there whether you're a new resident, old resident or somebody who's visiting town, can walk 
in and sit and listen – maybe I'm being naïve. (M-INDUSTRY) 
At the same time, people acknowledged that given the limits to industry trustworthiness (discussed above) 
the public media remained essential in the broader context; that is, outside the specific interests of the 
Forum: 
And then, the only reason we knew how badly it failed, apart from the environmental site stuff, 
was leaks. It was leaked to the ABC20 basically, it was how we found out. (N-PROF) 
                                                     
20 ABC – Australian Broadcasting Commission, national public media broadcaster 
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No consistent engagement between the Forum and the local council 
Nearly all respondents voiced concerns about the lack of consistent engagement between the local 
municipal government (West Coast Council) and the Forum. Forum members reported surprise that the 
Council did not regard the Forum as an opportunity for direct productive connection with the aquaculture 
industry: 
But I think that conduit back to Council for not just our industry, for the Strahan community 
would be fantastic. It could be a real connector. (M-INDUSTRY) 
Formal Council representation was a feature of the initial meetings, with the then-Mayor endorsing the 
process and Councillors attending in a formal capacity (e.g. see Minutes April 2014, February 2015). At 
some point, the relationship between the Council and the Forum changed and the links between Council 
officers and the industry representative petered out. It is not clear from the available data when or why this 
happened. Subsequent to the extreme overstocking event and dissolved oxygen problem in 2016, relations 
between the Council and the Forum were renegotiated, with a local Council member taking the community 
chair by agreement of the Forum members (Minutes March 2017). Later in that same year, the Council 
again withdrew from the Forum by withdrawing authorisation of the Councillors to represent the Council. 
This left Forum members who were also Councillors acting in individual private capacities. In their formal 
explanation for this research, a Council representative explained that the Council had formed a different 
view on how they wished to engage with the aquaculture industry and that the Forum approach could not 
capture the range of Council interests in the aquaculture industry operations: 
As Council we expect – as the local government authority representing the 4000 voters and 
ratepayers, that we would have a rock solid relationship with the industry. With the major 
industry like we do with mining. We have that with mining. The aquaculture seem to almost 
be happy with this strange position, where they tell the community forum and then somehow 
that's relayed back Council. (Local Council Representative) 
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Informal connections between the Forum members and non-Forum residents 
There were no formal mechanisms in place to guide engagement between Forum members and other 
residents. People explained this in terms of how that particular community works. Key to the explanations 
were two characteristics, that people know each other in this small town and will talk about their interests, 
and secondly that in this community some people liked to be involved in community activities and others 
did not: 
Over the years the community have got a bit of an angst at times saying ‘oh how come these 
people are on it and we can't get a say’ So they've actually opened it for invitations so they 
actually have to say ‘look I want to go and I go to [CHAIR] and say ‘oh this person wants to 
come’ and we go ‘yeah that's fine’. And so they've done that, but that wanes off. It's often 
when things are happening and they (community members) want to know what's going on. 
But a lot of those people who want to join and think that'll be great, they come to two meetings 
and they're gone again. I think it's just the fact that they want to know what's going on. (M-
COMMUNITY) 
Despite this account of how the community works, other people who were interviewed expressed concerns 
about the lack of transparency that resulted from the absence of formal mechanisms: 
And I was, I am worried that perhaps meetings are still almost held in secret. I think the 
community knows there’s a Forum, some community members know there’s a Forum. But I 
don’t think they know how they would be invited to participate. Or if they could put up their 
hand. (M-COMMUNITY) 
Interviews with non-member residents indicated that people knew about the Forum in two circumstances: if 
they had a direct personal connection, like a friendship, with a Forum member or if they were a part of a 
formal association that had a representative attending the Forum. As noted in the beginning of this section, 
the TOR revisions in 2018 introduced specific clauses to address this lack of accountability to community 
members, and to clarify and explain the process for gaining membership of the Forum. 
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Applying the axioms of the SES participation norm to the 
Forum 
In this section, I address the first case study research question: (1a) How did the dominant 
conceptualisation of participation influence the structure and activities of the participatory initiative (if at all)? 
(i.e. the dominant SES participation norm as identified in Chapter 4)? The purpose of this analysis is to 
understand the influence of the SES paradigm in actual instances of marine governance and so 
problematise notions of participation in the applied context. As in the previous case study, I did this by 
setting out my analysis of the activities and structures of the Forum using the three SES axioms (see 
Chapter 4, pg. 100) as a subheadings. 
Participation is ontological (Axiom 1) 
The idea that the Forum as a community–industry relationship was an essential aspect to governing the 
Harbour resonates strongly with the axiom that participation is ontological. At the core, the Forum was 
designed to enable aquaculture industry representatives and people who lived in the Strahan community to 
work on shared goals regarding the impacts of expanded aquaculture activities in the Harbour. For such an 
endeavour, community participation is essential in an instrumental way – shared goals cannot be 
generated by a single party. The aquaculture industry’s interest in experimenting with the Forum as 
ongoing and more than mere communications paired with the community receptivity and commitment to the 
Forum reflect this axiom. As such, the Forum structure resonates with Axiom 1 that social processes are 
essential to how marine social-ecological systems are governed, despite no direction and specific 
articulations of this axiom in the Forum materials. 
Institutional power is dispersed (Axiom 2) 
The assumption that power is dispersed across a range of actors underwrites the design of the Forum in a 
similar manner as for Axiom 1 discussed above. Both actor groups, community and industry, embraced the 
notion that ongoing engagement between the local community and the industry was an important aspect of 
governing the Harbour from the earliest meetings. The strong interest and sense of commitment and 
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potential that emerged in those early meetings indicated a common sense that some aspects of sharing 
uses of the Harbour belonged with the civil actors, or the community. This in turn implies that the actors 
regarded governance as comprising more than only the formal legislatively based government regulation of 
the aquaculture industry. Viewed in this way, the Forum can be understood as an experiment in a form of 
hybrid governance (sensu Vince and Haward 2017). Few direct references to the dispersal or sharing of 
power appear in the Forum material. I suggest that the norm of ‘good faith’ discussed earlier is a clue that 
the participants regarded the Forum as something more substantial than only information provision. Also 
discussed in the previous section, members’ accounts pointed to their awareness of the Forum as a 
relationship of shared or dispersed power. This understanding of the power relations of the Forum may 
explain, for example, why the industry members continued to turn up and show commitment to the Forum 
after 2016 when the risks to their social acceptability were at a high point and they were not compelled by 
the formal regulations to engage with their communities. It may also help explain why community Forum 
members continued to turn up even though they did not trust the industry members to be forthcoming and 
had a number of examples of the lack of trustworthiness of industry members actions or contributions to the 
Forum. 
Governance is social (Axiom 3) 
The precept of this axiom is that the design of a governance institution must enable the development of 
social resources as the primary mechanism for governing the shared resource (see Chapter 4). The Forum 
reflected the precepts of this axiom in that social processes were fundamental to the structure and 
operation of the Forum. The notion of neighbourliness as the means by which sharing the Harbour, sharing 
the benefits and solving on-land problems would be delivered is a standout example in the case of the 
Forum. Similarly, ‘good faith’ relationships as the basis for trust and informal connections between 
members and non-members also reflect this SES governance axiom. The robust working relationships, the 
good faith norm and neighbourliness were social capacities the participants felt to be significant 
achievements of the Forum and worth protecting to ensure the continued effectiveness of the Forum. As 
with the other two axioms, direct references to the Forum as a governance process were not evident in the 
material. However, the Forum as a hybrid community–industry approach to governance was built around 
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social processes and social resources as the basis for problem solving and adjusting each other’s 
behaviours. 
I suggest this analysis shows that the SES norm of participation was a powerful if indirect influence on the 
Forum members. Further, the Forum was clearly defined as a locally based enterprise, a strong 
characteristic of the SES participation norm. Using the frame of the SES participation norm is useful in 
understanding the institutional structures and activities, as well as pointing to some of the limits of the 
Forum. 
Applying the lens of participation-representation: 
authorisation; dissent and exit; accountability 
In this section, I address the second case study research sub-question: 2c. What does application of the 
conceptual lens explain, if anything, about the dominant conceptualisation of participation in the applied 
context? The purpose of this analysis is to understand the extent to which the work of the Forum could be 
argued to represent community interests and perspectives, and so further problematise the 
conceptualisation of participation at play in the applied context. I do this by applying the lens of 
participation-representation (Table 15, Chapter 5, pg. 139) to the account of the Forum provided above. 
The analysis in this section is laid out using each condition as a subheading. 
Authorisation 
For the first few years of the Forum, authorisation of who was speaking for ‘the Strahan community’ lay 
within the Forum structure and not with community members more broadly. Based on the TOR, the rules, 
the Forum members both defined and represented ‘the community’. Their self-authorised participation in 
the Forum was the representative mechanism for ‘the community’ to exercise influence on the industry and 
its activities in the Harbour and determine the best interests of ‘the community’. The Forum’s authorisation 
rules were not static, however, and three phases can be discerned: establishment; operation of the Forum 
via the participation rules; and revision of the TOR in 2017. The revision of the TOR in 2017 adjusted the 
internal location of authorisation, seeking to relocate it outside the Forum and with the broader community. 
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In the establishment phase, authorisation of what ‘the community’ comprised, which people represented 
‘the community’ and how those people would represent ‘the community’ lay with the TSGA and the 
independent consultant that initiated the notion of the Forum and organised the first meetings. This initial 
external location of authorisation was used as an instrumental step in bringing community members 
together to develop how the industry and the community members might work together. The legitimacy test 
for such an instrumental approach lies in how authorisation was handed over to the broader community for 
people themselves to determine the ‘what’, ‘who’ and ‘how’. In the case of the Forum, the establishment 
phase appeared to be a temporary form of external authorisation because the decisions about who was to 
be involved and how the process was to develop were handed over to community members in the first 
meeting (Minutes March 2014). In those first two meetings in 2014, the initial invited community members 
and industry members together put in place the rules for participation (the TOR 2014) and this was a move 
to the operations phase of the Forum. 
For the operational phase of the Forum, mid 2014 until at least the end of 2017, the TOR 2014 specified 
two clauses that defined participation but also established an internally located authorisation. Firstly, the 
participation clause determined that the Forum was open to ‘stakeholders’: 
The Community Advisory Forum will be open to any stakeholder interested in productive 
engagement with the aquaculture industry operating on the west coast.  
TOR 2014, Structure/membership, pg. 1 
In principle, this rule of openness located the authorisation of ‘the community’ representatives outside the 
Forum and with members of the broader community. In practice, there was no evidence of a formal, 
transparent process driven by ‘the community’ to determine who would participate nor to authorise who 
could represent ‘the community’ through the Forum. The connection between Forum members and the rest 
of the community, as has been discussed, was instead via informal community connections. Further, the 
rule of openness implied that direct self-representation of any community member was the preferred 
principle and practice for Forum membership. In practice, there were occasions where community 
members were reminded of Forum dates and encouraged to attend but this was not consistent nor an overt 
commitment via the TOR. Further, as noted earlier, non-member community awareness of the Forum was 
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patchy, suggesting that the information connections had limits to reaching the whole Strahan community. 
These informal processes are social resources and capabilities that are characteristics of groups and 
communities and to that extent they can be powerful and meaningful. They are, however, also subject to 
informal processes of change, and community member efforts to change or renegotiate the representative 
relationship can be overlooked, unnoticed or even ignored. This also means that such informal 
authorisation processes do not provide sufficient safeguards for the exchange of power between a citizen, 
or community member, and the representative, in this case the Forum member.  
Finally, alongside the openness rule and self-representation principle, the participation clause contained a 
‘productive engagement’ rule. This rule defined allowable community members and disallowed others and 
although how ‘productive engagement’ would be decided remains unaddressed, the implication is clear that 
it would be decided by the existing Forum membership. The productive engagement rule clearly sits in 
tension with the openness rule and the implied self-representation principle. The result of this ambiguity is 
that authorisation in practice remains within the Forum but is couched in a promise of participation. 
The second relevant clause, the ‘independence clause’, stipulated that the ‘best interests of the community’ 
must be the focus of the Forum’s work: 
The independence of the WCCAF21 is based on their [members’] capacity to put the best 
interests of the industry, council and community ahead of all other interests, so that the 
WCCAF is capable of exercising objective independent judgement. Capacity to act 
independently and the skill sets and experience of individual representatives to complement 
the skills and experience of the WCCAF overall are critical criteria in representative selection.  
TOR 2014 Independence, pg. 2 
This clause specifies that the existing, self-authorised Forum members will determine and effectively define 
community interests and then negotiate among themselves which aspects of community ‘best interests’ 
were to be traded off for combined ‘industry, council and community’ interests. The scope and agenda 
                                                     
21 WCCAF – West Coast Community Aquaculture Forum 
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items discussed earlier work to articulate shared ‘best interests’ and the authorisation of the Forum scope 
clearly lay in the hands of Forum members – on behalf of ‘the community’. The authorisation problem here 
is that it is not clear from the TOR how or if these shared interests were to be validated – that is authorised 
– with or by the broader community being represented through this clause. 
The independence clause contains an additional authorisation challenge in the interplay between the 
independence clause and the reference to representatives. Across the TOR, the term ‘representative’ was 
used to define membership rather than a more open term such as ‘community member’ or ‘participant’ and 
sits in tension with the openness rule of the participation clause. In practice, the Forum membership 
comprises a mix of formal representatives, including industry representatives, and self-authorised 
‘community’ members. Members with a formal representative role are bound by formal authorisation 
processes that enable them to represent specified group interests. The independence clause, however, 
insisted that each Forum member must put the of ‘best interests’ of the combination of all members ‘ahead 
of all other interests’. From the perspective of authorisation, the problem here is that the independence 
clauses requires that formally authorised representatives may have to trade off their constituents’ interests 
in order to place the shared ‘best interests’ ahead of their constituencies. It is not clear, for example, how a 
company representative would be able to subscribe to any ‘best interests’ that were not consistent with 
company policy. Similarly, Forum members representing the local Council would not be able to bind the 
Council to actions or commitments without subjecting a proposal to the full Council, or even the ratepayers, 
for decision. Nor would a Councillor, as a member of the Forum, be able to agree to a definition of ‘best 
interests’ that was at odds with Council policy. This tension for formally representative members is an 
example of the chain of representative relationships that conflict with the aspiration for direct participation 
implicit in the openness rule and the Forum intentions (see Chapter 3, pg. 56). In practice, this tension was 
at play in the changes in local government’s participation in the Forum as discussed earlier. 
As it happened, the independence clause was removed from the TOR in the revision process in 2017, and 
the term ‘representative’ was replaced with the term ‘participant’ to describe Forum members. There is no 
commentary in the minutes that explains why the clause was removed, nor why the term ‘representative’ 
was changed. Regardless of the intention, these two revisions resolved these particular authorisation 
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tensions. The changes did not, however, solve the problem of how to establish productive links between 
the Forum and the local Council. This problem remains outstanding and the connections between ‘local’ 
and wider polities remains an area for further research, given the continued development of hybrid forms of 
marine governance. 
In the third phase, the TOR were revised in 2017 and the members introduced two new rules that 
specifically aimed to strengthen the authorising capacity of community members outside the existing Forum 
membership. Firstly, a process clause was paired with the participation clause that formally specified how 
people outside the existing membership group could join the Forum: 
Membership of the Community Advisory Forum will be open to resident stakeholders 
interested in productive engagement with the aquaculture industry operating on the west 
coast. Every six months a call for nominations will be made through the 
industry/community newsletter, with all applications from prospective new members 
to be put to the next Forum meeting for approval, or feedback to the applicant if not 
approved. Members of the Forum should be listed in each newsletter, so that they are 
available to other residents for consultation, and membership shall last for 12 months.  
TOR 2018, Structure/membership, pg.1 (emphasis to the new clause added) 
While criteria for approval or non-approval is not specified here, it can be assumed that the three existing 
criteria apply; that is, 1) residency; 2) interest in productive engagement; 3) representing one of the 
minimum definition categories of ‘the community’. Secondly, the third of the participation criteria was 
revised with the introduction of the words ‘ideally’ and ‘including’; that is, from ‘Representatives should 
include: ...’ (TOR 2014) to ‘Ideally, participants will be drawn from across the community, including: ...’ 
(TOR 2018). This revision added flexibility to the definition of ‘the community’; that is, it is no longer 
specifically defined and limited within the TOR. Community members could apply for membership 
regardless of what they do or do not represent formally or by preference. The ‘ideally ...’ clause becomes a 
statement of aspiration and an opening out definition of ‘the community’ rather than limiting. As such, this 
allows a subtle transfer of authorisation to people outside the Forum; that is, some ability to define who and 
what interests comprise ‘the community’. 
  
 
  205   
    
     
Notwithstanding the positive impact on authorisation of these revisions, two new limits to authorisation are 
triggered by other revised clauses that acted to maintain control in the hands of existing Forum members. 
The lack of clarity on the approval/non-approval criteria for membership applications mentioned in the 
previous paragraph is one point at which a limit is applied. While the definition of ‘the community’ might 
have been partially opened to people outside the Forum, in practice, getting approval required meeting 
criteria that were defined by the existing Forum members. The least transparent of the membership criteria 
is the ‘capacity for productive engagement’. It is not clear how an applicant member could demonstrate this 
capacity, nor why an applicant might be refused on this basis. A second limit to community authorisation 
introduced in the 2017 revisions is the ‘notice of intention to attend’ clause, worded as follows: 
To ensure that open, honest, thorough and robust conversations can take place, the meetings 
should be considered private, and any guests wishing to attend should apply to the Chair one 
month prior. The decision on whether that guest will be invited to attend should be based on 
what information or support they can provide to the Forum, rather than what they can learn 
from it.  
TOR 2018, Structure/membership, pg. 2 
As discussed earlier, Forum members explained that the TOR revision was triggered by the appearance of 
non-resident people at Forum meetings. People reported in interview that until then, the understanding that 
people might turn up the meetings had been an informal and assumed feature of the Forum as expressed 
in the openness rule (see above). The definitions of ‘private’ and ‘guest’ in the introduced clauses are 
implied rather than specified, but the wording of the second sentence of the clause implies that a ‘guest’ is 
a non-resident with specific interests. It is nevertheless not entirely clear, and if paired with the new 
membership application rule, the terms ‘private’ and ‘guest’ could be interpreted as including non-member 
residents who have not been approved for membership. 
In this analysis, using the authorisation condition to analyse the institutional rules helped tease out some of 
the subtleties embedded in the institutional rules and how they work together. Understood like this, the 
three authorisation processes and the formal rules worked against each other in unexpected but distinct 
ways. Using the authorisation conditions as a, lens, then, indicates that in practice, the Forum could not 
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have facilitated the agency of community members in governance of the Harbour. It did, however, set a 
foundation for doing so. 
Dissent and exit 
A number of the Forum members were formal representatives of specified groups, as required in the TOR. 
For constituents of those representatives, the capacity to dissent from or exit the representative 
relationships belonged outside the Forum. Other ‘community’ members, however, were not formally 
representative. This means that to be democratically legitimate, the processes for dissent and exit should 
have been specified in the TOR, but in this case they were not. Their absence from the TOR is closely 
linked to the lack of articulated or practical community authorisation processes discussed in the previous 
section. As established earlier, the general ‘community’ members of the Forum were linked with the 
broader community informally and this suggests that some level of capacity to dissent or exit from the 
representative relationship could potentially have been activated through social dissent; for example, by 
registering objections with the Forum either in person or in writing to the Forum, or through discussions 
‘about town’. Although informal community connections can be powerful social resources, they can also 
change without either party being aware. This means that the informal nature of this link between Forum 
member and non-member and the implied processes for dissenting and exiting do not provide reliable 
capacity for non-members to control the terms of the representative relationship between themselves and 
the Forum community members. The informal basis for the representative relationship cannot be easily 
addressed if the stakes change or are suddenly raised; for example, as in the divisive impact of the 
ecological damage due to salmon cage overstocking. This also means that control over the terms of the 
representative relationship are not clear and are controlled by the representative rather than the person or 
group to be represented. In this sense, the informal links are insufficient to guarantee the dissent and exit 
condition for community members. 
The revisions to the 2017 TOR discussed in the previous section worked to expand and clarify the process 
for how Forum members could be authorised to represent ‘the community’, with some limits. Accordingly, it 
could be inferred that the capacity for dissent and exit from the representative relationships might also have 
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been strengthened along with the authorisation. This had yet to be tested at the time of writing, which was 
prior to the first round of opening membership of the Forum to the broader Strahan community. 
Accountability 
The accountability picture of the Forum is mixed, as with the other conditions. In the initial years, 
accountability was passive and informal, but was strengthened through the revision of the TOR in 2017. 
Four connections points for accountability between the Forum and residents were in place but two of these 
were passive. Firstly, Forum members were consistent in ensuring a community newsletter was produced 
after each Forum meeting. Although the timing of the newsletter was delayed on some occasions, the 
minutes reflect consistent attention to correcting this problem. People reported that the newsletters were 
distributed in hard copy format through the main services in the town (e.g. the post office and the general 
store) and that the newsletters were always collected, which they took to indicate that people in the town 
were accessing them. They did not, for example, include information on how to join the Forum or get issues 
onto the Forum agenda. Notwithstanding the reported accessibility, then, the newsletters were passive 
forms of accountability. 
The second form of accountability was formally representative and more likely to be reliable in facilitating 
people’s meaningful agency through the Forum. Forum members with formal representative roles have 
formal accountability and two-way representation of interests in place; that is, their role is to represent their 
group’s interests to the Forum, and also represent the Forum to their group. Accountability is enacted 
through the representative chain and safeguarded by the rules of authorisation and accountability 
established by the people-to-be-represented, i.e. organisational members. This form of accountability is a 
function of the representative chain rather than of direct ‘community’ participation in the Forum. It only 
applies to those Forum members who are representatives of established groups e.g. Active Strahan. The 
mix of formally representative and direct participatory members results in inconsistency in whose agency is 
facilitated via the Forum and whose is not. This also means that this form of accountability is not a 
safeguard for community members who are not also members of those established community 
organisations. 
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Thirdly, people reported that informal links between Forum members and residents were in place, as has 
been discussed in a number of places in the preceding analyses. I have suggested that such links are 
underpinned by good will and good faith, but do not fully safeguard community members’ agency and 
participation in the Forum because of the informal social processes that produce them; for example, talking 
around town. Nor do informal links give people clear reliable and transparent control over the terms of the 
representative relationships with Forum members, or the advice and actions Forum members take as 
representatives of ‘the community’. The informal links are, then, only a limited and somewhat passive form 
of accountability for facilitating residents’ meaningful involvement in the Forum. 
The revision of the TOR in 2017 included a clause that specifically addressed the gap between the Forum 
and members of the community more broadly. This clause was the fourth aspect of the Forum that sought 
to address accountability, and was worded as follows: 
Issues requiring decisions and or recommendations affecting long term cultural, economic 
and social values of the community shall be canvassed within the broader community.  
TOR 2017 Structure/membership, pg. 2 
This clause specifies that work of the Forum members, representing ‘the community’, must be validated 
and opened to debate across the ‘broader community’. While the clause does not specify how this should 
be done, or how debate and dispute is to be handled, the clause does strengthen the accountability 
structure of the Forum for direct participation. On this basis, I suggest the Forum rules moved closer to 
facilitating the agency of broader community members through the Forum and with respect to the 
components of governance established through the Forum. At the time of writing, this rule had yet to be 
tested but holds promise for improving community members’ access and agency with respect to the Forum. 
Discussion and conclusions 
The Forum strengthened the connection between ‘the community’ and the expanding aquaculture industry. 
It also enabled ‘the community’ to have direct influence over local-level aspects of aquaculture industry 
operations and uses of the Harbour: aspects that lay outside requirements of formal legislative regulation. 
In other words, Forum members sought to govern together specific local-level aspects of the social, cultural 
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and economic impacts of the expanding industrial-scale aquatic activities. A number of positive local-level 
outcomes were achieved through the Forum and it provided a foundation for robust interactions between 
community members and industry representatives. People inside and outside the Forum regarded it as a 
useful and robust mechanism that ensured the aquaculture industry is accountable to its local community 
as a good neighbour and positive contributor to community life. The extreme events of 2016, however, 
brought to light some of the participation tensions inherent in this original structure. Forum members 
revised the TOR in 2017–2018 to address those challenges and, in revising, set some terms to strengthen 
the connection between the Forum and other community members. The local-level scope of the Forum, 
however, meant that there were no links between the Forum and the most relevant regulating agencies. 
The result was that the Forum as a model of community–industry governance held promise for improving 
governance of the Harbour but was limited in the capacity to protect the Harbour from significant negative 
ecological impacts. 
As a hybrid form of governance, the lack of connection with the state, via the Tasmanian State Government 
agencies, was a problem that was implicated in severe and negative ecological impacts for the Harbour. 
The lens, however, was not sensitive to this problem of ‘local’ participation. The value of the lens is in 
understanding and rethinking the institutional forms that conduct, create and direct the representative 
relationships that bind participants, those who actually turn up, to those for whom they aspire to speak. In 
the case of the Forum, however, the members were persistent and committed to transparency and fairness 
in the structure and activities of the Forum. Their active review and response to the tensions was effective 
in strengthening the legitimacy of the locally focused initiative. This suggests the Forum was likely to give 
more voice and facilitate more agency for community members into the future. 
How, if at all, did the SES participation norm influence the Forum? 
The three axioms were woven together through the Forum. The influence of the axioms was not direct but 
could be plausibly inferred from the assumptions, experiences and structures of the Forum. This finding 
supports the proposition established at the end of Chapter 4 that the dominant conceptualisation of 
participation across the literature was also likely to be influencing applied instances of participatory marine 
governance. The findings here do not explain or indicate how the axioms of the SES participation norm 
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moved to influencing the Forum. There was some indication in the data that industry members responsible 
for the establishment were influenced by emerging governance practices and suggests the influence of key 
people in guiding and designing governance structures and in carrying social norms. I suggest that 
although the line from the SES literature to the Forum members’ thinking and design was not direct, the 
presence of the dominant SES conceptualisation of participation exhibited features of a social or collective 
norm; that is, shaping shared assumptions and intentions and in turn informing the institutional rules and 
practices of collective efforts (Rinal and Lapinksi 2015). 
The direct community–industry structure of the Forum suggested that governing social impacts of shared 
water use did not require the ‘state’ – government – to be at the table at all. Rather, social impacts could be 
managed by collaboration directly between the industry members and community members. I suggest also 
that although the Forum started as a communications process, it quickly developed a wider focus on 
community development and governing social impacts such as truck movements and marine debris. This 
assumption resonates strongly with each of the axioms of the SES participation norm. As such, I suggest 
the Forum was a case in which an influence of SES participation axioms was to open a conceptual ‘space’ 
for experimentation with hybrid governance relationships directly between community and industry 
members. This conceptual ‘space’ enabled community and industry members to respond in practical ways 
to the understanding that marine ecosystems are more than a hydrological system to be managed through 
ecological regulation. If so, this finding lends support to the interactive governance theory proposition that 
collective values and norms that lead to new governance ‘imaginaries’ – i.e. what I called a conceptual 
‘space’ – are central to governance innovation realities for complex social-ecological systems (e.g. Song et 
al 2013; Jentoft 2007; Waters and Barnett 2018). In this particular case, the SES participation norm exerted 
an enabling influence for direct community-industry governance arrangements for issues that lie outside the 
direct remit of state-based management and regulation. The finding then also reflects the research into the 
significance of diverse forms of hybrid governance arrangements in environmental governance (Baird et al 
209; Lemos and Agrawal 2006; Vince and Haward 2019) but draws attention to potential of semi-formalised 
arrangements directly between industry and community members. 
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Notwithstanding the productive influence, however, the presence of the participation norm was also 
implicated in tensions Forum members experienced when pursuing their participatory intentions. Direct 
participation of ‘the community’ was clearly an aspiration and intention for the Forum. Yet actually 
managing circumstances where many people did engage with the Forum brought to light the challenge of 
retaining openness to all community members and the need for predictability and consistency for building 
the social resources required for effectiveness (good faith and trust). In this case, the norm limited the 
institutional options available to Forum members as they grappled with the tensions after the trigger event. 
Their efforts to retain the principles of open and direct participation under the continuing influence of the 
participation norm, but also manage the negative impacts of direct participation, resulted in conflict between 
the new TOR rules. Forum members struggled to find institutional resolutions to the practicalities of 
facilitating the direct participation of community members without introducing representative mechanisms or 
strengthening the ones already in place. This finding indicates the limiting influence of Axiom 1 that 
participation is ontological and supports my proposition that the norm of direct participation was likely to 
limit the effectiveness and legitimacy of participatory forms of governance. The effect of the norm in this 
instance was not productive, rather it obscured the potential of representative mechanisms for 
strengthening participation institutionally in ways that could be explained, debated and understood by the 
local and wider polities, and by the members themselves. 
What does the participation–representation lens explain, if anything, 
about the democratic legitimacy of the case study initiative? 
Analysis using the lens revealed subtle contradictions between the rules and practices of the Forum. It also 
showed that adjustments in institutional rules shifted the capacity of the Forum to make the conditions 
available for community members. This can be seen by considering the transition from initiation of the 
Forum to the revision of the Terms of Reference (TOR) in 2017. To initiate the Forum, authorisation of who 
represented ‘the community’ lay in the hands of the industry association and the consultant. The initiative 
was at this stage an instrumental activity in the interests of the aquaculture industry and not related to 
community agency. Authorisation was then handed over to community members who were selected or 
‘authorised’ from this external and instrumental step, and they then designed the rules of authorisation and 
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participation for themselves, the 2014 TOR. Nevertheless, in the first few years of the Forum, authorisation 
of who could represent ‘the community’ lay within the Forum rather than with the broader community. This 
means that in the establishment and early years of the Forum, the structure excluded rather than included 
community members – other than those few founding members. This was a case in which the 
unacknowledged representative mechanisms of key community members representing the broader 
community, although practical and instrumental, lead to anti-democratic effects rather than facilitating 
greater community influence over the social impacts for their community. This might be a practical and 
understandable decision to make in an establishment phase of participatory governance initiatives. If 
ongoing, however, this finding indicates that retaining authorisation processes and rules within an initiative 
will undermine the legitimacy of an initiative, as indeed it did as the limited membership settled in as a 
Forum practice. 
Revisions of the TOR in 2017 opened up authorisation processes to town residents more broadly, and in 
doing so introduced an acknowledgement that the selection of community members he Forum was 
effectively an unacknowledged representative resolution to broad and open direct participation. The 
revisions to the institutional rules were simple adjustments that built on the principles inherent in the 
Forum’s purpose and intentions; they were not complex or experimental. The lens was useful in explaining 
how the revised rules strengthened the legitimacy of the Forum’s authorisation and participation rules, as 
well as revealing where rules can inadvertently undermine the principles of legitimacy. This suggests that 
while the conditions are deeply conceptual, they also have practical dimension that could be useful in the 
applied context to guide the design of institutional rules. Using the lens in the design of TOR, for example, 
would be useful for enabling designers to be very clear about how the core conditions could be 
safeguarded in innovative governance forms. Further, the lens would be useful for members of existing or 
established participatory processes or initiatives to evaluate the effects of their rules on throughput 
legitimacy and address inadvertent exclusionary and anti-democratic rules or practices. 
The analysis of the implementation and revision phases of the Forum also showed that the conditions were 
closely interlinked: where authorisation was external to the representative relationships, exit and dissent 
was absent; where accountability was strengthened, exit and dissent and authorisation were also 
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strengthened. The links were not straightforward, however, and are affected by how the rules work 
together. This could be seen in the changes to the participation and membership rules where one rule 
strengthened authorisation and the other simultaneously resulted in different limits. For other cases of new 
or established participatory initiative, evaluating all institutional rules and practices and how they interact 
using the lens is essential to understanding the interplay among the conditions. While a focus on 
authorisation rules and practices in the first instance is an important place to start, the other conditions 
require examination in the light of authorisation practices. To use the lens in facilitating public scrutiny of 
the rules and practices of participatory initiatives would introduce a high level of transparency and 
constitute a sound reflective practice that would introduce authorisation, dissent and exit and accountability 
practices directly into any participatory initiative. Introducing reflective capacities into governance 
processes is a well-established process linked with governance innovation and development (Feindt and 
Weiland 2018; Hajer and Wagenaar 2003; Sol et al 2018; Voß and Bornemann 2011; Wilner et al 2012). 
With this lens in place, members and designers of participatory initiatives could subject rules, practices and 
processes to the scrutiny of potential constituents using the conditions to focus precisely and specifically on 
democratic process and throughput legitimacy. 
In summary, the participation–representation lens was useful for analysing and linking both the conceptual 
and practical aspects of the Forum in order to understand which members spoke for which parts of the 
Strahan community. The Forum was very much ‘local’: the geographic definition of ‘the community’ was 
limited to a single town of approximately 700 people. Yet even at this scale, representative mechanisms 
were necessary to the functioning of the Forum. Some of the representative resolutions that characterised 
the Forum were formal, and others were indirect. The indirect forms, predicated on the direct participation 
norm, were the least effective in facilitating agency for community members and required adjustments to 
the rules to strengthen authorisation and accountability. The lens also shed light on the interplay between 
the rules and practices, and how the interplay influences the conditions. This is a heartening as it suggests 
that the lens can be useful for addressing structural and institutional challenges brought into relief by its 
analytic strength. 
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Chapter 8. 
Synthesis and meaning making 
The overarching purpose of this research has been to problematise participation by using political theory to 
understand the limits of participatory practices in marine governance. Early in this thesis I established that 
the influence of the precepts of participation democracy theory on participatory forms of governance result 
in low throughput legitimacy, and so are implicated in citizen disillusionment with participatory governance. 
This lack of legitimacy is the limitation to participatory governance I have focused on in this research. In this 
chapter, I draw together the findings from each of the studies I have conducted and presented in Chapters 
3, 4, 6 and 7. I have reviewed and synthesised the findings to consider what, if anything, my research 
explains about the limits to participatory practices in marine governance and what research and practice 
directions are suggested by my research for addressing those limits. Consistent with my research design 
and intentions, I have focused on institutional design (rules and practices) as they pertain to throughput 
legitimacy.  
In this chapter, I start by summarising and comparing the findings to identify patterns and standout features 
using matrices. In the first matrix, I compare the findings that address the first overarching research 
questions: (1) What is the dominant conceptualisation of participation (the norm) within the marine 
governance theory and practice? and (1a) How does the dominant conceptualisation of participation (the 
norm) influence the structure and activities of participatory initiatives in the applied context (if at all)? In the 
second matrix, I compare the findings from each study that pertain to the research questions common to 
the empirical studies (i.e. Chapters 4, 6 and 7): (2b) What does application of the conceptual lens explain, if 
anything, about the dominant conceptualisation of participation in the marine governance literature? and 
(2c) What does application of the conceptual lens explain, if anything, about the dominant 
conceptualisation of participation in the applied context? The dominant conceptualisation reviewed was the 
participation norm of the social-ecological systems (SES) paradigm. I finish the chapter with a discussion of 
the meaning of the synthesised findings for marine governance theory and practice. 
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Recap of the findings 
The guiding questions for Chapter 3 were: (2) What can political theory help explain about the limits of 
participatory approaches to marine governance? and (2a) What conceptual lens from political theory can 
assist in the problematisation of ‘participation’ in marine governance? The objective was to examine two 
major traditions of democratic theory – representative democracy theory and participatory democracy 
theory – to rethink participation and problematise the assumptions about citizen participation in political 
processes. At the heart of both traditions is a concern with how to facilitate citizen participation in the polity, 
i.e. political agency. In the network society in which the sites of potential political agency have multiplied 
and the modes of political identity have diversified, facilitating participation has become complex and 
existing approaches to citizen participation have not met these needs. In my Introduction I called this ‘the 
contemporary problem of participation’. In my analysis of the two democratic theory traditions, I found that 
both scholars and practitioners have been deeply engaged with the strengths and limits of representative 
resolutions to the problem of participation, but in very different ways. The story that unfolded was clear, 
participation and representation are intrinsically linked modes of citizen agency, and it is the link between 
them that is essential to facilitating citizens’ political agency.  
The institutional resolutions to this intrinsic link are different across the two traditions. In representative 
democracy theory, the formal representative institutions are the central means to facilitating political 
agency. In participatory democracy theory, I found the opposite, the citizen’s direct self-presentation is 
regarded as the only democratically legitimate means to political agency. I also identified that the 
participatory democracy traditions struggled to address the direct participation of a large number of citizens, 
such as characterise contemporary democratic polities, i.e. political communities. Further, within this 
tradition I noted that representative mechanisms are accessed as pragmatic or instrumental resolutions to 
the limits of direct participation of many citizens. I turned to Pitkin’s 1967 seminal theory of representation 
to make sense of how the dynamic between participation and representation worked and to generate 
insights into this problem of participation in the social-ecological systems (SES) context of marine 
governance. From this work I examined Piktin’s three conditions that explain the intrinsic link between the 
two modes (participatory and representation): the conditions are authorisation, dissent and exit, and 
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accountability. I formulated these conditions as an analytic lens to examine the research and practices in 
marine governance. 
The guiding questions for Chapter 4 were: (1) What is the dominant conceptualisation of participation (the 
norm) within the marine governance theory and practice? and (2b) What does application of the conceptual 
lens explain, if anything, about the dominant conceptualisation of participation in the marine governance 
literature? This chapter was the first of three specifically concerned with marine governance, and the 
second step in problematising participation. The objective was to itemise the component parts of the norm 
of participation and examine how the problem of participation is addressed in marine governance empirical 
literature. I found that the body of marine governance theory and practice was dominated by the SES 
paradigm, which is, in turn, significantly influenced by the self-presentation precept of participatory 
democracy theory. In the SES paradigm, participation is conceptualised as an ontological condition of 
human society, not just a political right under aspirations for democracy (as in participatory democracy 
theory). I found this conceptualisation to be a function of the driving purpose of SES thinking, that is 
achieving human behaviour change and adaptation to changing climate and marine conditions and 
ecosystem limits. Given this purpose, participation of each citizen is necessary to effect behaviour change, 
and representative mechanisms are inadequate for this purpose. From this foundation, governance is 
subtly reformulated to a social process focused on changing human social, economic and political 
structures to meet the limits of the changing ecosystem, rather than an institutional policy process for the 
allocation of ‘who gets what, when, how and why’. These are necessarily simplifications of a wide body of 
marine governance research, but my findings, as qualitative content analysis, reveal this basic shape of 
participation as implicit within the SES paradigm. 
Chapters 6 and 7 presented case studies of participatory marine governance initiatives. The purpose of the 
case study method was to see if the axioms of the SES participation norm examined in Chapter 4 were 
reflected in the applied context, and to test if the conditions (the lens) identified in Chapter 3 were useful for 
analysing institutional design. I posed two guiding questions for the case studies namely: 1a) How did the 
dominant conceptualisation of participation influence the structure and activities of the participatory initiative 
(if at all)? and 2c. What does application of the conceptual lens explain, if anything, about the dominant 
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conceptualisation of participation in the applied context? The cases were chosen to provide examples of 
innovations or pilots in marine governance in mature democratic contexts. The first case study was located 
in east coast Canada, the Southwest New Brunswick Marine Advisory Committee (the MAC). The MAC 
was a pilot in integrated management of a highly valued and productive waterway marked by multiple and 
increasing uses, the southwest Bay of Fundy. The second case study, the West Coast Community 
Aquaculture Forum (the Forum), located in Tasmania, Australia, was an experiment in hybrid community–
industry governance of the sustainable expansion of salmonid aquaculture in a sensitive harbour 
ecosystem, Macquarie Harbour. In both cases, I found that the SES participation norm was in play, and in 
both cases the institutional design and practices lacked throughput legitimacy that in turn limited the 
capacity of the initiative to meet the governance objectives. 
How is participation conceptualised in marine governance? 
In the first matrix, Table 18 below, I mapped the findings from Chapters 3, 4, 6 and 7 for the first research 
question of how participation is conceptualised. Comparing these findings for this first research question 
set the foundations for problematising participation by making explicit the precepts, axioms, rules and 
practices across each study, and enabling a qualitative examination of the consistencies and differences. 
To do this, the precepts from participatory democracy theory were plotted in the left-hand column of Table 
18, and the findings from each of the marine governance chapters were plotted against those precepts 
across the table columns moving left to right. A green mark signifies that the precept was present, an 
amber mark signifies some presence but also some ambiguity in the empirical finding, and a red mark 
signifies absence of a precept. A text summary of specific empirical findings was provided for each element 
of the matrix to enable the qualitative analysis of consistency across the empirical studies. The prevalence 
of green ticks across each element of the matrix demonstrates a high level of consistency between the 
precepts of participatory democracy theory and the conceptualisations of participation within the SES 
paradigm and across the case studies. The findings vary in the details but are consistent overall. In 
particular, the content analysis findings from Chapter 4 are more circumspect than those of the case 
studies because they are derived via a synthesising method in contrast to the specific details of the case 
studies. 
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Table 18: Synthesis of findings for the first overarching research question: What is the dominant conceptualisation of participation (the norm) within the marine governance theory and 
practice? 
Thinking about participation (Ch. 3) 
 
Precepts of participation democracy 
theory 
The norm of participation (Ch. 4) 
 
Social-ecological systems paradigm 
Southwest Bay of Fundy Marine 
Advisory Committee (MAC) (Ch. 6) 
Integrated management of marine 
waterway 
West Coast Community Aquaculture 
Forum (Forum) (Ch. 7) 
Hybrid governance of salmon 
aquaculture  
Direct participation is privileged over 
representative mechanisms as the most 
legitimate expression of democratic 
principles (the ideal) 
 Direct participation is necessary 
because it is how the world works and 
how human adaptation to ecosystem 
limits will be achieved 
Axiom 1: Participation is ontological 
 Privileged direct participation 
and sought to actively avoid 
representation. 
‘Hats off’ rule 
 
 Privileged direct participation of 
people who lived and worked closely 
with the Harbour with no links to the 
broader community 
Openness rule 
Representative mechanisms are present 
(the practice) 
 ‘Local’ community or network 
prioritised over the broader polity 
‘Stakeholder’ appeared as the primary 
participant but as a subset of a ‘local’ 
community 
 Members were to generate 
‘community perspectives’ 
Individual ‘community-at-large’ 
members were expected to represent 
community perspectives 
The ‘community values criteria’ 
device was meant to represent 
community views and aspirations 
Sample of community members 
gathered to represent views of the 
community 
Informal discussions across the small 
community the conduit for 
representing community perspectives 
Treats representative resolutions as 
pragmatic and instrumental necessities; 
overlooks the political function of 
representative mechanisms (the 
practice) 
 Ambiguous term ‘stakeholders’ 
employed as substitute for 
‘community’ 
 ‘Community-at-large’ members 
as practical resolution to community 
participation 
CVC regarded as a practical substitute 
to broad-based community 
engagement 
 BUT members revised the Terms 
of Reference to acknowledge the 
necessity of representative 
mechanisms and make the process of 
participation overt and transparent to 
community members 
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Although the findings vary, they do consistently reflect the precepts of participatory theory. Firstly, in each 
study direct participation appeared as the foundational assumption that required no explanation. In the SES 
paradigm, participation is conceptualised as ontological, i.e. as the foundation for achieving the SES 
objective of human adaptation to changing marine ecosystems and adaptation to marine ecosystem limits. 
In both case studies, the participatory initiative was built on assumptions about improving governance of 
the marine estate through the direct participation of those involved with the marine ecosystem at the local 
level. In both case studies, there were rules to protect the foundational element of participation; for 
example, as expressed through the MAC ‘hats off’ rule and through the openness rule of the Forum. 
Secondly, in each case representative mechanisms were active despite the first precept of direct 
participation. In marine governance theory and practice (the SES paradigm), this was implied through the 
focus on ‘stakeholders’ and ‘resource users’ as proxy for the ‘community’. Within the paradigm, the 
emphasis was heavily on the ‘local’, with ‘community’ defined by the ecosystem. The representative 
precept was more explicitly evident in the case studies through the rules and practices of membership. The 
MAC ‘community-at-large’ emerged as the informal mechanism through which individuals known to the 
MAC network were appointed as representing the ‘community’ (as local). Further, in both the MAC and the 
Forum, membership comprised an unexplained mix of non-aligned individual members who were to 
represent the ‘community’ (also ‘local’) and specific commercial and conservation stakeholders. In each 
case, the representative mechanisms in place conflicted with the intention for direct participation of citizens, 
i.e. the ‘community’. 
Thirdly, it was clear that in each study the representative mechanisms at play were not acknowledged as 
holding specifically political functions in their own right. Rather, they were informal and treated as pragmatic 
solutions to the problem of the participation of large and diverse communities of interest. In the SES 
paradigm, the uncritical substitution of the ‘stakeholder’ and ‘resource user’ for the ‘community’ reflected a 
similar sleight of hand resolution to large-scale participation as evident within participatory democracy 
theory. My analysis of the institutional rules and practices of both case studies showed slightly different 
responses to the tension triggered by the representative resolutions at play. In the case of the MAC, efforts 
to use the community values criteria device (CVC) as a substitute for actual community member dialogue 
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failed and people regarded the practice as meaningless. In the case of the Forum, members had greater 
awareness of the tensions between their aspirations for openness and direct participation and the 
challenges of actually facilitating the participation of a range of community members. Common to both was 
the inability to facilitate the participation of the ‘community’ and the lack of throughput legitimacy that 
resulted from unacknowledged but pragmatic representative resolutions to this problem. 
Finally, I would add that although the influence of the SES participation norm as identified in the literature 
was clearly present in the case studies, the influence was not direct. Nor was it apparent from this research 
how the norm ‘travelled’ from the literature to the applied context. Examining how the SES participation 
norm became activated in the applied context lies beyond the scope of this thesis, which sought rather to 
first establish what kind of participation norm was operating, if any. Nevertheless, relationship between the 
research and the practice is a potentially significant issue to understand, particularly because as I have 
shown in this case the influence of the norm has resulted in strong democratic processes. Beyond a level 
of agreement that social norms are a communicative act, however, the development and activation of 
norms remains a subject of debate within behaviour change literature (Biel and Thogersen 2007; Rimal and 
Lapinski 2015; Saurugger 2018) and so well beyond the scope of this project The findings here do show 
association between the marine governance literature and the applied context. The value provided here is 
in first understanding the norm and then examining how it influences assumptions, institutional rules and 
practices in the applied context as an initial step in addressing the institutional constraints to participatory 
practices. 
In summary, then, despite the differences in the particularities of each study (Chapters 4, 6 and 7) the 
conceptualisations of participation across each study had common elements: that participation should be 
direct and self-presentation is formally privileged over representative mechanisms, and that participation 
should reflect the ‘community’ defined as ‘local’. Moreover, a gap between this conceptualisation as guiding 
principles and the institutional practices that relied informally on representative mechanisms was present in 
each study. Together, the intention and the gap in each study reflected the features of participatory 
democracy theory I identified as significant for problematising participation: 
1) aspirations for direct self-presentation of all citizens, but – 
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2) a resort to representative mechanisms for facilitating citizen participation, but – 
3) without addressing the conditions for legitimacy of those representative mechanisms. 
What this also means is that in dealing with the intrinsic link between participation and representation, 
participation is formally privileged over representation as the aspiration and normative intention, and 
representative mechanisms are relegated to informal and necessary resolutions to facilitating participation, 
but the political functions and significance of representative processes are overlooked.  
The findings from the case studies have demonstrated that in participatory marine governance this effect is 
leading to anti-democratic processes in which community members and potential constituents or 
stakeholders are excluded rather than included in marine governance. Further, the conceptualisation of 
participation is reformulated through the SES paradigm to place the ecosystem at the centre of the polity, 
shifting the definition of who can participate from the citizen to the local community member and 
stakeholder, and shifting the reason why they can participate from agency within a political community 
focused on the distribution of common goods to the adaptation to ecosystem limits determined by SES 
science.  
These assumptions are shaping the theory and practice of marine governance. This means that marine 
governance theory and practice is likely to be vulnerable to the lack of legitimacy associated with 
overlooking the political function of representative mechanisms. This means that the productive potential of 
the SES paradigm and emerging forms governing the marine environment will fail to achieve the desired 
goals – effectively and fairly balancing multiple uses of the marine environment and adapting to ecosystem 
changes. If citizens, constituents and stakeholders withdraw or are excluded from marine governance, as I 
have shown is highly likely, the opportunities for developing new social forms and social-ecological polities 
that function in better balance within a changing marine social-ecological system will be lost. 
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What can political theory help explain about the limits of 
participatory approaches to marine governance? 
The second question guiding this research was a turn to political representation theory as a means to 
problematise of participation theory and practice in marine governance. To guide this part of the research I 
posed the second overarching research question with sub-questions to guide each study as follows: 
 (2) What can political theory help explain about the limits of participatory approaches to marine 
governance? 
(2a) What conceptual lens from political theory can assist in the problematisation of ‘participation’ in 
marine governance? (Chapter 3) 
(2b) What does application of the conceptual lens explain, if anything, about the dominant 
conceptualisation of participation in the marine governance literature? (Chapter 4)  
(2c) What does application of the conceptual lens explain, if anything, about the dominant 
conceptualisation of participation in the applied context? (Chapter 6 and 7). 
I have mapped the summary findings for this group of questions in the matrix in Table 19 below. To do this, 
I placed the conditions that comprise the lens - authorisation, dissent and exit, and accountability – in the 
left-hand column (see Chapter 3). For the purposes of this synthesis, I have formulated these as normative 
statements that must be met for representative relationships to be regarded as democratically legitimate as 
discussed in Chapter 3 (pg.69). I then mapped the findings from each of the marine governance studies 
(Chapters 4, 6 and 7) against these normative statements. As with the synthesis in the previous section, I 
generated a text summary of specific empirical findings for each element of the matrix to enable the 
comparison and analysis. As with the previous matrix, in (Table 19) a green mark signifies that the 
condition is present, an amber mark signifies some presence of the condition and some questions about 
what the presence means, and a red mark signifies absence of the condition. In this synthesis the 
prevalence of red marks across the matrix revealed that in most instances the conditions were not formally 
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addressed in a way that reflected the normative statement. This table stands in stark contract to Table 1, 
which was typified by green ticks.  
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Table 19: Synthesis of findings for research question: What does application of the conceptual lens explain, if anything, about the conceptualisation of participation in the marine governance 
literature and the applied context? 
Thinking about participation (Ch.3) 
 
 
Lens of participation–representation 
as normative democratic principles 
The norm of participation (Ch.4) 
 
 
Social-ecological systems paradigm 
Southwest Bay of Fundy Marine 
Advisory Committee (MAC) (Ch. 6) 
 
Integrated management of marine 
waterway 
West Coast Community Aquaculture 
Forum (Forum) (Ch.7) 
 
Hybrid governance of salmon 
aquaculture  
 
Authorisation 
Permission given by those-to-be-
represented to those representing. 
This is the act of handing over 
agency (the political right to 
participation in the polity) to 
another and so is a power dynamic 
 Objective and purpose of 
governance is set by ecosystem limits 
Ecosystem limits are represented 
through ecosystem and biological 
sciences 
Not overtly addressed because taken 
care of by direct participation  
 Instigated by network of interested 
stakeholders and government officials 
Authorisation by government officials 
‘Hats off’ rule severed formal 
authorisation for professionals 
‘Community-at-large’ members 
represented ‘community’ but no 
engagement from ‘community’ on 
selection of ‘community-at-large’ 
members 
? Instigated from extensive community 
consultation (MRP) 
Community values criteria (CVC): a 
representative mechanism that 
symbolised community authorisation 
 but - Instigated by professional 
practitioner 
 
? Members revised the TOR to 
acknowledge the necessity of 
representative mechanisms and make 
the authorisation and participation 
process overt and accessible to 
community members 
Dissent and exit 
The right of those-to-be-represented 
to dispute or leave the terms of the 
representative relationship. This is 
 Dissension reformulated as conflict 
to be solved through social processes 
 Dissension and exit present Dissension and exit present 
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the guarantee of the citizen’s 
freedom, and so is a relationship of 
power. 
 BUT resulted in exclusion and 
disconnection from components of 
‘community’ or the polity 
Did not impact on the structure or 
assumptions (the norm) 
BUT resulted in exclusion and 
disconnection from components of 
‘community’ or the polity 
Did not impact on the structure or 
assumptions (the norm) 
Accountability 
The active engagement between 
those-to-be-represented and those 
representing that enables the 
representative to be held responsible 
for exercising the agency of the 
represented, and enables the 
represented to understand, consider 
and be part of the actions of the 
representative (in their name). 
? Not overtly addressed 
Inferred that this is addressed through 
direct participation and so assumed to 
be also direct (self-presentation and 
direct accountability to the citizen) 
 Passive through website and 
informal non-specified interactions with 
‘people in the community’ 
‘Hats off’ rule severed formal 
accountability for professionals 
‘Community-at-large’ members 
represented ‘community’ but no formal 
or substantial engagement between 
‘community’ and ‘community-at-large 
members’ 
No plan for broader community to 
engaged in the use of or outputs off the 
Community Values Criteria (CVC) 
 Passive through newsletters and 
informal non-specified interactions with 
‘people in the community’ 
? Members revised the TOR to 
acknowledge the necessity of 
representative mechanisms and make 
the authorisation and participation 
process overt and accessible to 
community members 
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The analysis showed that the authorisation and accountability conditions were closely linked and 
embedded in the principle of direct participation or self-presentation in governance arrangements. This is 
because the principle of self-presentation by definition implies the citizen’s self-authorisation and 
accountability is inherent in act of self-presentation and direct participation. In each case, the aspirational 
commitment to direct participation (the norm and Axiom 1) resulted in gaps in specifically addressing the 
process for authorisation. This in turn meant that active accountability was not addressed and assumed to 
be taken care of through direct participation. In each case, the source of authorisation was external and 
appeared to be a result of pragmatic response to the context. The source of authorisation within the SES 
paradigm was slightly different from the applied case studies, but nevertheless externally determined. In 
this case, participant legitimacy was derived from the SES science and the urgent call for behaviour 
adaptation to changing ecosystem conditions – a pragmatic and science-based response to authorisation. 
In both case studies the authorisation of members to represent the ‘community’ was effected by people 
already active in the governance initiative rather than those-to-be-represented, i.e. members of the 
‘community’. In neither case did the institutional rules and practices require authorisation to be tested 
transparently and overtly with the broader community. In both cases, members did show some 
awareness of the tension, as signalled by the amber mark. After three years of operation, for example, 
the Forum members tabled their uneasiness about this gap and sought to address it by revising the terms 
of reference. MAC members experimented with gathering authorisation through widespread consultation 
and generating the assessment tool they called the CVC. In each case, accountability was enacted 
passively, via website or post facto newsletter and more substantial forms of accountability identified by 
Pitkin were overlooked or assumed conceptually to be addressed via the precept of direct participation. 
This strongly suggests that the absence of authorisation rules and practices will result in minimal or 
passive accountability rules and practices. This is because where authorisation rules are absent, the 
constituency is not clear, and in turn, is it not clear to whom accountability is owed. 
The findings for the dissent and exit condition were also mixed because although overall they were not 
addressed directly in the rules of either case study initiative, the key instance in the MAC when the 
condition was tested suggested they were also absent in practice. The significant impact of dissent or exit 
from the implied or unacknowledged representative relationship on the fundamentals of an initiative 
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indicated that the connection between dissent and exit and the institutional rules and practices is a 
significant factor for throughput legitimacy. In the case of the SES paradigm, dissention and exit was not 
directly addressed, except in so far as conflict among stakeholders was constituted as a problem to be 
solved through participatory governance processes. As a principle, there were no institutional rules in 
either case study to formally address dissent and exit from the representative relationship. There are two 
factors here: firstly, the presence of representative mechanisms was not formally acknowledged in the 
institutional rules – on the contrary, openness and direct participation were privileged. Secondly, and 
closely related, is a link with the absence of authorisation discussed in the previous paragraph. Where no 
citizen (community) authorisation of representatives exists, logically and necessarily neither can formal 
opportunities to dissent from or exit from a representative relationship exist. In all cases, acts of dissent or 
exit in any form were treated as external problems rather than understood as central to the democratic 
legitimacy of the representative relationships or representative mechanisms in play. In practice, while 
dissension was present in both the case studies it resulted in exclusion of the dissenter from the 
governance process altogether. The stark and concerning example occurred within the MAC when the 
Chief of the First Nations was excluded from the initiative. The influence of the norm was so powerfully 
embedded in the institutional rules and practices that this significant exclusion was accepted as 
unfortunate but unresolvable. Here again, the interplay between the conditions is revealed as significant 
in shaping how throughput legitimacy is constituted through the institutional rules and practices. 
Overall, the results show that the conditions for democratic legitimacy are overlooked and poorly 
understood in marine governance, and this is due to the strength of the SES participation norm in both 
the theory and practice of marine governance. The SES participation norm shapes institutional rules and 
practices in ways that obscure the significance of the representative mechanisms that are inevitably in 
play wherever an effort is made to facilitate citizen or ‘community’ participation in marine governance. The 
absence of the conditions also strongly indicates that throughput legitimacy is compromised in 
participatory marine governance theory and practice. Moreover, the analysis has revealed the 
interdependence between the conditions. This means that it is important to analyse how the institutional 
rules and practices work together to deliver or undermine the three conditions, but it is also important to 
examine how the conditions themselves interact to constitute throughput legitimacy. If we were to 
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rephrase the research question and ask instead are the normative democratic principles of political 
agency present in emerging marine governance arrangements? the answer would be ‘no, not really’. In 
addressing the actual research question, I have demonstrated that the lens is useful for articulating the 
political principles implicit in the emerging SES theory of governance and is also useful in revealing the 
subtle but significant political implications of participatory practices in emerging forms of marine 
governance, as influenced by the SES norm of participation. 
Discussion 
In this section I discuss the patterns and threads identified through the synthesis of the findings from each 
study, above. In pulling these threads together, I have identified four interrelated overarching findings 
from the problematisation of participation I have conducted that explain limitations in participatory 
approaches to marine governance. 
Representation is always present but not overtly addressed in marine 
governance 
The first finding is that representative mechanisms or practices are embedded in participatory marine 
governance and how they are handled has an impact on the throughput legitimacy of marine governance 
arrangements. This is a corollary to the understanding I argued in Chapter 3, that participation and 
representation are always intrinsically linked and work together to facilitate political agency. Yet I have 
also shown that this insight disappears in participatory democracy theory (e.g. Dryzek 2006; Pateman 
1970) and is also lost under the axioms of the SES participation norm (Adger et al 2005; Folke et al 2005; 
Hughes et al 2005). I demonstrated that in marine governance, the political function of representative 
modes – the long chain of representation – was overshadowed by the strength of SES axiom that 
participation is ontological and must therefore necessarily comprise the direct participation ideals and 
aspirations. In both the marine governance literature and practice the representative mechanisms were 
informally and instrumentally adopted to resolve the practical challenges of facilitating the participation of 
the ‘community’ qua stakeholders in the marine governance initiatives. 
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In the content analysis of marine governance literature, this showed up as the presence of the term 
‘stakeholder’ being used interchangeably with ‘community’ (Berkes 2009; Cinner et al 2013; Gelcich et al 
2010; Gutierrez et al 2011). In the MAC case study, despite specific efforts to restrict representation 
through the ‘hats off’ rule, ‘community-at-large’ members informally represented the ‘community’ and the 
CVC represented the ‘community’ through criteria expressing the stakes and interests of the community. 
In the Forum, community members were held to speak for community interests alongside representatives 
of community interest groups. These effects reflect the participatory democracy precept of privileging 
direct participation as an aspiration and ideal over pragmatic but frequently overlooked representative 
mechanisms. These effects also indicate that ‘the community’ as a constituency, is difficult to represent 
even on a small scale. This finding reflects the problem of representation and groups discussed in 
Chapter 3 (pg. 61). It also reflects research into fisheries governance in which the claims of 
representatives to ‘speak’ for the broader community were found to be problematic (Griffin 2013). This 
problem contributes to the lack of throughput legitimacy because some groups – for example 
stakeholders – can be represented but representing other more amorphous groups – such as ‘the 
community’ – in democratically legitimate ways is not clear. Application of the lens, however, pointed to 
the role of material practices as interpretations of the institutional rules e.g. the CVC, or the ‘community-
at-large’ positions, in representing indefinable yet politically essential groups like ‘the community’.   
These empirical findings also demonstrated how representation is always present in otherwise apparently 
participatory practices. These empirical findings also demonstrated how the participatory efforts fail to 
deliver democratic throughput legitimacy where the representative practices are treated as instrumental 
or as apolitical ontological conditions of governance, as I have demonstrated they are in marine 
governance. This finding may seem uncomfortable in a context dominated by the SES participation norm, 
as I have shown marine governance is. However, it is significant for shedding new light on citizen 
disillusionment in emerging and ostensibly participatory forms of marine governance that are seeking to 
harness the adaptive potential of increased civil participation in marine governance (Adger et al 2005; 
Berkes 2009; Folke et al 2005; Jentoft 2007). 
The conclusion that I draw from this is that participatory marine governance will always and inevitably 
involve representative mechanisms. Regardless of whether participatory initiatives start with 
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representative mechanisms in place or not, they are bound to end up with them at some point. To some 
extent this is understood in the participatory governance literature, but it is primarily treated as an 
instrumental problem that must be lived with; for example, through pragmatic approaches to ‘stakeholder 
engagement ‘(e.g. Stringer et al 2006; Reed 2008). In SES governance literature dealing with scale and 
complexity, this understanding is implicitly rather than explicitly addressed; that is, that a ‘long chain of 
representation’ as I have termed it must reside within polycentric or nested governance structures (e.g. 
Armitage 2008; Marshall 2012). However, my research has shown that institutional rules and practices 
will influence the extent to which the representative mechanisms can produce throughput legitimacy and 
so must be addressed overtly as central to how participatory practices can deliver greater democratic 
outcomes. Pitkin positioned the link as a power dynamic and a fundamental democratic principle, and my 
research has shown that there is an important institutional dimension to this intrinsic link in the 
participatory context. This means that institutional rules and practices can determine the extent to which 
the balance between the participatory aspiration and representative practice could be regarded as 
democratically legitimate. This also means, then, that efforts that do take into account the intrinsic link 
between representation and participation in the design of institutional rules and practice can serve to 
strengthen connection with constituencies, and so also then increase the democratic throughput 
legitimacy of participatory practices. This conclusion is a useful contribution to governance practice 
because it enables governance actors in the democratic context to be alert to how representative 
mechanisms show up in governance arrangements. Understanding the intrinsic and political nature of the 
link can assist practitioners and research to avoid overlooking representative mechanisms or treating 
them as inconvenient but instrumental resolutions to managing larger-scale participation. Further, by 
introducing Pitkin’s normative theory that addresses the power dynamic between participatory intention 
and representative mechanisms, the finding contributes to the body of critical analysis of the SES 
framework (e.g. Armitage 2008; Chaffin et al 2014; Cote and Nightingale 2011; Epstein et al 2014; Griffin 
2013; MacKinnon and Derrickson 2013; Morrison et al 2017). 
In addition, I suggest this research also makes a contribution to the current retheorisation of political 
representation underway in the political theory literature (see Brito Vieira 2017a). In this work, the major 
theorists (e.g. Mansbridge 2018; Saward 2018) have begun to grapple with a normative approach to 
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political representation that makes sense of the political representation in the contemporary network 
society (see Introduction pg. 17 for a description of this).  In setting out the challenge for political 
representation theorists, Brito Vieira has identified the need for theoretical innovation in order for the 
concept and practices of political representation to remain relevant (2017a, pg. 9). Brito Vieira has also 
argued that to do so requires a return to and reengagement with Pitkin’s seminal theory, as I have done in 
this research (2017a, pg. 1). I propose that my own reengagement with Pitkin’s understanding of the 
intrinsic link between democratic participation and political representation has opened new ways of 
thinking about political agency and participation for the network governance context. Further, in 
operationalising Pitkin’s components of democratic legitimacy I have been able to bring this seminal 
democratic theory to bear on the social and political implications of the ‘turn’ to the social-ecological 
systems (SES) paradigm for thinking about climate change and social adaptation. While I have yet to fully 
explore the implications of this finding, I suggest that this research makes a useful empirical and 
theoretical contribution to understanding how political representation shows up institutionally under hybrid 
and network governance conditions and how the notion of the polity is potentially reformulated under SES 
conditions (see also Griffin 2013; Montanaro 2017). 
The dominant conceptualisation undermines democratic throughput 
legitimacy in participatory marine governance 
The effects of the SES conceptualisation of participation dominant in marine governance are to 
undermine the legitimacy of participatory approaches to governance. This second finding follows from the 
first: the SES participation norm reflects participatory democracy theory, and both carry into marine 
governance a failure to deal overtly with representative mechanisms. As I have shown, this failure 
undermines the democratic legitimacy of participatory efforts because it excludes constituents rather than 
facilitating their participation in the governance effort. 
In the case of the MAC, members sought to faithfully reflect the norms and practices of direct 
participation, but experienced representation in play. Its presence was not overtly recognised and made 
participation uneasy for ‘community-at-large ‘members. It also meant few MAC members were prepared 
to proceed to formal ‘community advice’ or perspectives because of the sense, which was difficult to 
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explain, that the CVC process lacked legitimacy. Similarly, professional formal representatives who were 
also MAC members experienced untenable tension in the face of the ‘hats off’ rule. These tensions 
rendered the participatory approach meaningless, created risks for the members and reduced the 
legitimacy of the process in the eyes of both the government partners and the community members. 
Within the Forum, members became sensitive to the representative characteristics of their hybrid 
governance process and had taken responsibility for the need to formalise it in their TOR review. In effect, 
they had transitioned from initial direct participatory principles and aspirations to accepting and working 
with the presence of representative functions. 
However, it is interesting to note that the hybrid structure of the Forum excised the ‘state’, the third actor 
in the governance triad, and the formal and legitimate representation of ‘public interest’ beyond the very 
local reach of the Forum (e.g. Armitage et al 2012; Jentoft 2007; Kooiman et al 2008). This step was 
implicated in adverse impacts for the ecosystem because of the lack of formal accountability within the 
Forum that is usually represented by the state (Adger et al 2005; Jentoft 2007; Folke et al 2005). This is 
an important point that I did not fully address in this research in order to maintain my research focus on 
participatory practices. Hybrid forms of SES governance between private and civil actors that move away 
from state-centric notions of network governance (e.g. Armitage et al 2012) continue to emerge (Vince 
and Haward 2017). Accordingly, I suggest cases like the Forum warrant further empirical and theoretical 
examination in the contexts where participatory ideals and aspirations are highly valued, and actors are 
seeking to innovate in how larger-scale SES are governed (e.g. see also Fleischman et al 2014; 
Patterson et al 2017). 
This second finding explains how it is that participatory processes in marine governance fail to deliver 
throughput legitimacy by pointing to the necessity of understanding the political characteristics of the 
intrinsic link between participation and representation. My research showed that in actual instances of 
participatory marine governance, representative mechanisms were present, were overshadowed by the 
aspiration for direct participation, and did lead to poor throughput legitimacy in the design and activity of 
each case study. Indeed, my empirical case studies suggested that in some cases institutional rules and 
practices may be specifically working against the link between representative and participatory 
mechanisms and in some cases severing the connection between so-called participatory initiatives and 
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the intended or potential constituencies. This effect reflects Griffin’s (2013) findings from her research into 
European fisheries governance, and also works directly in opposition to the aspirations of proponents of 
participatory governance (such as Fung 2006; Fischer 2017; Ansell and Gash 2008). The corollary to this 
finding, then, is that current participatory practices under the influence of the SES participation norm 
cannot meet demands for increased democratic participation (Urbinati 2015) nor address the new sites 
and modes of political agency of the networked society (Hajer and Wagenaar 2003). 
Urbinati (2015) and others (e.g. Disch 2011; Urbinati and Warren 2008; Runicman 2018) have voiced 
concerns about the limits of current forms of representation for the contemporary highly diverse and 
networked context. Research considering this problem is still developing (e.g. Nasstrom 2011; Schweber 
2016) and in some cases the empirical or institutional implications are not yet clear (e.g. Nasstrom 2011; 
Rehfeld 2017; Saward 2010; Schweber 2016). In participatory democracy theory, theorists and 
practitioners turn to representative mechanisms such as lottery or random sampling to solve the problem 
(e.g. Fung 2006) and more recently very local level participatory methods (e.g. Fishcer 2017). Here at 
least is experimentation with representative mechanisms, although as I argued in the Chapter 3 these 
experiments also largely struggle with throughput legitimacy in the normative terms I have adopted from 
Pitkin. More directly within SES research, some have asked questions of representation from a critical 
perspective (e.g. Epstein et al 2014; Griffin 2013; Lebel et al 2006), however, with the exception of Griffin 
(2013), the questions of representation are addressed from within the participatory frame. This means 
that practices and efforts under the influence of the SES participation norm cannot address neither 
existing throughput legitimacy limitations nor the demands for increased participation unless and until 
practitioners and researchers overtly address the normative political function of representative 
mechanisms. I suggest that addressing questions of representation within the contemporary networked 
context remains largely a developing area for at least marine governance theory and practice, and that 
the work I have conducted here provides a fresh perspective on how such critical research might 
proceed. 
The conclusion I draw from this is that addressing how representative mechanisms are embedded in and 
necessary to participatory practices is warranted, otherwise claims of participatory governance will remain 
misleading and will continue to undermine the democratic legitimacy of marine governance. Indeed, I 
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argue that participatory marine governance institutions that lack clarity about who is representing whom 
(or what), and how this representation is authorised and accounted for, will be unlikely to lead to 
successful marine governance outcomes. This position reflects and supports research into representation 
and agency in other contexts (e.g. Smith et al 2005; Klijn and Skelcher 2007), and Griffin’s analysis of 
fisheries governance (2013). Overlooking the political significance of representative mechanisms and 
relying on the aspirational privilege of direct participation will continue to undermine participatory 
governance and will factor in disillusionment and failure of so-called participatory processes. 
Representative mechanisms clearly should not be treated as only pragmatic or instrumental resolutions to 
the problem of direct participation as is currently the case. On the other hand, if marine governance 
actors are overt in addressing the inevitable presence of representative mechanisms within participatory 
practices, the potential of SES adaptive marine governance research and practice will be strengthened. 
Addressing the presence of representative mechanisms will involve ensuring institutional rules and 
processes create and foster the conditions in which existing or potential constituencies can: authorise 
their representation; exercise dissent and exit in ways that influence the governance process and 
influence their representation; and experience active accountability in the representative relationship. The 
conditions do not specify how these must take place, only that they must.  This position challenges Axiom 
1 of the SES paradigm because even if participation is an ontological condition, it nevertheless relies on 
representative mechanisms. Furthermore, this being the case, exclusion is always a risk in participatory 
forms, and so democratic legitimacy is always at risk unless the conditions – authorisation, dissent and 
exit, and accountability - are present and active. Although these findings challenge axiom 1 of the SES 
paradigm, taking them into account will nevertheless strengthen the research and practice in generating 
adaptive marine governance arrangements by re-politicising people’s participation, and so also move 
towards reducing the likelihood of disillusionment with the promise of participation. 
The conceptual lens of participation–representation is robust and useful 
for institutional analysis and design  
The lens of participation–representation is a conceptually robust and also practical normative tool for 
examining the extent to which throughput legitimacy can be said to be present in participatory institutions. 
In applying the lens to the forms of representation active in the case studies I have been able to bring 
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fresh insight to the limits of the precepts of participatory democracy theory and the SES participation 
norm in marine governance. Specifically, I have used the conditions which comprise the lens to examine 
and explain how representative mechanisms show up in participatory theory and practice in marine 
governance, and how this contributes to democratic throughput legitimacy. The absence of these 
conditions explains a significant limitation in current participatory practice, but also provides a pathway 
forward for addressing the problem. Furthermore, using the lens, I found the interplay between the 
conditions, or more precisely the interplay between the institutional rules and practices through which the 
conditions are activated, to be essential in understanding throughput legitimacy in the participatory 
context. These are new insights into how representative mechanisms operate in contemporary network 
and participatory context as described in my Introduction (see also Hajer and Wagenaar 2003), in this 
case marine governance. 
In applying the lens to each study, I identified a number of interesting findings specifically with respect to 
the conditions under the SES participation norm. Firstly, I found that the process or actor that authorised 
legitimate participation lay outside the proposed constituency: in the SES paradigm it was implicit in the 
social-ecological systems framing of the purpose of the polity; in the MAC the authorising process lay with 
the government actors; in the Forum it lay initially with the professional practitioner and later in the hands 
of self-appointed community representatives. Despite these different authorisation processes, they were 
all externally located i.e. away from the constituency and had negative flow-on effects for both exit and 
dissent, and accountability, and so also in turn for the democratic legitimacy of each case. 
I established that the dissent and exit condition is fundamental to safeguarding personal freedom but is 
conceptually absent in the SES participation norm because of axiom 1 that participation is ontological.  
Pitkin (1967) explains that without the ability to disagree with the representative’s actions or decisions 
(dissent), or the contract of the representative relationship (exit), the representative relationship has a 
high risk of coercion for the citizen. Coercion undermines the capacity of the representative relationship to 
facilitate the group’s or person’s political agency and so in turn, agency can only be said to have been 
experienced if those-to-be-represented are free from coercion. In the electoral mode, dissent and exit are 
exercised post facto at the ballot box. It is less clear how dissent and exit show up in so-called 
participatory or other forms of governance. Following Pitkin’s insight and reflecting on the experience of 
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the Peskotomuhkati Chief (see Chapter 6), my work has shown that the capacity to dissent from and exit 
representative relationships and/or institutions must be clear to the constituents and must have influence 
over relationships and/or institutions. 
Without citizen influence over the ‘what, where, how, when and why’ of the governance process, it is 
difficult to argue that participation has been meaningful or democratically legitimate. It was clear that the 
Chief exercised agency through his dissent, but the result was exclusion and exit rather than progress 
towards more legitimate community-based marine governance. How meaningful, then, was the Chief’s 
agency in this situation? 
Closely associated with problem of exclusion in the case study, I also found that under the influence of 
the SES participation norm there is little space for dissent and exit as an expression of democratic agency 
and as a characteristic of democratic legitimacy. Under the SES participatory paradigm, however, 
conflicts and differences are conceptualised as distracting conditions. Conflict is a problem that must be 
solved through social processes such as negotiation and social learning to produce new aligned 
assumptions and positions towards the objective of adapting to changing marine conditions. Interestingly, 
my case study findings suggested allowable dissent lay within the institutional rules on purpose and 
scope as expressed in, for example, the MAC consensus rule to record differing views of a specific policy. 
Dissent that sought to affect the institutional rules, as in the Chief’s case revisited above, was disallowed. 
This was because it was regarded as disruptive to the SES axiom that direct participation will and should 
build social capital and trust. I propose the effect of this paradigmatic conceptualisation of dissent (and 
exit) insulates governance processes from genuinely dissenting inputs as options for institutional change, 
and in particular change that strengthens the democratic legitimacy of governance processes. While 
these points regarding dissent and exit primarily extend from a single instance in one case study and 
absence in the other, they are likely to hold also for situations like this. Although a single instance, it is 
nevertheless a significant one when considering Indigenous nations’ relationships with institutions and 
processes that seek to govern traditionally owned lands or waters. 
Taking these findings across the four studies together, I suggest then that where authorisation is 
externally located, accountability becomes subsumed as a function of direct participation and does not 
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need to be addressed beyond passive post facto information provision. When this happens, the direct 
participation ceases to be democratically legitimate. I also suggest that the interplay between the 
authorisation and dissent and exit conditions is important but very complex and requires further 
investigation. This is a tentative but somewhat unsurprising finding given the understanding that 
conceptually the three conditions must work together to produce political agency. Future research that 
examines the institutional forms and practices of the dissent and exit conditions is warranted, and 
theories of reflexive and pluralist governance (e.g. Meadowcroft 2007; Patterson et al 2017; Stirling 2016; 
Voß and Bornemann 2011) together with Michael Saward’s performative representation theory (2010) 
may be fruitful ways forward for understanding institutional forms of this complex condition better. 
The conclusion I draw from this third finding is that the participation–representation lens, comprising the 
three interrelated conditions, is a analytically powerful and accessible approach to analysing how 
participatory and representative mechanisms are linked in governance processes. Further, application of 
the lens is useful in revealing and examining the interplay between the institutional elements that is 
instrumental in producing the presence or absence of the legitimacy conditions. I have demonstrated that 
the lens is useful in drawing attention to the interplay between the key elements of an initiative: 
participants’ assumptions, values and intentions; the articulated purposes of an initiative; the institutional 
rules codified in key governance documents; and the practices and activities performed as the practical 
expression of these elements. It is the interplay among these elements that results in the presence or 
absence of the conditions and so also then democratic legitimacy of an initiative. It is the interplay among 
the elements, then, that warrants attention in designing, evaluating or refreshing institutional governance 
arrangements. Application of the lens in these ways is therefore likely to be useful in designing and 
testing governance arrangements that seek to incorporate diverse forms of representation that are 
relevant to the network context. If actors use the lens in designing, implementing or reviewing governance 
arrangements, they will, for example, be able to examine how different representative mechanisms work 
for facilitating the participation of different constituencies. In more specifically SES terms, application of 
the lens will assist researchers and practitioners to expand the focus of ‘social’ processes to include the 
more specifically political functions of institutional forms of participation and throughput legitimacy.  
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I identified a key limitation to the conceptual foundations of the lens in Chapter 3, that the lens is derived 
from foundations that do not directly address contemporary theories of power (see Chapter 3, pg. 51). I 
deployed Pitkin’s core principles in combination with insights from Saward’s performative theory of 
representation as an heuristic to examine the empirical usefulness of the lens. While the lens has proved 
useful, I suggest that the conceptual lens would benefit from future conceptual and empirical work that 
introduces and tests the capacity to analyse power relations using the lens beyond the institutional 
context. As such, I suggest that experimentation and innovations in hybrid and other forms of marine 
governance using the lens will retain clearly articulated democratic principles at the core and enable 
practical consideration of throughput legitimacy. On this basis, I suggest that ‘experiments’ and 
innovations in participatory governance supported through an applied action research-style methodology 
would be a useful direction for further research to extend and strengthen the democratic legitimacy of 
marine governance. Further, I would argue that doing so is particularly important as marine nations face 
changing marine ecosystems and increasing ‘blue economy’ industrialisation of the marine ‘estates’ (e.g. 
Choi 2017; Pauli 2010; Silver et al 2015; Winder and Le Heron 2017) in the context of increasing 
demands for citizen involvement in policy processes and decreasing citizen trust in existing governance 
processes. Although in this research I retained a focus on subnational governance, these findings are 
likely to be salient for international and cross-national governance, in which the problems of how to 
structure institutional ‘architectures’ for equitable just and effective ecosystems governance remain 
current (e.g. Biermann et al 2010; Patterson et al 2017). 
The SES paradigm lacks a coherent articulated underpinning political 
theory 
My fourth finding is that although the SES paradigm is a compelling approach to the challenges of 
adaptation ahead, a coherent underpinning political theory has yet to be articulated. This is important 
because the SES norm of participation uncritically reflects the precepts of participatory democracy theory 
and practice, and that lack of recognition results in important limits to the participatory approaches to 
marine governance. Indeed, it results in anti-democratic practices and processes in marine governance 
discourse and practice (see Chapter 4). The implied claim to greater democratic legitimacy via direct 
‘community’ participation within the SES participation norm and its subsequent failure was a factor in both 
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my case studies. Despite strong foundations in community engagement and clear assumptions about 
direct participation as critical to effective marine governance, in both the MAC and the Forum the rules 
and practices shut people out. In both cases, direct participation in the innovative governance 
arrangements was assumed ex ante to improve the throughput legitimacy of marine governance, and in 
both cases it failed. I have shown that both cases foundered on a failure of throughput legitimacy because 
the axioms of the SES participation norm provided no guidance, language or tools for taking account of 
the institutional and political implications of how participation can be facilitated. 
As I demonstrated in Chapter 4, the primary driver for governance under the SES paradigm is human 
adaptation to ecosystem limits and changes (Adger et al 2005; Berkes 2009; Folke et al 2005). This 
contrasts with the primary driver of governance as a process of a democratic state, which would ensure 
the right of every citizen to have a say on the objectives of the polity and the allocation of the polity’s 
resources (Brito de Vieira and Runciman 2013), which may not necessarily result in adaptation to climate 
change effects as the agreed priority. The findings demonstrated that in the SES context, citizen or 
‘community’ participation is treated as a condition of how the world works, i.e. an ontological condition, 
rather than a political right under a democratic system that has institutional implications (as examined in 
Chapter 4). I labelled this Axiom 1 of the SES participation norm (see Chapter 4). My research findings 
indicate that the implications of this axiom for marine governance processes and practices are significant. 
It became evident in my research that without a clear theoretical underpinning, such as provided by the 
lens of participation–representation, policy and community actors engaging in participatory marine 
governance are inadvertently producing anti-democratic processes. This leads me to conclude that if the 
implicit SES political theorisation that sits behind participatory practices remains unarticulated, marine 
governance measures based on the SES paradigm are likely to continue to produce the anti-democratic 
effect of excluding people rather than including people in decision-making.  
From here, I then also find that it is important to examine the implications of the assumptions and axioms 
of the paradigm for institutional design and democratic legitimacy. To do this would be to build on existing 
work critically analysing the SES paradigm (e.g. Cote and Nightingale 2012; Epstein et al 2014; Fabinyi et 
al 2014; Patterson et al 2017; Smith and Jentoft 2017) and contribute specifically to strengthening the 
democratic legitimacy of marine governance processes. To do so would also build on the SES 
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governance research that has sought to address the problems of governing larger-scale ecosystems (e.g. 
Armitage 2012; Biermann et al 2010; Chaffin et al 2014; Marshall 2008). The conceptual frame and 
approach I have presented in this thesis contributes a specific focus on the challenges of governing 
larger-scale and diverse polities, i.e. political communities within the SES framework, and introduces 
fresh ways to examine problems of representation, complex governance and plural political communities 
(e.g. Patterson et al 2017; Stirling 2016). Given the widespread influence of the SES paradigm (e.g. 
Armitage et al 2012), this work is likely to also have relevance for other resource policy areas. I have 
shown through my research that the application of the lens of participation–representation is a useful 
place to start this process, but there is more work to be done. 
Understanding constituent perspectives 
Lastly, I raise a new question for future research to consider that in my mind follows from the institutional 
focus I have maintained in this research: how do potential constituents negotiate, experience and assess 
the participation–representation relationship? In this research, I have focused on the institutional design, 
the rules and practices, that shaped the participation–representation link, and have focused on the 
intentions and experiences of the people involved in the design and practices. Clearly, though, 
participatory governance is also about the experience of an intended constituency, however a 
constituency might be defined (Saward 2010). The conditions that comprise the lens of participation–
representation, authorisation, dissent and exit, and accountability, are equally a matter for those-to-
represented as they are for those who represent (Saward 2010). Examining the perceptions and 
experiences of those-to-be-represented was outside the scope of this project. My purpose was to 
examine institutional arrangements (rules, norms, processes and actions) and experiences of 
participants-as-representatives of those institutional arrangements. From my research, I have been able 
to progress an understanding of how institutional arrangements shape the balance between participation 
as representation. 
Understanding how potential constituents (those-to-be-represented) experience institutional 
arrangements that seek to facilitate their political participation is a necessary step in extending the theory 
and practice of network and hybrid governance (e.g. Severs 2010; Waters 2018). Saward’s (2010) 
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performative theory of representation introduces a conceptualisation of those-to-be-represented as 
‘audiences’ to political processes of representative claim-making. Saward’s ((2010) approach is built on 
the understanding of representing as a dynamic process and relationship rather than an institutional 
process. While Saward (2010) has attended to how representative claim-making happens, the question of 
how ‘audiencing’ happens and the responsiveness component of representation are questions still to be 
fully explored (e.g. Saward 2010, Severs 2010). How do people negotiate representative claim-making 
and what do they regard as political participation in the context of a myriad of sites for representative 
claim-making, given the changing political technologies and network practices – how do they ‘audience’? I 
suggest that further research examining constituents’ ‘audiencing’ practices using the lens of 
participation–representation would further extend our understanding of how governance processes can 
better reflect or animate democratic principles of participation through representation. 
Summary 
In problematising participation in this research, I have been able to examine how the conceptualisation of 
the influential SES norm of participation has produced limits in the democratic legitimacy of participatory 
practices in marine governance. My research points to a simple yet significant observation: poorly 
designed governance institutions will fail the democratic legitimacy test if they are based on a lack of 
attention to the intrinsic link between democratic participation as a right and representative mechanisms 
as necessary for political participation - even if driven by well-intentioned aspirations for democratic 
participation. On the other hand, the democratic legitimacy of governance institutions could be 
strengthened by applying the lens of participation–representation and working thoughtfully with the 
interplay among the rules and practices of authorisation, dissent and exit, and accountability. Given the 
diversity of practices in marine governance, there will likely be exceptions to my findings. However, the 
combination of methods I have used in this research – bringing together analysis of the marine 
governance field with fine-grained rich analysis of case studies – demonstrates that this problem of the 
participation norm, institutional design and democratic legitimacy warrants inquiry. I have produced and 
tested a robust and practical tool for institutional design that can assist practitioners and researchers to 
extend and strengthen how we design and practise marine governance for the democratic context. As 
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such, this research makes a novel contribution to addressing citizen disillusionment in marine governance 
processes. 
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Conclusion 
In this thesis, I have been concerned with the institutional analysis of marine governance in the 
democratic context. The purpose was to problematise the norm and practices of participation to shed new 
light on the current limits of marine governance, and to extend participatory governance theory and 
practice. These purposes were a response to the marine governance literature indicating the theoretical 
underpinnings of marine governance would benefit from further development, and my own previous 
research and experience indicating that political representation had something to do with failures of 
participatory processes. To problematise, i.e. to look differently at participation in governance, I set 
research objectives that enabled me to rethink assumptions about participatory governance practice 
(Chapters 3 and 4), then to explore any insights such re-conceptualisation yielded for the applied context 
(Chapters 6 and 7), and finally to synthesise the findings to generate new insights into participatory 
governance theory and practice (Chapter 8). This research design meant that I was able to bring together 
the ‘conceptual’ with the ‘applied’, and the ‘general’ with the ‘particular’. Through this work I have 
examined participation in marine governance, both in theory and in practice, in way that sheds light on the 
dominant norm of participation in marine governance: a way that will assist practitioners, researchers and 
citizens to improve the democratic legitimacy of marine governance processes. 
The institutions and practices of participation needed to be problematised because the largely settled 
assumption about the value of direct citizen participation in governance seemed to be leading to adverse 
outcomes. Further, recommendations arising from earlier empirical research have largely suggested that 
despite critiques of the failures and limitations, more direct participation has been posed as the solution to 
existing problems of direct participation. My research has been timely because the twin challenges of 
climate change impacts for marine ecosystems and rising citizen disaffection with existing democratic 
structures signals this is a time of significant change for human societies. Adapting to changing climate 
for example does not need to proceed through democratic structures and processes nor by adhering to 
democratic principles. If, however, polities – i.e. citizens and communities – continue to hold democratic 
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principles dear, then innovating in democratic structures and processes to adapt to the changes in marine 
ecosystems is imperative. 
Hannah Fenichel Pitkin’s 1967 seminal theory of representation pre-dated the contemporary network 
socio-political context, the participatory turn in policy and governance, and rapid, uncertain climate 
change. In this work, Pitkin focused on first principles of political participation, representation and 
democratic legitimacy and so provided a useful starting point for rethinking the norm of direct 
participation. Pitkin explained the intrinsic link between the foundational democratic principle of every 
citizen’s participation in the polity and the representative relationships necessary to facilitate that 
participation in a populous context. Moreover, Pitkin established normative criteria for assessing the 
democratic legitimacy of the link: authorisation, dissent and exit, and accountability. As part of my 
research, I formulated Pitkin’s understanding of the link and the criteria as a conceptual and analytic lens 
to see if Pitkin’s theory could be useful for institutional analysis in a network governance context. 
In this context, I found that Pitkin’s theory provided a useful framework, and the participation–
representation lens I formulated was also useful for examining democratic legitimacy in the contemporary 
applied context. I have concluded that the lens was useful precisely because it was built on the 
understanding that participatory principles are intrinsically linked to representative mechanisms. This 
means that the lens was not blind to the presence and political function of representative mechanisms. 
Because of this central assumption about the connection between participation and representation, 
application of the lens enabled me to identify that under the influence of the contemporary SES norm of 
participation, the political function of representative mechanisms often gets overlooked and that this 
conceptual blind spot in participatory initiatives undermines the throughput legitimacy of such efforts.  
Additionally, I found that the social-ecological systems (SES) paradigm is the dominant framing of marine 
governance theory and practice but as a paradigm does not offer a coherent articulated account of 
democratic principles, structures and practices. More pertinently to my research concerns, the SES 
paradigm does not account for citizen participation as a political right but rather implicitly constructs it as 
an essential strategy for adaptation to climate change and ecosystem limits. I contended, therefore, that 
this means the SES paradigm is blind to the intrinsic participation–representation link and assumptions 
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about direct participation overshadow and obscure the function of representative relationships and 
mechanisms in facilitating political agency. This means that under the influence of the SES paradigm, 
implicit assumptions about direct participation, practitioners, citizens and communities have been unable 
to address throughput or process legitimacy, leading to anti-democratic institutional arrangements. From 
this conceptual work, I found that participatory marine governance has a democratic throughput or 
process legitimacy problem in theory and in practice. This is not the whole story for the limits and 
challenges of participatory marine governance, but it does provide new insights into an important 
dimension, i.e. institutional legitimacy as a practice. 
On synthesising my findings, I have concluded that unfounded but nevertheless powerful normative 
assumptions about direct participation as the democratic ideal have shaped marine governance research 
and practice. These assumptions have resulted in institutions, processes and practices that lack 
democratic legitimacy, particularly throughput or process legitimacy. The conceptual tool I have 
generated in this research was effective in explaining how the norm undermines democratic legitimacy 
despite the implicit claim to increasing democratic legitimacy. There will always be exceptions to this 
finding as marine governance research and practice is a vast and diverse endeavour. My case study 
examination also was limited to marine governance in the mature English-speaking settler democracies of 
Australia and Canada. Nonetheless, my research has been rigorous because I conducted it as a carefully 
integrated qualitative social research study that brought together the general with the particular. I did this 
in two ways. Firstly, I synthesised my analysis of the broad field of marine governance through content 
analysis with my rich case study examination of the particular. Secondly, I tested strong conceptual 
underpinnings that I generated through the theorisation and content analysis, within the applied context of 
my case study analyses. This means that my findings are relevant for the particular context and also 
relevant more broadly for marine governance in democratic contexts. 
How then do we avoid this throughput legitimacy problem in marine governance in the future? Looking 
through the participation–representation lens proved a better way to think about the institutional design 
and practices of participatory governance than forging ahead under the influence of the norm that direct 
participation is a priori a more democratic approach than carefully considered representative relationships 
and mechanisms. My research has shown that the application of the participation–representation lens is 
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conceptually robust and a practical aid to reviewing and redesigning the institutional structures and 
practices of participatory governance. 
Civil participation in governance and public policy deliberation remains a powerful norm and democratic 
aspiration but to be effective and democratically legitimate, participation practices must continue to move 
from symbolic to substantive. My research has indicated the lens can be applied to guide positive 
amendments to participation in practice. However, there is no ‘one size fits all’ rule for improving 
participation practice. The broad body of research has been clear that governance is a multifaceted and 
complex process of power, institutions, actors and context and that particularities and context are 
significant influencing factors. Similarly, legitimacy is a complex judgement of input, throughput and 
output made by a range of actors drawing on an almost dizzying multiplicity of perspectives, interests, 
values and experiences. Further, marine social-ecological challenges are regarded as ‘wicked’ and 
complex in themselves. Nevertheless, as a social researcher I must heed the call to be practical rather 
than falling into the trap of simply pronouncing ‘it’s complex and it depends’. I suggest that the lens I have 
produced and tested changes governance and participation practice by clarifying an aspect of the 
complexity – that is institutional design and democratic legitimacy. Application of the lens can provide 
guidance to the necessarily diffused and often place or context specific needs and problems. If used by 
policy-makers, researchers, or other actors involved in influencing the design of governance processes, 
the lens can assist by drawing attention to the context-specific characteristics and requirements for the 
three conditions. The change in practice with respect to participation and governance, then, lies in the 
design and evaluation of community/civil involvement in ways that also involve citizens in the design 
process. If this lens is used as a normative guide for democratic institutional legitimacy, practitioners and 
citizens will be able to see beyond the participation norm of direct participation and mitigate the 
throughput legitimacy risk.   
My research has established a place to start improving institutional design and has also revealed that the 
interplay between the conditions, codified in institutional rules and practices, is complex and significant in 
influencing the legitimacy outcomes. This means that it is not possible to recommend specific rules or 
practices that address the conditions in all contexts, but that understanding the interplay better is 
important. Further research into how the interplay works and how it influences throughput legitimacy will 
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add important additional knowledge about the theory and practice of participatory governance. Such 
research can also extend our understanding of how to address the democratic legitimacy gap in social-
ecological systems governance. I have shown that the lens provides insight for institutional legitimacy and 
I suggest that it may also provide fertile ground for exploration of citizens perceptions of legitimacy. It has 
proved useful and relevant for marine governance situations in the Australian and Canadian contexts and 
is likely also to be useful and relevant in comparable parliamentary democracies with marine 
responsibilities. Future research into the relevance of the lens for democratic nations with different 
cultural contexts and institutions would be a fruitful contribution to marine governance more broadly. 
Moreover, the influence of the ‘participatory turn’ extends beyond marine governance to range of wicked 
policy areas and as such the lens is likely to have application for such policy areas influenced by the 
participation norm. Further research into the relevance of the lens for resource governance under the 
social-ecological systems paradigm, for example, would assist in developing the conceptual 
underpinnings and political theory implicit within the social-ecological systems paradigm. The lens may 
also have relevance for examining the democratic legitimacy and design of institutional structures and 
practices within other policy areas with well-established participatory practices, such as participatory 
budgeting and urban planning. 
Marine ecosystems are changing, and the predictions are that the changes will be significant and the 
effect uncertain and far reaching for people who live, work and recreate as part of marine social-
ecological systems. At the same time, advances in marine technologies have paved the way for 
increasing marine exploitation and industrialisation. Democracies, also, are changing, and citizen 
demands for greater agency, transparency and action to address power imbalances and non-legitimate 
institutions are undermining the people’s faith in democratic principles. This is a heady mix, a perfect 
storm even, that demands new forms of governance and greater accountability for the political principles 
at play in emerging forms of private, government and civil governance. In this research, I have focused on 
one element of this mix: throughput legitimacy of institutional design and practice in marine governance. I 
have explained how participatory practices appeared to result in exclusion rather than political 
participation. I have done this by applying a political theory of participation and representation to the 
theory and practices of marine governance. I have re-introduced normative criteria that work together to 
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explain how political agency is facilitated and how institutional legitimacy operates in marine governance; 
namely authorisation, dissent and exit, and accountability. I have critiqued the social-ecological systems 
paradigm that is dominating marine governance and explained how the gaps in the paradigm are 
inadvertently leading to anti-democratic governance practices. My research has made a useful 
contribution to marine governance theory that will enable policy actors, including citizens, address some 
of the shortcomings of current practice. I have also made a novel and conceptually sound contribution to 
the emerging theory of social-ecological systems governance that will enable all of us involved in marine 
governance to think about and experiment more soundly and overtly with democratic adaptation to a 
radically changing social, political, economic and ecological future. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Detailed methods and results for generating 
the purposive sample 
Search purpose and design 
The purposive sample of influential papers was derived from a large base corpus of academic papers that 
represented marine governance theory and practice.  Academic literature was chosen as the source of 
the base corpus because it represents both conceptual knowledge production (through theory making) 
and practice (through empirical research) (e.g. Ellegaard and Wallin 2015). I generated the purposive 
sample from within a large base corpus so it was a ‘normal sample’ and so plausibly reflect the body of 
papers on marine governance22 as they pertain to Australia and Canada, providing a second measure of 
comprehensiveness.  
I generated the purposive sample in two stages: Generating the base corpus; Deriving a purposive 
sample from within the base corpus. I describe both stages in the following sections.   
Stage 1: Generating the base corpus 
I generated a base corpus using the principles of systematic literature review i.e. that the search must be 
systematic, explicit, comprehensive and reproducible (Denyer and Tranfield 2009).  To do this I used a 
systematic approach to keyword searching – setting keywords derived from the core study concerns - and 
comparing results across two comprehensive literature databases: Web of Science and SCOPUS. Then 
refining the search to ensure alignment with my research scope and concerns (see Introduction, pg. 23). 
This strategy ensured the sample was both comprehensive and appropriately targeted. The details of the 
                                                     
22 As per the central limit theorem. 
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search terms and cleaning process provided below ensure the study meets the criteria for being explicit 
and reproducible. On this basis, the purposive sample and findings generated from analysing it can be 
regarded as reliable and relevant to late mode democracies similar to Australia and Canada.  
Firstly, I generated search terms that reflected the core concepts and purpose of the study. The search 
strategy, i.e. the alignment between the search terms and purpose of the study are set out in Table 20 
below.  
Table 20 Alignment between search strategy and the purpose of the study 
Relevant study 
concept 
Search terms Rationale 
Participatory 
governance 
Marine governance 
Coastal zone 
governance 
 
 
(1) ‘Marine OR coastal’ [and/or] 
‘governance’  
To ensure wide coverage of papers 
dealing with marine and coastal 
governance across any jurisdiction 
The term ‘governance’ captures a diverse 
range of processes and approaches to 
authorization, accountability, planning, 
decision-making, regulation and 
implementation. The term can also 
capture the cross-cutting aspects of 
marine commons policy areas and 
incorporates approaches that generally 
involve a range of actors including 
stakeholders, resource users and citizens. 
Policy areas as search term combined 
with [and/or]‘governance’ 
(2) marine protected area/s 
(3) marine spatial planning 
(4) marine renewable energy 
(5) aquaculture  
To capture papers that specifically deal 
with marine and/or coastal environments 
or ecosystems 
To exclude papers that did not directly 
deal with governance. 
Exclusions 
Limited to English language 
publications 
SCOPUS: Exclude bio-physical/hard sciences 
Web of Science: limited to Social 
Sciences Index   
To exclude papers that deal primarily 
biophysical topics, or other hard sciences 
topic and do not directly address policy 
and governance processes.  
 
Using the search terms from Table 20 I conducted an identical search in two indexing databases to 
ensure comprehensiveness of the search: SCOPUS and Web of Science (WoS).  SCOPUS was as used 
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it contains the largest number of journals (Li 2010), and Web of Science was used because it covers a 
long time-span and is well regarded for the quality of the indexing (Naukkarinen and Bragge 2016). The 
two databases therefore have slightly different strengths and weaknesses and using both ensured I had 
case a wide net for the literature search and minimised the chance of missing relevant papers.  
I conducted a set of trial searches which I had reviewed by a University of Tasmania librarian for search 
quality, and to ensure my search terms were robust, and the search was reproducible. As a result of this 
review, I added two exclusions: limiting the search to articles and reviews; and publications in English 
only.  I conducted the searches in September 2018, and ran a search for each search term separately i.e. 
5 searches in each database (10 in total): 
vi. ‘marine or coastal’ [and/or] ‘governance’;  
vii. ‘marine spatial planning’ [and/or] ‘governance’;  
viii. ‘marine protected areas’ [and/or] ‘governance’;  
ix. ‘marine renewable energy’ [and/or] ‘governance’; and, 
x. ‘aquaculture’ [and/or] ‘governance’.  
The Web of Science search was limited to the Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI). This function is not 
available in SCOPUS, and so as an alternative, limit criteria to exclude biophysical sciences were applied 
manually to each result list in SCOPUS.  
I then:  
• downloaded the results lists into Endnote software; 
• combined the 10 search lists into a single Endnote folder; 
• identified duplicates using the Endnote sort function; and 
• manually deleted duplicates.  
The result after combining and removing duplication was a raw corpus of 2829 journal articles.  
After trialling the methods for analysing this raw corpus I found three problems: two related to the size of 
the corpus, and one related to research scope. Firstly, the corpus was too large to reliably ‘clean’ the data 
i.e. removing papers that were not relevant to governance (see the following section for details of this). 
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Secondly, the corpus was too large for the computer software, Vosviewer to analyse and produce useful 
results with respect to the deductive approach I used to capture my research interests (see description in 
Coding and Analysis in Chapter 4, pg. 78). Thirdly, the initial raw corpus included material addressing a 
wide range of governance contexts from authoritarian, limited democracy to ‘development’ contexts of 
emerging democracies and so-called failed states. This material was not pertinent to my focus on later 
modern constitutional democracies (see Introduction, pg. 23).  
After consultation with Research Librarians about how to reliably limit the base corpus I added two search 
filters to align with my research scope (see Introduction, pg. 23, and Chapter 5, pg. 117) namely 
‘Australia’ and ‘Canada’. The result from this step was a base corpus of 724 journal articles, as laid out in 
Figure 8 below.  The different search capabilities of each database (described above) explains the 
difference results for each list as seen in Figure 8.  
Figure 8: Search steps for generating the data set 
Keyword search 
 
Combine 
 
Clean  
Filters applied to each search:  
• Limited to articles and 
reviews 
• SCOPUS - Exclude bio-
physical/hard sciences 
• WoS – limit to SSCI 
• Limit to English language 
• Limit to [Australia and/or 
Canada] 
• Articles and reviews only 
Download and combine 
search lists into Endnote 
 
Combine 5 SCOPUS lists:  
Result: 635 
Combine 5 WoS lists: 
Result: 441 
 
Result: 1076 
 
 
Remove duplication using 
Endnote 
PDF’s attached using 
Endnote 
Check abstracts for relevance 
 
Base corpus: 724 
(i) ‘Marine governance’ 
Results            
SCOPUS: 613          WoS: 435 
    
‘Marine protected area’ AND 
‘governance’ 
Results                
SCOPUS:  138         WoS: 177 
‘Marine spatial planning’ AND 
‘governance’ 
Results            
    
  
  
 
  290  
   
   
    
SCOPUS:  32        WoS: 22  
‘Marine renewable energy’ AND 
‘governance’ 
Results           
 SCOPUS:  7       WoS: 6 
    
‘Aquaculture AND ‘governance’ 
Results            
SCOPUS:  61        WoS: 60 
    
 
As well as removing duplicates from the corpus, I conducted a manual review of titles and abstracts to 
remove any papers that did not deal directly with marine governance. This took three forms: 
1. Papers that dealt with governance of other policy areas. For example, the following text from an 
abstract shows this paper dealt with disaster recovery governance not marine governance: 
“Post-disaster social recovery remains the least understood of the disaster phases despite 
increased risks of extreme events leading to disasters due to climate change. This paper 
contributes to advance this knowledge by focusing on the disaster recovery process of 
the Australian coastal town of Cardwell which was affected by category 4/5 Tropical 
Cyclone Yasi in 2011.”23 
2. Papers that dealt with the marine environment, but within which governance did not figure in a 
substantial way. For example, the following text from the abstract shows this paper was 
concerned with the technical aspects of monitoring in the high seas context and provides 
recommendations about technology transfer, but mentions marine governance only as an 
element of the paper: 
                                                     
23 Serrao-Neumann, S., Crick, F. & Low Choy, D. Nat Hazards (2018) 93: 1163. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11069-018-
3345-5 
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“This paper identifies ways that automatic identification system (AIS) data can inform MCS 
on the high seas and thereby enhance conservation and management of biodiversity 
beyond national jurisdictions. AIS data can be used to (i) identify gaps in governance to 
underpin the importance of a holistic scope for the new agreement; (ii) monitor area-based 
management tools; and (iii) increase the capacity of countries and RFMOs to manage via 
the technology transfer.”24  
3. Papers that dealt with technical, biophysical aspects of the marine ecology or marine science but 
not marine governance. For example, the following text from an abstract shows the paper was 
concerned with technical science related to salmon mortality, and while make the case for this 
research in the policy context did not directly deal with governance processes:   
“Scientific documentation that salmon lice impact the marine survival of salmon is robust. 
However, it is also evident that marine survival of salmon is strongly impacted by other 
factors, and that the effect of salmon lice is most likely an integral part of these other 
mortality factors. In this paper, our goal is to discuss and give advice on how managers 
and policy makers should handle this complexity, and to identify the greatest challenges 
in using scientific results to construct robust management rules.”25  
The result was corpus of 724 marine governance literature academic papers relevant to Australia and 
Canada.  
Stage 2 Generating the purposive sample of influential papers 
Following Garcia-Lillo et al 2017, and as described in Chapter 4 (pg. 76) I combined the results of an 
‘ancestor’ and ‘descendent’ analysis of the papers within the base corpus to generate the purposive 
                                                     
24 Dunn DC, Jablonicky C, Crespo GO, et al. 2018 Empowering high seas governance with satellite vessel tracking data. Fish Fish. 
19, pp. 729–739.  
25 Vollset, K.V., Dohoo, I., Karlsen, O., Halttunen, E., Kvamme, B.O., Finstad, B., Wennevik, V., Diserud, O. H., Bateman, A., 
Friedland, K.D., Mahlum, S., Jørgensen, C., Qviller, L., Krkošek, M., Åtland, A., and Barlaup, B.T. 2018 Disentangling the role of sea 
lice on the marine survival of Atlantic salmon, ICES Journal of Marine Science, Volume 75, 1:1  pp. 50–60. 
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sample of influential papers. The details of how I conducted each of these analyses are described in this 
section.  
Results from the descendant analysis 
Citation data from corpus was used to identify which marine governance papers are likely to have highly 
influenced others in the set (and potentially beyond the set). Descendant analysis uses citation data to 
identify the influence of any paper on any other papers published after it (Van Eck and Waltman 2014).  
A limitation of citation counts is that this information does not necessarily take publication date into 
account in considering impact. A significant paper published in 2016 might show 5 citations, for example, 
and be regarded by citing authors as making a significant contribution to the research but be weighted as 
less impactful than a 2006 paper showing 10 citations. To address this, I used an averaged figure to 
compare papers and even comparison of influence. The citation data was exported from the indexing 
databases for the base corpus and the average citations per year per paper were calculated. The 
average citations per year for each paper in the set were plotted (see Figures 9 and 10 below) and the 
median for each identified.  
Figure 9: SCOPUS Citation analysis  
 
Figure 10: Web of Science citation analysis 
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Five papers from the SCOPUS set were above the median average citations per year of 38; and nine 
papers from the Web of Science set were above the median average citations per year of 15. These 
papers were compared, and duplications were removed with a final result of six papers as set out in Table 
21.  
Table 21: Descendent analysis - influencing papers from within the corpus 
Authors Title 
Adger et al 2005 Social-ecological resilience to coastal disasters 
Maes et al 2016 An indicator framework for assessing ecosystem services in support of the EU Biodiversity Strategy to 2020 
Defeo et al 2009 Threats to sandy beach ecosystems: A review 
Cinner et al 2016 Bright spots among the world's coral reefs 
Hughes et al 2005 New paradigms for supporting the resilience of marine ecosystems 
 
Results from the ancestor analysis 
Ancestor analysis refers to research clusters that have exerted intellectual influence across a body of 
literature. The clusters are generated from co-citation data extracted from a body of literature using a 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
1 17 33 49 65 81 97 11
3
12
9
14
5
16
1
17
7
19
3
20
9
22
5
24
1
25
7
27
3
28
9
30
5
32
1
33
7
35
3
36
9
38
5
40
1
41
7
43
3
44
9
Average citat ions per year 
n-441 range 0 to  29.86 median 15
  
  
 
  294  
   
   
    
statistical visualisation software. In this case I used Vosviewer26 software version 1.5.5 that has been 
designed to analyse co-citations statistics for a body of literature. Vosviewer software produces visual 
‘maps’ of the resulting clusters of researchers or papers bound by conceptual commonality or links (Van 
Eck et al 2013). Here I encountered a limitation with the Vosviewer software, that is that the software at 
the time (version 1.5.5, in August and September 2018) unable to process large data sets in the format 
exported through the data base. This meant I was able to only use the Web of Science data for this 
ancestor analysis (n = 441). I discussed alternatives with Vosviewer designer Van Eck but this problem 
could not be resolved (pers. comm.  Van Eck, August 2018). 
The results of the ancestor analysis are set out in Table 22 below.  
Table 22: Highly co-cited marine governance papers 
Paper details  
Ostrom, E., 1990. Governing the commons. Cambridge university press. 
Ostrom, E., 2009. A general framework for analyzing sustainability of social-ecological systems. Science, 
325(5939), pp.419-422. 
Gutiérrez, N.L., Hilborn, R. and Defeo, O., 2011. Leadership, social capital and incentives promote 
successful fisheries. Nature, 470(7334), p.386. 
Folke, C., Hahn, T., Olsson, P. and Norberg, J., 2005. Adaptive governance of social-ecological systems. 
Annu. Rev. Environ. Resour., 30, pp.441-473. 
Ostrom, E., 2007. A diagnostic approach for going beyond panaceas. Proceedings of the national Academy 
of sciences, 104(39), pp.15181-15187. 
Cinner, J.E., McClanahan, T.R., MacNeil, M.A., Graham, N.A., Daw, T.M., Mukminin, A., Feary, D.A., 
Rabearisoa, A.L., Wamukota, A., Jiddawi, N. and Campbell, S.J., 2012. Comanagement of coral reef 
social-ecological systems. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 109(14), pp.5219-5222. 
Dietz, T., Ostrom, E. and Stern, P.C., 2003. The struggle to govern the commons. science, 302(5652), 
pp.1907-1912. 
Gelcich, S., Hughes, T.P., Olsson, P., Folke, C., Defeo, O., Fernández, M., Foale, S., Gunderson, L.H., 
Rodríguez-Sickert, C., Scheffer, M. and Steneck, R.S., 2010. Navigating transformations in governance of 
Chilean marine coastal resources. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 107(39), pp.16794-
16799. 
Ostrom, E., 2005. Understanding institutional diversity (Vol. 241). Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Berkes, F., 2009. Evolution of co-management: role of knowledge generation, bridging organizations and 
social learning. Journal of environmental management, 90(5), pp.1692-1702. 
                                                     
26 http://www.vosviewer.com/ 
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Crowder, L.B., Osherenko, G., Young, O.R., Airamé, S., Norse, E.A., Baron, N., Day, J.C., Douvere, F., 
Ehler, C.N., Halpern, B.S. and Langdon, S.J., 2006. Resolving mismatches in US ocean governance. 
SCIENCE-NEW YORK THEN WASHINGTON-, 313(5787), p.617. 
Halpern, B.S., Walbridge, S., Selkoe, K.A., Kappel, C.V., Micheli, F., D'agrosa, C., Bruno, J.F., Casey, 
K.S., Ebert, C., Fox, H.E. and Fujita, R., 2008. A global map of human impact on marine ecosystems. 
Science, 319(5865), pp.948-952. 
Jackson, J.B., Kirby, M.X., Berger, W.H., Bjorndal, K.A., Botsford, L.W., Bourque, B.J., Bradbury, R.H., 
Cooke, R., Erlandson, J., Estes, J.A. and Hughes, T.P., 2001. Historical overfishing and the recent collapse 
of coastal ecosystems. science, 293(5530), pp.629-637. 
Christie, P., 2004. Marine protected areas as biological successes and social failures in Southeast Asia. In 
American Fisheries Society Symposium (Vol. 42, No. 42, pp. 155-164). 
 
Stage 3: Combining the descendent and ancestor analyses 
The results from both descendent and ancestor analyses were combined in an Excel spreadsheet and 
duplicates were removed. Each paper was reviewed again for relevance, that is, to ensure the content of 
the paper directly addressed governance (as per study design above) and seven papers were removed 
from the set:  
• Cinner et al 2016 was removed as this paper is a statistical analysis and comparison of the 
biological performance of coral reef systems and does not address governance implications of 
the comparison;  
• Crowder et al 2006 was removed as it deals with legislative fit rather than governance as a 
process 
• Defeo et al 2008 was removed as it dealt with a review of sandy beach ecosystems 
• Douvere 2008 was removed as it deals with the principle of marine spatial planning as a method 
rather than governance per se.  
• Halpern et al 2008 was removed as it deals with impact description rather than governance 
• Jackson et al 2001 was removed as it deals with primarily with ecosystem collapse 
• Maes et al 2016 was removed as this paper deals with an indicator framework for ecosystem 
services and, although potentially useful as a governance tool, the paper does not directly deal 
with governance. 
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In addition, Ostrom 1990 was removed as it is a book rather than a journal article.  The final list is set out 
in Table 23 below.  
 
 
 
 
Table 23: Results of combining descendent and ancestor analyses 
Author Year Title 
Adger W.N. et al  2005 Social-ecological resilience to coastal disasters 
Armitage, D.R. et al  2009 Adaptive co‐management for social–ecological complexity.  
Berkes, F.  2009 Evolution of co-management: role of knowledge generation, bridging organizations and social learning.  
Christie, P.  2004 Marine protected areas as biological successes and social failures in Southeast Asia. 
Cinner, J.E. 2012 Co-management of coral reef social-ecological systems 
Dietz, T. et al 2003 The struggle to govern the commons  
Folke, C. et al 2005 Adaptive governance of social-ecological systems.  
Gelcich, S. et al  2010 Navigating transformations in governance of Chilean marine coastal resources. 
Gutierrez, N.L. 2011 Leadership, social capital and incentives promote successful fisheries. 
Hughes T.P. et al  2005 New paradigms for supporting the resilience of marine ecosystems 
Jentoft, S.  2007 Limits of governability: Institutional implications for fisheries and coastal governance 
Jentoft, S. et al  2007 Marine protected areas: a governance system analysis. 
Ostrom, E. et al  2007 A diagnostic approach for going beyond panaceas.  
Ostrom, E. 2009 A general framework for analyzing sustainability of social-ecological systems. 
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Limitations 
The first limitation to this method is that the ancestor analysis was only able to be conducted using the 
Web of Science data set. The Web of Science set is still sufficiently large to indicate intellectual influence 
across marine governance theory and practice (relevant to Australia and Canada). It does mean however 
that the final purposive sample does potentially contain a bias toward descendent citations, i.e. it may not 
capture intellectual influence from outside the corpus as strongly as it reflects intellectual influence within 
the base corpus. Notwithstanding this, the Web of Science set is still large (n = 441) and so sufficient to 
indicate influence. To acknowledge this limitation, in the body of the study (Chapter 4) I refer to the 
papers in the purposive list as ‘highly influential’ to indicate that this is a limited though overall robust 
purposive sample.  
Reference list 
Denyer, D., and D. Tranfield. 2009. “Producing a Systematic Review.” In The Sage Handbook of 
Organizational Research Methods, edited by D. Buchanan and A. Bryman, 671–689. London: 
Sage. 
Ellegaard, O. and Wallin, J.A., 2015. The bibliometric analysis of scholarly production: How great is the 
impact?. Scientometrics, 105(3), pp.1809-1831. 
García-Lillo, F., Úbeda-García, M. and Marco-Lajara, B.. "The intellectual structure of human resource 
management research: A bibliometric study of the International Journal of Human Resource 
Management, 2000–2012." 2017 The International Journal of Human Resource Management 
28:13 pp.1786-1815. 
Van Eck, N.J. and Waltman, L., 2014. Visualizing bibliometric networks. In Measuring scholarly impact 
(pp. 285-320). Springer, Cham. 
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Appendix 2: Codes used to organise the close reading of 
the purposive sample 
In this step each paper was read separately to gain a coherent sense of the paper and understand the 
approach to participation.  I used codes to in Table 24 to organise the analyses.  
Table 24: Codes to guide the close reading of each paper in the purposive sample 
Code:  Description / rules 
Overarching focus of the paper  A summary of the paper abstract and the theoretical or conceptual 
orientation of the paper 
The problem to be solved Text that describes any gap in the research or problem from the applied 
context the paper seeks to address 
The recommendations A summary of the implications or proposed application of the findings.  
Reason for participation Text that describes why actor participation is required and what function 
the participation is held to serve, what problem or kind of problem the 
participation is held to address, or any other rationale for the participation 
Methods of participation Text that describes how participation should be conducted or facilitated 
including processes, activities that describe participation or proposed 
processes, activities or principles that would guide or deliver participation 
Problems with participation  Text that describes any limits, challenges, barriers to implementing or 
conducting participation or any other reason that participation is difficult, 
complex or unachievable 
Terms used for the range of 
actors 
Any term, word or label used to describe which actors should or are 
involved in any process as participants. 
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Appendix 3: Summary results from the close reading of 
the purposive sample 
In this Appendix I have laid out a summary of the close reading of each journal article in the purposive 
sample. For convenience I have organised these summaries using subheadings for the focus, problem of 
interest, recommendations (providing the broader context for the paper) and then also a summary of their 
individual approach to participation (reasons, problems, how and who). These latter four subheading also 
reflect the deductive codes used for thematically analysing conceptualisations of participation across the 
sample using NVIVO (see Appendix 4).    
Adger et al 2005 
Adger, W.Neil, Hughes, T., Folke, C., Carpenter, S. and Rockstrom, J. 2005 Social-Ecological Resilience 
to Coastal Disasters, Science, Vol.309, pp.1036-1039 
Overarching focus of the paper 
To address governance contexts and structures required to deal with disaster management. The 
proposition in this paper is that under ecosystem change unexpected shocks can be increasingly 
expected and that governance systems should reflect social-ecological properties to deal with disasters, 
and if they do will contribute to social-ecological system resilience. In particular they argue for a need to 
bring multiple levels of governance together to harness social capitals from across the levels of the social 
systems as the basis for regenerative capability – a social systems version of ecosystem regenerative 
capability and resilience.  
The problem to be solved 
To build social resilience and preparedness for extreme climatic events as an aspect of social-ecological 
systems resilience and adaptive capacity.  
The recommendations 
• Define resilience and disaster management at broader scales than just government or policy 
response and “actively managed and nurtured” (pg. 1039). 
• Generate diverse sources of ecosystem knowledge and translate these into governance systems. 
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• Develop multi-level social networks as the basis for development social capital and institutional 
governance frameworks (legal, political and financial). 
• Share management authority across multi-level social and governance networks.  
Reason for participation 
• To build and strengthen multi-level social networks and social capital as the basis for social 
system resilience and preparedness for extreme climatic events.  
Methods of participation 
• Collective action (unspecified) through responsive institutions 
• Social network self-mobilisation promoted by forma legal authorities (government) 
• Social learning and building social cohesion through unspecified institutional arrangements 
Problems with participation  
• None specified with participation methods 
• Developing strong leadership and new norms within management authorities to generate the 
network governance forms.  
Terms used for the range of actors 
• Communities 
• Civil society 
• Private corporations 
• Resource users 
• Management authorities. 
 
 
Armitage, D. et al 2009 
Armitage, D.R., Plummer, R., Berkes, F., Arthur, R.I., Charles, A.T., Davidson-Hunt, I.J., Diduck, A.P., 
Doubleday, N.C., Johnson, D.S., Marschke, M. and McConney, P., 2009. Adaptive co‐
  
  
 
  301  
   
   
    
management for social–ecological complexity. Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment, 7(2), 
pp.95-102.  
Overarching focus of the paper  
To introduce features of and requirements for adaptive co-management approach to governing social-
ecological systems (or social-ecological complexity).   
The problem to be solved 
Development of institutional arrangements through which trust can be built as the basis for addressing 
“multi-scale society-environment dilemmas” (pg. 95). 
The recommendations 
• Innovation in institutional arrangements that are built on social networks are necessary to 
address social-ecological complexity and change. 
•  Ten “conditions for success” (pg. 101) in implementing adaptive co-management subject to local 
conditions.  
• Management experiments that share risk and enable social learning and locally relevant 
governance strategies are essential to developing governance arrangements under adaptive co-
management. 
Reason for participation 
• The basis for generating social sources for adaptability to social-ecological changes and adaptive 
co-management 
• Trust building, institutional innovation and social learning 
Methods of participation 
• Collaborative processes  
• Group decision-making 
• Shared learning and social learning (experiential and experimental) 
• Knowledge co-generation 
• Deliberative processes 
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Problems with participation  
• Addressing conflict or competing interests 
• Divided management institutions do not enable participatory approaches 
Terms used for the range of actors 
• Stakeholders  
• First peoples /First nations 
• Individuals 
• Management institutions 
 
Berkes 2009 
Berkes, F., 2009. Evolution of co-management: role of knowledge generation, bridging organizations and 
social learning. Journal of Environmental Management, 90(5), pp.1692-1702 
Overarching focus of the paper  
Berkes addresses specific institutional arrangements and processes that are held to enable the 
governance of complex resources by bringing together multiple agencies and actors.  
The problem to be solved 
• Enabling adaptive problem solving and governance at larger scales 
The recommendations 
• By introducing processes and institutional arrangements for social learning and knowledge co-
generation, governance systems can transition from centralised to co-management and then to 
adaptive 
• Experimentation in governance arrangements is necessary to develop flexible, multi-level 
governance systems 
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Reason for participation 
• To bring together a range of relevant and necessary knoweldges (epistemologies) to address 
resource complexity 
• To generate social learning as the means for governance and systemic development toward 
adaptation, and towards more appropriate governance actions 
Methods of participation 
• Knowledge sharing and co-generation 
• Social learning  
• Bridging organisations as institutional structures to support knowledge sharing and social learning 
Problems with participation  
• Grappling with the potentially very large numbers of organisations required in systemic 
participation 
Terms used for the range of actors 
• Organisations 
• Stakeholder groups 
 
 
Christie 2004 
Christie, P. 2004 Marine Protected Areas as Biological Successes and Social Failures in Southeast Asia, 
American Fisheries Society Symposium, 42: 155-164 
Overarching focus of the paper 
This paper introduces the importance of social outcomes alongside biological outcomes for marine 
protected areas (MPA) as a management strategy. Christie’s approach has a normative dimension to it 
i.e. justice and equity and ensuring all community members share the economic benefits derived from the 
marine resources, as well as instrumental goal of improving the effectiveness of resource management 
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policies and strategies.  The paper is influenced by the empowerment position and methods of the 
development literature and the case study, Bunaken National Marine Park in Indonesia, indicates that 
Christie is strongly influenced by the development discipline.  
The problem to be solved 
Inadequate attention, in marine protected area policy, to the social conditions in which they are 
established and to the social impacts of the elements of the policy (e.g. no take).   The problem to be 
solved is the effectiveness of MPA as a policy strategy.  
The recommendations 
The social context, which for Christie includes livelihood, equity and power imbalances, must be taken 
into account and addressed through a management policies like MPA.  
Reason for participation 
• Increase effectiveness of management policy (in this case MPA).  
Methods of participation 
• Test ecosystem models and science (social learning)  
• In-person (face-to-face) communications (analytic deliberation, well-structured dialogue) 
• Social monitoring 
Problems with participation 
• None specified 
Range of actors 
• Resource users i.e. fishers 
• Policy actors (bureaucrats)  
• Scientists 
• Communities (mostly assumed to be dependent on marine resources for livelihood and so also 
stakeholders 
 
  
  
 
  305  
   
   
    
Defeo et al 2009 
Defeo, O., McLachlan, A., Schoeman, D.S., Schlacher, T.A., Dugan, J., Jones, A., Lastra, M. and Scapini, 
F., 2009. Threats to sandy beach ecosystems: a review. Estuarine, Coastal and Shelf Science, 
81(1), pp.1-12 
Overarching focus of the paper  
The paper presents an extensive collation of physical and ecological science on sandy beaches and 
review anthropogenic threats to sandy beach ecosystems. 
The problem to be solved 
Addressing a knowledge gap regarding sandy beach ecosystems as the basis for addressing 
anthropogenic threats to sandy beach ecosystems (“coastal squeeze” pg. 8). 
The recommendations 
• Addressing human threats to sandy beach ecosystems requires a paradigm shift to shared 
governance between formal legal management authorities and stakeholders 
Reason for participation 
• To effect behavior changes among people who live and work in sandy beach ecosystems and 
promote compliance with legislation 
Methods of participation 
• Involvement in planning and designing legislation for managing sandy beach systems and limiting 
human impacts 
Problems with participation 
• None specified 
Terms used for the range of actors 
• Stakeholders (unspecified) 
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Dietz et al 2003 
Dietz, T., Ostrom, E. and Stern, P.C. 2003 The Struggle to Govern the Commons, Science Vol. 302, 
pp.1907-1912 
Overarching focus of the paper  
Starting from Ostrom’s locally-based, community self-organising governance work, this paper makes the 
case for bringing civil society into the environmental governance frame, and draw attention to human 
impacts on resources, particularly economic forms (livelihood and market) and globalized human systems 
(market).  
The problem to be solved 
The gap between market and centralized government forms of governance. More particularly they identify 
that in complex interdependent human systems (particularly globalized market governance) the case for 
the delegation of authority, decision making, rule design or sanctions (as per Ostrom’s earlier work) is not 
clear, and the solutions are yet to be developed.  
The recommendations 
Key findings are “conditions” in complex, globally interdependent human systems that would benefit from 
future research:  
• Information: sufficient ecological science and the conversion into useable information for policy 
makers 
• Conflict: they argue for approaches, strategies and institutions that can convert conflict into 
learning opportunities. They suggest participatory policy making and participatory science as 
most likely to achieve this.   
• Compliance incentives and inducements: Noting that legal sanctions and monitoring is expensive 
and complex, they recommend a turn towards social processes 
• Infrastructure for governance: greater understanding of the technological, physical and 
institutional infrastructures that support governance is required. For the authors this includes 
experience, experimentation, a diversity of values and social capital 
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• Change preparedness: change is regarded as the new reality, and understanding how all manner 
of change (knowledge, science, climate, ecosystem) requires institutional diversity 
The key processes required according to this paper are analytic deliberation and institutional diversity. 
With respect to the latter, institutional structures should be dynamic i.e. new institutions, a variety of 
institutions and institutional redundancy should be encouraged rather than a push for institutional 
simplicity. They argue for a mix of governance types: market, government and civil society. The civil 
society components are built on social processes rather than legal rules.  
Reason for participation 
• Ensure compliance with regulation 
• Lower the cost of compliance behaviours (for all actors) 
• Convert conflict and difference into learning and change (about ecosystem dynamics and 
adapting behaviours accordingly) 
Methods of participation 
• Community based strategies as per Ostrom 
Problems with participation 
• None specified 
Terms used for the range of actors 
• Resource users i.e. fishers 
• Policy actors (bureaucrats)  
• Scientists 
• Stakeholders (Interested publics, NGOs) 
 
Folke 2005 
Folke, C. 2005 Social-Ecological Resilience to Coastal Disasters, Science, Vol.309, pp.1036-1039 
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Overarching focus of the paper 
This paper provides an examination of empirical cases of adaptation to abrupt ecosystem change and 
turbulence. In doing so, the authors consciously set out the foundations of the social aspects of the 
social-ecological system approach: that is the social processes that constitute how the world works (from 
within the SES paradigm), and so drive the imperative for multiple and diverse interconnected institutions 
of governance.  
The problem to be solved 
Social and ecological vulnerability, resilience and adaptative capacity are the core concerns of this paper, 
and so preparing social systems (societies) for abrupt, often unexpected, ecosystem changes, including 
the ecosystem services or resources derived by societies from the marine social-ecological systems 
becomes the problem to be solved.  
The paper also introduces a “window of opportunity” proposition, which poses crisis events, turbulence or 
abrupt change as opportunities for driving institutional, social, cultural and behaviourial changes. The 
window of opportunity proposition is further developed and examined empirically in Gelcich et al 2010. 
The recommendations 
This paper expands the notion of building the adaptive capacity of people and social systems, in ways 
that mirror ecological systems adaptive capacity, i.e. by working with and expanding diversity, flexibility, 
and dynamism. They propose that social learning, that is learning across, among and within the formal 
and informal networks that comprise social systems, as the primary social process that should be 
institutionally and in practice facilitated. Building the social system around social learning, they argue, in 
turn builds the “social resources” (social capital, thick social ties, and trust) that will enable a society to not 
only adapt to new circumstances but also rebuild from negative abrupt change (vulnerability). This review 
established four conditions for adaptive governance of social-ecological systems: 
• Learning to live with change and uncertainty (values and social memory) 
• Combining different types of knowledge for learning (social learning and social memory, 
incorporating ecology science for new behaviours and change)  
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• Creating opportunity for self-organisation toward social-ecological resilience (action, commitment, 
new behaviours and values emerge when people drive it themselves)  
• Nurturing sources of resilience for renewal and reorganization.  
Reason for participation 
• To identify and build the social resources of a social system to build resilience and adaptive 
capacity of the social system. 
Methods of participation 
• Social learning through group, networks and bridging organisations considering new information 
together  
• Expanding social networks, both formal (institutional) and informal 
• Self-organising.  
Problems with participation (or existing governance) 
• None specified 
Terms used for the range of actors 
• Any individual actors that impact upon or are dependent upon the marine ecosystem 
• Leaders that emerge from anywhere across the social system  
 
Gelcich  
Gelcich, S., Hughes, T.P., Olsson, P., Folke, C., Defeo, O., Fernández, M., Foale, S., Gunderson, L.H., 
Rodríguez-Sickert, C., Scheffer, M. and Steneck, R.S., 2010. Navigating transformations in 
governance of Chilean marine coastal resources. Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences, 107(39), pp.16 794-16 799. 
Overarching focus of the paper 
Provides a case study of conditions and phases that can facilitate transformation to governance regimes 
that are better equipped to deal with multiple human negative impacts on marine social-ecological 
systems.   
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The problem to be solved 
Existing and increasing human exploitation and uses of marine social-ecological systems is forcing 
greater declines and existing governance systems are not equipped to deal with the complex ways and 
reasons for exploitation.  
The recommendations 
• Shared recognition of the impacts and causes of overexploitation or resource change/crisis is a 
critical factor in governance transformation 
• Governance transformation occurs when new knowledge is generated among networks and when 
new knowledge is incorporated into governance systems  
• Leadership that connects new knowledge from social networks with management authorities is an 
enabling factor for governance transformation 
• Taking advantage of points of crisis or unexpected significant change for driving governance 
change is a further factor in governance transformation 
Reason for participation 
• To generate new knowledges, ideas, practices and behaviours that can address human overuse 
and exploitation of marine resources and marine social-ecological systems.  
Methods of participation 
• Communication networks 
• Shared research projects 
Problems with participation (or existing governance) 
• Requires shared recognition of a problem as basis for generating desire to address the problem 
Terms used for the range of actors 
• Scientists 
• Fishers  
• Management authorities 
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Gutierrez et al 2011 
Gutiérrez, N.L., Hilborn, R. and Defeo, O., 2011. Leadership, social capital and incentives promote 
successful fisheries. Nature, 470(7334), p. 386. 
Overarching focus of the paper  
Presentation of the results of an evaluation of 130 case studies of fisheries management strategies with a 
view to understanding enabling factors for effective fisheries.   
The problem to be solved 
Improving fisheries management to deal with fisheries overexploitation and the attendant risk to humans 
from fisheries failure.  
The recommendations 
• Strong community leadership in co-management arrangements is a key enabling factor 
• Building social capital through co-management arrangements leads to more effective fisheries 
management and governance 
• Co-management arrangements also need to be supported by incentives based management 
strategies for effective fisheries management 
• Co-managed protection areas 
Reason for participation 
• Build collective ownership, responsibility and knowledge among fishers with respect to resource 
conditions and the implications for fishing practices 
• Develop collective norms, trust and ongoing communication networks 
• Increase compliance to regulations  
Methods of participation 
• Formal co-management arrangements 
• Collective fishing rights (catch shares) 
• Communication networks 
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Problems with participation  
• Requires clear and legitimate community leadership founded on “collective interests not self-
benefits” (pg. 388) 
Terms used for the range of actors 
• Fishers 
• Resource users 
 
Hughes et al 2005 
Hughes, T., Bellwood, D.R., Folke, C., Steneck, R.S. and Wilson, J.W. 2005 New paradigms for 
supporting the resilience of marine ecosystems, Trends in Ecology and Evolution, 20:7, pp.380-
386 
Overarching focus of the paper  
Another important paper at the height of the expansion of the social-ecological systems paradigm. The 
paper is firmly based on ecosystem-based approach and on the research the suggests marine 
ecosystems are not only complex and significantly impacted upon by human activities and governance, 
but are also at the basis of social wellbeing.  
The problem to be solved 
The driving concern of this paper is ecosystem regime change, with negative consequences for social 
wellbeing, as the likely outcome of the multiple effects of climate change, increasing exploitation (driven 
by market governance) and lack of non-market governance regimes that deal with the complexities of the 
social-ecological systems ‘reality’. The paper critiques the existing market-based governance of marine 
resources i.e. demand, supply and distribution via markets and establish biodiversity as a critical indicator 
for assessing effectiveness of management or governance regimes.  
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The recommendations 
The paper introduces  interdisciplinary sciences as a requirement to progress the insights of ecology 
sciences and social-ecological systems theory, and the paper concludes with a simple and clear set of 
four attributes they argue are essential and define social-ecological systems:   
• embracing uncertainty and change  
• building knowledge and understanding of resource and ecosystem dynamics  
• management practices that measure interpret and respond to resource and ecosystem dynamics  
• flexible institutions and social networks in multi-level governance. 
Reason for participation 
• Increase effectiveness of sciences to inform ecosystem management  
Methods of participation 
• Interdisciplinary research 
Problems with participation  
• None specified 
Terms used for the range of actors 
• Resource managers 
• Scientists (marine ecologists, social scientists, economists) 
 
Jentoft 2007 
Jentoft, S. 2007 Limits of governability: Institutional implications for fisheries and coastal governance, 
Marine Policy, 31 pp. 360-370 
Overarching focus of the paper  
This paper is focused on the challenges of governance given SES paradigm. Jentoft here does not make 
the case for the SES paradigm, but rather assumes interconnectedness and interdependence, and 
vulnerability as conditions of SES.  Jentoft specifically introduce power to explain and describe the 
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complexity and dynamism and so also explain the limits to ‘governability’ i.e. the extent to which an SES 
can be effectively governed.  
The problem to be solved 
Designing effective governance systems for complex, diverse, dynamic and potentially vulnerable 
systems-to-be-governed, including by working with power dynamics and the associated political 
processes as an important subset of social processes that characterise SES. 
The recommendations 
Participation of resource-user groups and other stakeholders (defined by power and interests) is an 
essential aspect of an effective governance system. An unspecified actor, presumably either governance 
scholars or policy actors, should analyse power and interest dynamics, including the discursive and 
constructivist ways in which power and interests are generated, and ensure power balancing in the 
design of governance systems.  
Reason for participation 
• To ensure SES governance is fair and just 
• Because this is how the world is (i.e. already defined by multiple actions and perspectives 
through social processes) 
Methods of participation 
• Not specified in this paper 
Problems with participation  
• The political processes that are inherent to SES can result in power imbalances and so in turn 
reduce the governability of the SES “system-to-be-governed”. 
• He mentioned issues of representation but does not address these. 
Terms used for the range of actors  
• Stakeholders  
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Jentoft et al 2007 
Jentoft, S., van Son, T. and Bjorken, M. 2007 Marine Protected Areas: A Governance System Analysis, 
Human Ecology, 35:5, pp. 611-622 
Overarching focus of the paper  
 Application of interactive governance theory to marine protected areas as a policy case study.  The 
authors analyse MPA first as a governance system, then as a system-to-be governed, and in so doing, 
draw out the institutional implications for governance design under the SES conditions of diversity, 
dynamics, complexity. Berkes fourth condition, vulnerability/resilience is implied here also through the 
problem definition of ecosystem change.  
The problem to be solved 
Designing governance systems for SES (i.e. complexity, diversity and dynamic; also interdependency 
between ecological and social systems), and how to increase “governability” of SES i.e. the potential for 
an SES to be governed for sustainable use of resources.  
The recommendations 
Participation of user-groups and stakeholders (defined by power and interests) is designing, implementing 
rules and applying sanctions is a normative right, and instrumentally essential for ensuring equitable 
distribution of costs and benefits (of management system) and therefore increase the governability (and 
so in turn the protection of the ecosystem).  
Reason for participation 
• Increase governability 
• A normative right to ensure equitable distribution of costs and benefits of management system  
Methods of participation 
• Problem structuring; interaction planning; rule and sanction design; implementation (behavior 
change) monitoring and applying social sanctions.  
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Problems with participation  
• Subject to the flow of power, and without inclusion of less powerful actors with a stake or 
dependency on the ecosystem can lead to non-legitimate or unfair management regime, which 
will, in turn, reduce the governability of the “system-to-be governed” (social, ecological or social-
ecological) 
Terms used for the range of actors 
• Resource user-groups 
• Stakeholders (unspecified but defined by reference to power and interest analysis of policy 
actors) 
 
Ostrom 2007 
Ostrom, E. 2007 A diagnostic approach to for going beyond panaceas, PNAS, 104:39, pp. 15181-15187 
Overarching focus of the paper  
 In this paper, Ostrom provides a practical extension of the commons governance research agenda by 
reviewing the empirical research and synthesising what is known into a research framework to guide 
future, and improved, governance research and design.  Ostrom’s term for this is the diagnostic approach 
as suits the dynamic, complex and diverse characteristics of SES. In this paper Ostrom also expands the 
concept of nested variables dynamics to address the problem of multiple scales that characterize most 
SES.  
The problem to be solved 
Improving the nuance and systematization of research into governance of SES in order to improve actual 
governance of SES: “to recognize which combination of variables tends to lead to relatively sustainable 
and productive use of particular resource systems operating at specific spatial and temporal scales and 
which combination tends to lead to resource collapses and high costs for humanity.” (pg. 15181).  
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Ostrom also raises the problem of how to govern SES when the ideal conditions (social cohesion, 
relationships and social capital) are absent – this, she argues, is far more likely than the ideal conditions 
of earlier commons research.  
The recommendations 
The framework of variable influencing governance effectiveness and design ought to be used by policy 
and research actors to tailor governance institutions and processes to the specific conditions of each 
complex, dynamic, and diverse SES. The diagnostic approach is therefore an iterative approach to design 
and research that focuses on the social and ecological processes and resources that characterize each 
situation and furthermore avoids the trap of applying a blue-print approach (or panacea) to dealing with 
SES governance.  
Reason for participation 
• Increase social resources (trust, relationships shared norms, commitment) that will increase the 
effectiveness of SES management and governance 
Methods of participation 
• Not specified as a “blue-print” in this paper, but rather Ostrom provides a comprehensive table of 
variables for analysis that will assist in identifying which forms of participation and institutional 
structures will enable effective governance of specific SES. 
Problems with participation (or existing governance) 
• Ostrom’s primary concern is the negative consequences of applying a ‘simple’ set of rules about 
participation (based on the social resources/commons research) to complex, diverse and often 
multi-scalar SES.  
Terms used for the range of actors 
• Individuals 
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Ostrom 2009  
Ostrom, E., 2009. A general framework for analyzing sustainability of social-ecological systems. Science, 
325(5939), pp.419-422. 
Overarching focus of the paper  
Provides a framework for organising and bringing together the range of social-ecological systems 
sciences and research on the sustainability of ecosystems.  
The problem to be solved 
The diversity of social-ecological systems research including disciplinary diversity and the wide range of 
angles and questions addressed with respect to social-ecological systems has prohibited effective 
synthesis and the generation of clear directions and actions for addressing loss and collapse of 
ecosystems globally.  
The recommendations 
• Provides a multi-level and nested framework for analysing research outcomes that reflects social-
ecological systems complexity (comprising nested sub-systems nested multiple variables) 
• Institutional arrangements generated from using the framework must take into account social 
variables as well as ecological variables and also take into account the links between social and 
ecological variables 
Reason for participation 
• Connecting social actors results in stronger institutional arrangements focused on ecological 
sustainability 
• Building shared norms and behaviours is a basis for effective resource governance for 
sustainability 
Methods of participation 
• Collective choice rules 
  
  
 
  319  
   
   
    
• Otherwise not specified as this is not the purpose of the framework, rather Ostrom makes the 
point that forms of participation (institutional arrangements) must reflect the combination of 
variables relevant for the social-ecological system under analysis 
Problems with participation  
• Group size will affect costs of participation but must be analysed in the context of sustainability 
outcomes 
Terms used for the range of actors 
• Users 
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Appendix 4: Codebook for the deductive analysis of the 
purposive sample 
In this step I coded the body text of each paper from the purposive sample in NVIVO for MAC 10, and 
using the codes in Table 25.  
Table 25: Codebook for deductive analysis of the purposive sample 
Code Description/rule 
Text that describes or explains… 
WHY …reasons for participation in marine governance 
WHO …which actors are regarded as preferred, recommended or observed 
participants for marine governance 
This text may directly describe the actors and define the actor groups, or it 
may simple refer to actors. 
HOW …processes, activities or methods by which actors are preferred, 
recommended or observed to have participated in marine governance  
Problem to be solved by 
participation 
…any gap in the research, any problem or any opportunity from the applied 
context the paper or research seeks to address 
Limitations to participation …any limits, challenges, barriers to implementing or conducting participation 
or any other reason that participation was described by the authors as 
difficult, complex, unachievable or not successful in delivering the desired 
benefits, objectives, goals or other expected positive result 
Benefits from participation …any successes, benefits or evidence that participation has been instrumental 
in meeting goals or objectives or delivering any other outcome or output that 
is described as positive by the authors 
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Appendix 5: Explanation of my previous contact with the 
West Coast Community Aquaculture Forum 
In 2012 I was contracted by the salmonid aquaculture association to examine the social and economic 
impacts expected by residents from the proposed expansion of salmon farming in Macquarie Harbour as 
part of the environmental impact assessment for the proposed expansion. To do this, I generated a list of 
‘stakeholders’ i.e. people who were active in the local community and reflected the interests or values 
recognised in the Environmental Impact Statement (Tassal et al 2011). I then facilitated a set of 
community meetings and engagement events in 2012 and 2013 that enabled people in the Strahan 
community to voice their interests and concerns about the proposed expansion. On the back of this 
engagement and in the context of industry members exploring greater engagement with local 
communities, I was contracted again by the industry association to establish an ongoing forum with ‘the 
community’. People from the initial stakeholder list were invited to attend a community meeting to 
consider the idea of an ongoing forum (Minutes, February 2014), followed by a second meeting in which a 
purpose, structure and processes, or Terms of Reference (TOR, 2014) were generated (Minutes April 
2014). My role in these two meetings was to organise, facilitate and record meeting notes and the draft 
TOR. After these meetings (February and April 2014), I withdrew from the process. I had no further 
engagement with the Forum until I commenced this research in August 2018. 
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Appendix 6: Copy of the research information sheet and 
consent form 
Information Sheet for Interviewees 
Project Title: Understanding participant perspectives on political representation 
Introduction 
This research project is designed to examine the limits and constraints of stakeholder participation and political 
representation in integrated marine governance.   
The project team is Ms Maree Fudge, Prof Marcus Haward, Dr Emily, Ogier, Dr Karen Alexander, Dr Peat Leith and 
Assoc Prof Catriona MacLeod from the University of Tasmania.  
This research is in partial fulfilment of Ms Fudge’s PhD. Understanding the experiences of ‘real world’ participants in 
integrated marine governance processes is an essential part of Maree’s research.  
Why have I been invited to participate in this research? 
You have been identified as a person who has been involved integrated coastal governance as a researcher or 
policy maker.  
As such you would be a valuable contributor to understanding the limits and constraints of participatory governance 
processes and political representation.  
What does participation involve? 
Your participation would involve two parts:  
1. a semi-structured interview with Maree Fudge, the researcher, in 2018 and  
2. the option to participate in a review workshop in 2019 to consider the initial research findings.  
The interview will take approximately 30-60 minutes of your time, and will be used as a data to help me understand 
the experience of governance participation.   
The interview will cover the following areas:  
1. Extent, forms and reasons for your involvement, non-involvement or interest in integrated coastal 
governance 
2. Challenges, barriers, concerns and opportunities for community and stakeholder participation in planning 
and decision-making processes relevant to integrated coastal governance. 
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Are there any possible benefits or risks from participating? 
This research is focussed on understanding the limits and constraints of participatory governance processes and 
representation. 
This research will be used to improve the processes and activities within integrated marine governance, and for the 
purposes of Maree’s doctoral dissertation.  
There are no specific risks to participants in this study. Data will be de-identified and will attribute information to 
individual participants. There is a small risk that it may be possible to identify who has contributed the information on 
the basis of roles. In any use of these data, participants will not be identified unless permission to do so is obtained 
from the participant.    
Some questions about experiences of difficulties with representative and participative practices may contain 
information that is sensitive, and these data will remain de-identified (never attached to the participant details) and 
used in such a way as to ensure anonymity.  
You will have the opportunity to and review a copy of the transcript of your interview, which will be emailed to you so 
you can make any corrections. 
All participants involved in this research process are free to withdraw at any time until 30 March 2019. 
Ethics approval 
The University of Tasmania Social Sciences Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC) has approved this study. If 
you have concerns or complaints about the conduct of this study, you should contact the Executive Officer of the 
HREC (Tasmania) Network on +61 3 6226 7479 or email human.ethics@utas.edu.au.   
You will need to quote the project number:  H0016572  
 
Contact 
If you have any queries, I encourage you to contact me, Maree Fudge, via email, skype or phone:    
Email:  maree.fudge@utas.edu.au  
Skype: mareefudge 
Email: Marcus.Haward@utas.edu.au 
Phone: +61 3 6226 233 
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Thank you for taking the time to consider participating in this study.  
If you wish to participate, please sign the attached consent form.  
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CONSENT FORM 
Understanding participant perspectives on political representation 
 
1. I have read and understood the Information Sheet provided to me regarding the research project 
and the purposes of the interview. 
2. Any questions that I have about my participation in the research have been answered to my 
satisfaction. 
3. I understand that the interview will last between 30 and 60 minutes on the subject political 
representation and community and stakeholder participation in coastal governance. 
4. I understand that the interview will be recorded and transcribed. 
5. I understand that all research data will be securely stored on the University of Tasmania 
(Australia) premises for at least five years, and will be destroyed when no longer required. 
6. The nature and possible effects of my participation in this project have been explained to me. 
7. I understand that participation involves no foreseeable risks. 
8. I understand that the researchers will maintain confidentiality of my identity (unless indicated 
otherwise below) and that any information I supply to the researcher will be used for the purposes 
of the research. 
9. I understand that my answers to some questions about my perspectives on difficulties associated 
with stakeholder representation will remain de-identified, even if I agree that I can be identified in 
other parts of the research.   
10. I understand that although the information I supply to the researcher will be de-identified before it 
is used in research publications, there remains a slight risk that it may be possible to identify who 
has contributed the information. 
11. I agree that research data gathered from me for the study may be published provided that either I 
cannot be identified as a participant or I agree to be identified. 
 
 I agree that I can be identified   Yes  
 
      No 
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12. I agree to participate in this investigation and understand that I may withdraw at any time 
without any effect until 1 February 2019, and if I so wish, may request that any data I 
have supplied to date be withdrawn prior to 1 February 2019 from the research.  
Name of Participant: 
Signature: Date: 
 
Thank you. Please email this signed consent form to maree.fudge@utas.edu.au 
 
Statement by Investigator 
 
 The participant has received the Information Sheet where my details have been 
provided so participants have the opportunity to contact me prior to consenting to 
participate in this project. 
Name of investigator   
 
Signature of investigator     Date 
 
 
 
